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THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND THE ENGLISH
ERADICATION OF Q UI TAM LEGISLATION
J. RANDY BECK*
Congress amended the False Claims Act in 1986 to encourage qui tam
enforcement of the statute, which penalizes submission of false claims
to the federal government. A qui tam statute authorizes a private
citizen "informer" to file suit on behalf of the government for
collection of a statutory forfeiture. A successful informer receives a
share of the recovery. Qui tam enforcement came from England,
where it served for centuries as the principal means of enforcing a wide
range of statutes. England moved away from qui tam enforcement in
the 1800s and abolished it altogether in 1951. In this Article, Professor
Beck considers the recurring problems that beset English qui tam
enforcement, the widespread contempt for informers, and the reasons
for Parliament's eventual eradication of such legislation. He concludes
that qui tam statutes contain an inherent conflict of interest because
they afford informers a pecuniary interest that often conflicts with
public interests at stake in the litigation. Professor Beck argues that
this conflict explains the problems with English qui tam statutes and
analogous problems under the False Claims Act. He recommends
modifying the Act to preserve the benefits of qui tam enforcement while
increasing the role of disinterested public prosecutors in enforcement.
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 541
I. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES AND THE NATURE OF
Q ui TAM LEGISLATION ............................................................... 549
II. THE Q ui TAM PROVISIONS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS Acr ........ 553
A. Enactment of the False Claims Act ...................................... 555
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. B.A., 1985, Baker
University; J.D., 1988, Southern Methodist University. I would like to express my
appreciation for the many helpful suggestions received from Dan T. Coenen, Anne
Proffitt Dupre, Mark L. Movsesian, Richard A. Nagareda, Judith R.T. O'Kelley, Erwin C.
Surrency, Alan Watson, Michael Wells, and the participants in the Southeastern
Association of American Law Schools Young Scholars' Workshop. Elizabeth A. Brooks
provided valuable research assistance. My interest in qui tam litigation began in private
practice, where I participated in the defense of several clients sued under the False Claims
Act. Among other cases, I was one of the attorneys for the defendant in United States ex
rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993). While I also worked for a short time at
the Department of Justice, my responsibilities there were not connected with the False
Claims Act.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
B. World War 11 and the Near Abolition of the FCA Qui
Tam Provisions ...................................................................... 556
C. The 1986 Revival of the FCA Qui Tam Provisions ............ 561
III. THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE WITH Qui TAM
ENFORCEMENT ............................................................................. 565
A. Roman and Anglo-Saxon Antecedents ................................ 566
B. Qui Tam Statutes in Medieval England .............................. 567
C. Qui Tam Reform in the Early Tudor Period ...................... 573
1. Reform Legislation Under Henry VII .......................... 574
2. The Injustices of Empson and Dudley .......................... 574
D. Qui Tam Reforms Under Elizabeth I and James I ..... 575
1. Professional Informers as "Viperous Vermin" ............ 576
2. Problems Arising from Qui Tam Enforcement ........... 579
a. Unlicensed Compositions ......................................... 580
b. Fraudulent and Malicious Accusations ................... 581
c. Selection of Inconvenient Venues ........................... 583
d. Selection of Inappropriate Defendants ................... 583
3. Governmental Responses to Abusive Qui Tam
Enforcem ent .................................................................... 585
a. R oyal Patents ............................................................. 585
b. Legislative Reform of the Enforcement of
Penal Statutes ............................................................. 587
E. Qui Tam Enforcement into the Nineteenth Century .......... 589
1. Abatement and Resurgence in Qui Tam
Legislation ........................................................................ 590
2. Qui Tam Enforcement of Religious Duties ................. 592
3. Qui Tam Regulation of Spirituous Liquors ................. 597
F. The Abolition of Common Informer Actions in
E ngland .................................................................................. 601
1. The Decline of English Qui Tam Enforcement ........... 601
2. A First Attempt at Abolition ......................................... 603
3. The Common Informers Act of 1951 ............................ 604
IV. THE Qu1 TAM INFORMER'S CONFLICr OF INTEREST .............. 608
A. Public Interest and Private Gain in Qui Tam
Enforcem ent ........................................................................... 609
B. Manifestations of the Informer's Conflict of Interest ......... 615
1. Diverting the Public's Share of the Qui Tam
R ecovery .......................................................................... 616
2. Imposing Unproductive and Counterproductive
Social Costs ...................................................................... 620
a. Fraudulent and Meritless Claims ............................. 622
b. Technical Violations .................................................. 627
[Vol. 78
QUI TAM STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT
c. Economically Harmful Prosecutions ....................... 633
3. Nurturing Unlawful Conduct ......................................... 633
4. Qui Tam Actions by Government Employees ............ 636
V. A SUGGESTED STATUTORY REFORM ....................................... 637
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 642
"What harm can there be if 10,000 lawyers in America are
assisting the Attorney General of the United States in
digging up war frauds?"
-North Dakota Senator William Langer
INTRODUCTION
Since 1986, the federal government has been conducting an
extensive experiment with a curious method of statutory
enforcement. In that year, Congress amended the federal
government's principal anti-fraud statute-the False Claims Act
(FCA)2-- to encourage an archaic form of litigation known as a "qui
tam" suit.' A qui tam statute permits a private citizen to bring an
action on behalf of the government for recovery of a statutory
penalty. The person who pursues the action-the "informer" or
"relator"-receives a portion of any amount recovered on the
government's behalf.4 Thus, qui tam statutes privatize government
litigation,5 permitting the private informer to sue for the government
on a contingent-fee basis.
Substantial federal reliance on qui tam enforcement is a new
phenomenon in this country. While qui tam statutes have been on the
books since the first Congress6 and the FCA has contained a qui tam
provision since the Civil War,7 these pre-1986 statutes generated
1. 89 CONG. REc. 7606 (1943) (statement of Sen. Langer).
2. See False Claims Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994)).
3. The name "qui tam" comes from a longer Latin phrase, "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means "[w]ho sues on behalf of the King as
well as for himself." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990) (translating from
Latin) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further discussion appears infra at text
accompanying notes 41-42.
4. See, e.g., infra note 52 and accompanying text.
5. Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, for instance, has called the amended
False Claims Act "an excellent example of privatization in the public interest." Letter
from Edwin Meese III to Taxpayers Against Fraud (Aug. 15, 1996) (visited Feb. 1, 2000)
<http://www.taf.orgltafldocs/meese.html>.
6. See infra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing qui tam statutes enacted by
early Congresses).
7. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of the
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relatively little litigation.8 By contrast, the generous bounty offered
to informers under the 1986 legislation9 has resulted in an increased
number of qui tam filings. The Department of Justice reports that as
of September 1999,2959 qui tam actions had been filed since the FCA
amendments took effect. 10 The rate of filings has increased over time;
in fact, more than 50% of those 2959 cases had been filed since the
beginning of fiscal year 1997.11 Expanding use of the FCA qui tam
mechanism makes it increasingly significant to recipients of federal
funds because any document created to support a funding request
potentially could be deemed a "claim" or "record" subject to the
False Claims Act).
8. See Constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 13 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 249, 281 (1989) ("On this side of the Atlantic, qui tam never really
gained a secure foothold, particularly at the federal level."). A search for the term "qui
tam" on November 15, 1999 in Westlaw's ALLFEDS-OLD database generated only 166
hits. Another 142 hits were obtained by running the same search in the ALLFEDS
database with a date restriction of "before 1987." Of the combined total of 308 hits, some
were duplicative, involving multiple opinions in the same case. Other opinions identified
in these searches did not arise from federal qui tam actions. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (referencing qui tam litigation in discussing an
Article III standing issue). While there may have been pre-1986 federal qui tam suits that
did not generate reported opinions or opinions that did not use the term "qui tam," the
result of these searches still suggests a relatively small number of pre-1986 federal qui tam
actions compared to the thousands of cases filed under the 1986 FCA amendments. See
infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
9. The successful informer's bounty can grow quite large under the amended FCA.
The recovery in an FCA action includes treble damages, plus a fine of $5000 to $10,000 for
each claim or business record violating the statute. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994). The
informer is normally entitled to between 15% and 25% of the proceeds if the Justice
Department intervenes in the suit, and between 25% and 30% if the Justice Department
chooses not to intervene. See id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2). The largest settlement paid to date in a
qui tam action is a $325 million settlement by SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories,
Inc., in 1997 that resulted in a $52 million bounty for the informers. See Margaret Cronin
Fisk, The Whistleblower Juggernaut: More and More Lawyers Belly Up to the Qui Tam
Bar, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at Al. In addition to a percentage of the proceeds, a
successful informer is entitled to recover costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees. See 31
U.S.C. § 3730(d)(l)-(2).
10. See E-mail from Craig Wiener, Department of Justice, to Randy Beck (Feb. 15,
2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wiener E-mail].
11. See id. While the rate of filings has generally trended upwards, in both fiscal 1989
and fiscal 1997, the number of filings "spiked" to levels that were not matched in the two
succeeding fiscal years. See, e.g., id. (reporting that 532 cases were filed in fiscal 1997,
compared to 471 cases in fiscal 1998 and 483 cases in fiscal 1999). In the early years
following the 1986 amendments, the defense industry was the principal target of qui tam
litigation; recent figures, however, show that the Department of Health and Human
Services was the client agency in the largest proportion of the cases filed, suggesting that
qui tam informers have now turned their primary attention to health care providers. See
John T. Boese, When Angry Patients Become Angry Prosecutors: Medical Necessity
Determinations, Quality of Care and the Qui Tam Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 54 (1999);
Wiener E-mail, supra note 10.
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statute.2
Apart from its practical significance for recipients of federal
funding, qui tam litigation has generated substantial scholarly
interest.13 Private prosecution of government claims seems difficult to
reconcile with Article II's command that "[t]he executive Power shall
be vested in [the] President of the United States"' 4 and with the basic
principles of Article III standing. 5 By 'exercising prosecutorial
powers, the informer appears to execute the laws without presidential
appointment or supervision.16 Moreover, the qui tam informer suffers
12. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2) (creating liability for presenting a "false or
fraudulent claim for payment" or making a "false record or statement" to get such a claim
paid); id. § 3729(c) (defining "claim"). But see id. § 3729(e) (excluding application of the
statute to "claims, records, or statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of
1986").
13. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the United States,
98 MICH. L. REv. 92, 132-36 (1999) (arguing that states should be deemed to have waived
sovereign immunity with respect to qui tam actions under the FCA); Edward A. Hartnett,
The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing
Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239,2243-45
(1999) (discussing the relevance of qui tam provisions such as those in the FCA to debates
about Article III standing requirements).
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
15. Interpreting Article III, the Supreme Court has held that "the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing" requires the plaintiff to establish: (1) an actual
injury; (2) caused by the conduct challenged in the litigation; and (3) redressable by a
favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations
omitted). Additionally, the plaintiff's injury must be "particularized," such that it
"affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Id. at 560 n.1. Thus, the Court
has declined to permit litigation of a mere "'generalized grievance' shared in substantially
equal measure by all or a large class of citizens." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)
(quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974)); accord Lujan, 504
U.S. at 573-74 ("[A] plaintiff [who] rais[es] only a generally available grievance about
government ... and seek[s] relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it
does the public at large-does not state an Article III case or controversy."); Richardson,
418 U.S. at 176-80 (holding that the "generalized grievance" bar precluded a suit by a
taxpayer challenging the government's failure to publish expenditures by the CIA).
Because the informer in a qui tam action sues based upon an injury to the public, rather
than an injury that the informer suffers individually, qui tam standing seems potentially
inconsistent with the particularized injury requirement expressed by the Supreme Court.
The Lujan Court, however, distinguished qui tam suits in dicta, suggesting that provision
of a bounty affords a litigant "a concrete private interest in the outcome" of the litigation.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573. If a statutory bounty satisfies Article III, then the particularized
injury requirement may not constitute part of "the irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing." Id. at 560.
16. The Constitution assigns to the President the responsibility to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3. The Supreme Court has identified
the pursuit of enforcement litigation as an aspect of the President's constitutional
responsibility to execute the laws. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (per
curiam) ("A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the
President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to
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no traditional "injury in fact" before instituting an action: the FCA
authorizes the informer to sue on the government's behalf without
regard to whether the informer has been harmed personally by the
defendant's conduct.'7  Consequently, commentators have debated
whether the FCA violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, the
Appointments Clause, and/or the Article Ill "case or controversy"
requirement." Others have focused on questions of policy or
statutory interpretation raised by the amended statute.19
"'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' " (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); see
also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-93 (1988) (holding that the Attorney General's
power to remove an independent counsel for "good cause" did not unconstitutionally
burden the President's ability to ensure faithful execution of the laws).
17. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (establishing liability for the submission of false claims to
the government); id. § 3730(b)(1) (authorizing persons to bring civil actions in the name of
the government for violations of id. § 3729(a)); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9
F.3d 743, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a qui tam plaintiff need not suffer an injury
to assert a claim and that the statute assigns the government's claim to the informer).
18. See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341
(1989); Sean Hamer, Lincoln's Law: Constitutional and Policy Issues Posed by the Qui
Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1997, at 89;
James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui Tam Provision,
16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 701 (1993); Frank A. Edgar, Jr., Comment, "Missing the
Analytical Boat". The Unconstitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims
Act, 27 IDAHO L. REv. 319 (1990); Robert E. Johnston, Note, 1001 Attorneys General:
Executive-Employee Qui Tam Suits and the Constitution, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 609
(1994); Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the False
Claims Act, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 543 (1990); Ara Lovitt, Note, Fight for Your Right to
Litigate: Qui Tam, Article II, and the President, 49 STAN. L. REv. 853 (1997); John P.
Robertson, Comment, The False Claims Act, 26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 899 (1994).
19. See Boese, supra note 11, passim; Anna Mae Walsh Burke, Qui Tam: Blowing the
Whistle for Uncle Sam, 21 NOVA L. REV. 869 (1997); Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Double
Dippers or Bureaucracy Busters? False Claims Act Suits by Government Employees, 49
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 97 (1996); Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry
Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and
the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273 (1992); Anthony L. DeWitt, Badges? We Don't
Need No Stinking Badges! Citizen Attorney Generals and the False Claims Act, 65 UMKC
L. REv. 30 (1996); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the
Plaintiff, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 167; Patrick W. Hanifin, Qui Tam
Suits by Federal Government Employees Based on Government Information, 20 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 556 (1991); James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A
History of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the
False Claims Act, and Their Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General
Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OFHO N.U. L. REV. 35 (1991); Major John C. Kunich, Qui Tam:
White Knight or Trojan Horse, 33 A.F. L. REv. 31 (1990); Ann M. Lininger, The False
Claims Act and Environmental Law Enforcement, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 577 (1997); Patricia
Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves into a
Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REv. 455 (1998); Frederick M. Morgan, Jr. & Julie Webster
Popham, The Last Privateers Encounter Sloppy Seas: Inconsistent Original-Source
Jurisprudence Under the Federal False Claims Act, 24 OHio N.U. L. REv. 163 (1998); John
R. Munich & Elizabeth W. Lane, When Neglect Becomes Fraud: Quality of Care and False
Claims, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 27 (1999); Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current
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The debate over the constitutionality of qui tam legislation has
also worked its way into the federal courts. A panel of the Fifth
Circuit, in an opinion vacated pending en banc review, recently
declared the FCA qui tam provisions unconstitutional on separation-
of-powers grounds.? The majority of federal appellate courts,
Practice and Procedure Under the Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims
Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23 (1998); Adam G. Snyder, The False Claims Act Applied to
Health Care Institutions: Gearing Up for Corporate Compliance, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 1 (1996); Kent D. Strader, Counterclaims Against Whistleblowers: Should
Counterclaims Against Qui Tam Plaintiffs Be Allowed in False Claims Act Cases?, 62 U.
GIN. L. REv. 713 (1993); Gary W. Thompson, A Critical Analysis of Restrictive
Interpretations Under the False Claims Act's Public Disclosure Bar: Reopening the Qui
Tam Door, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 669 (1998); Major David Wallace, Government Employees
as Qui Tam Relators, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1996, at 14; Harvinder S. Anand, Note,
Competing Relators and Competing Objectives Under the False Claims Act: Barring
Subsequent Claims Should Look Beyond the Plain Language of Section 3730(b) (5), 28
PUB. CONT. L.J. 89 (1998); Edmund C. Baird, III, Note, The Use of Qui Tam Actions to
Enforce Federal Grazing Permits, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1407 (1994); Troy D. Chandler,
Comment, Lawyer Turned Plaintiff. Law Firms and Lawyers as Relators Under the False
Claims Act, 35 Hous. L. REv. 541 (1998); Lisa Estrada, Casenote, An Assessment of Qui
Tam Suits by Corporate Counsel Under the False Claims Act: United States ex rel. Doe v.
X Corp., 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 163 (1998); Susan G. Fentin, Note, The False Claims
Act-Finding Middle Ground Between Opportunity and Opportunism: The "Original
Source" Provision of 31 US.C. §3730(e)(4), 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 255 (1995);
Gretchen L. Forney, Note, Qui Tam Suits: Defining the Rights and Roles of the
Government and the Relator Under the False Claims Act, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1357 (1998);
Christopher C. Frieden, Comment, Protecting the Government's Interest: Qui Tam Actions
Under the False Claims Act and the Government's Right to Veto Settlements of Those
Actions, 47 EMORY L.J. 1041 (1998); Kaz Kikkawa, Note, Medicare Fraud and Abuse and
Qui Tam: The Dynamic Duo or the Odd Couple?, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 83 (1998); Michael
Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for Less: The Department of Justice's Command
Performance Under the 1986 False Claims Amendments Act, 7 AD)MIN. L.J. AM. U. 409
(1993); Mary DuBois Krohn, Comment, The False Claims Act and Managed Care:
Blowing the Whistle on Underutilization, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 443 (1997); Frank LaSalle,
Comment, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden of Proof as a
Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REv. 497 (1995); Paul W. Morenberg, Comment,
Environmental Fraud by Government Contractors: A New Application of the False Claims
Act, 22 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 623 (1995); Valerie R. Park, Note, The False Claims
Act, Qui Tam Relators, and the Government: Which Is the Real Party to the Action?, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1061 (1991); Carolyn J. Paschke, Note, The Qui Tam Provision of the
Federal False Claims Act: The Statute in Current Form, Its History and Its Unique Position
to Influence the Health Care Industry, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 163 (1994-1995); Christopher P.
Perzan, Note, Research and Relators: The False Claims Act and Scientific Misconduct, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 639 (1992); Lisa Michelle Phelps, Note, Calling off the Bounty Hunters:
Discrediting the Use of Alleged Anti-Kickback Violations to Support Civil False Claims
Actions, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1003 (1998); Francis E. Purcell, Jr., Comment, Qui Tam Suits
Under the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986: The Need for Clear Legislative
Expression, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 935 (1993); Kara Nicole Schmidt, Note, Privatizing
Environmental Enforcement: The Bounty Incentives of the False Claims Act, 9 GEO. INT'L
ENvTL. L. REv. 663 (1997); Virginia C. Theis, Note, Government Employees as Qui Tam
Plaintiffs: Subverting the Purposes of the False Claims Act, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225 (1999).
20. See Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 531, reh'g en banc granted,
546 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78
however, have upheld the statute as it applies to private defendants.21
In litigation involving governmental defendants, the circuits have
divided over another significant constitutional question raised by the
legislation: whether the Eleventh Amendment precludes qui tam
litigation against a state.P The Supreme Court granted certiorari on
this issue in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
rel. Stevens2 one day after issuing a recent trio of state sovereign
immunity decisions.24 Shortly before oral argument in Vermont
196 F.3d 561 (5th Cir. 1999); see also infra note 21 (discussing Riley).
21. See United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech. Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 288 n.12 (5th
Cir. 1999) (noting that qui tam plaintiffs have Article III standing); United States ex rel.
Berge v. Board of Trustees, 104 F.3d 1453, 1457-58 (4th Cir. 1997) (declining, on the basis
of other circuit decisions, to hold that a qui tam plaintiff does not have standing); United
States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032, 1040-42 (6th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the qui tam provisions do not violate the principle of separation of
powers or the Appointments Clause of the Constitution); Kelly, 9 F.3d at 747-60 (rejecting
separation-of-powers, Appointments Clause, Article III, and due process challenges to the
qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act); United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v.
United Tech. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1153-55 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that the qui tam
provisions do not conflict with Article III).
In Riley, the U.S. District Court for Southern Texas found that a qui tam informer
lacks standing under Article III. See United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Hosp., 982 F. Supp. 1261, 1268-69 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (mem.), rev'd, 196 F.3d at 531, reh'g en
banc granted, 196 F.3d at 561. On appeal, however, a majority of the Fifth Circuit panel
concluded that Foulds had conclusively rejected the Article III challenge to the statute.
See Riley, 196 F.3d at 523 (upholding the plaintiff's standing in bringing a qui tam claim).
A different majority affirmed the district court's holding on the alternative ground that the
statute violated separation-of-powers principles. See id. at 531.
22. See Harvey Berkman, A Federalism Question Percolates: May Whistleblowers Sue
States?, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 1999, at A9. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from bringing an action against a state. See, e.g., United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 138-41 (1965). Three circuits have concluded that a qui tam
action under the FCA qualifies as a suit by the United States and, therefore, that the
Eleventh Amendment does not forbid the litigation. See United States ex rel. Stevens v.
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195, 201-03 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted,
119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999); United States ex rel Zissler v. Regents, 154 F.2d 870, 872-73 (8th
Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.2d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1998),
cert. dismissed, 119 S. Ct. 2387 (1999); Berge, 104 F.3d at 1458-59; United States ex rel.
Milam v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 48-50 (4th Cir.
1992). The Fifth Circuit has disagreed, however, holding that the Eleventh Amendment
precludes a qui tam action against an unconsenting state defendant. See Foulds, 171 F.3d
at 294. The D.C. Circuit has avoided the Eleventh Amendment issue by construing the
FCA as inapplicable to the states. See United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical
Inst., 173 F.3d 870, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that even though the Eleventh
Amendment issue was in some respects jurisdictional, the court could reach the statutory
question before the Eleventh Amendment question if requested to do so by a state),
supplemented by 173 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
23. 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999).
24. On June 23, 1999, the Court released three significant opinions restricting
Congress's power to authorize lawsuits against the states by private parties. See Alden v.
Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2254-66 (1999) (holding that constitutional structure implicitly
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Agency, the Supreme Court requested additional briefing on the issue
of Article III standing 5 The FCA qui tam provisions thus appear
poised to contribute to the developing body of case law defining the
contours of the Eleventh Amendment 6 and to generate a significant
allows states to invoke sovereign immunity against federal claims in state court, even
though the Eleventh Amendment only applies in federal court); College Sav. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2226-31 (1999)
(holding that a state does not constructively waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by
engaging in commercial activities regulated by the Lanham Act); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2205-11 (1999)
(holding that a federal statute authorizing patent infringement suits against states could
not be justified as an exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and, therefore, did not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
The next day, the Court granted certiorari in Vermont Agency, which raises two issues: (1)
the statutory question of whether the FCA applies to states; and (2) the constitutional
issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a qui tam action. 162 F.3d at 201-08.
25. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 120 S.
Ct. 523, 523 (1999) (mem.) (requesting briefs on the question: "Does a private citizen
have standing under Article III to litigate claims of fraud upon the government?");
Charles Tiefer, Surprise Order in Qui Tam Case May Foretell a Scalia Surprise, LEGAL
TIMES (Wash., D.C.), Nov. 29, 1999, at 52.
26. The following language from Alden v. Maine may telegraph the Court's intentions
regarding the Eleventh Amendment issue in Vermont Agency:
In ratifying the Constitution, the States consented to suits brought by other
States or by the Federal Government. A suit which is commenced and
prosecuted against a State in the name of the United States by [the Executive
Branch entrusted with a constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws] ...
differs in kind from the suit of an individual: While the Constitution
contemplates suits among the members of the federal system as an alternative to
extralegal measures, the fear of private suits against nonconsenting States was
the central reason given by the founders who chose to preserve the States'
sovereign immunity. Suits brought by the United States itself require the
exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a
control which is absent from a broad delegation to private persons to sue
nonconsenting States.
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (citations omitted). By emphasizing the constitutional and
political accountability of executive branch officials and distinguishing "a broad delegation
to private persons to sue nonconsenting States," the Court may be suggesting that a state's
implicit consent to suits by the federal government would not extend to a qui tam action
prosecuted by a private informer in the name of the United States. IL Qui tam informers
are neither chosen by nor subject to the direction of the President, who bears the
constitutional responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3. Moreover, if an informer pursues an action against a state without the
Justice Department's approval, no federal official takes "political responsibility for each
suit prosecuted against a State." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267; see also Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991) (holding that consent to suit "by the United
States-at the instance and under the control of responsible federal officers-is not
consent to suit by anyone whom the United States might select" and expressing doubt that
the federal government could delegate to an Indian tribe its exemption from state
sovereign immunity). Barring qui tam actions against the states would be consistent with
the expansive view of state sovereign immunity exhibited in recent cases. See, e.g., Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267-88 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
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opinion on Article III "case or controversy" requirements.
This Article approaches the FCA qui tam provisions from the
perspective of English legal history-a perspective that Congress
arguably should have explored in considering the 1986 legislation.
The analysis begins with the observation that qui tam enforcement
did not originate in our legal system, but is rather a "transplant"' 7
from England. In considering the wisdom of qui tam enforcement,
then, it would seem prudent to investigate how such statutes operated
in the English legal system from which they are borrowed. In
particular, one might expect Congress to study the decision of
England's Parliament in 1951 to abandon qui tam legislation in favor
of public enforcement of penal statutes.? After all, one surely should
be cautious when "transplanting" a species that has been deliberately
eradicated from its native soil.
This Article examines the English experience with qui tam
statutes, including Parliament's ultimate repudiation of such
legislation, in an effort to derive lessons for qui tam enforcement
under the FCA. Part I draws upon Blackstone's Commentaries to
describe the distinctive features of qui tam legislation. Part II
summarizes the relevant history of the FCA qui tam provisions,
focusing in particular on the reasons for the 1986 congressional
decision to encourage qui tam enforcement of the statute.
Part III considers the English history of qui tam enforcement.
The investigation shows that, for centuries, qui tam legislation
produced significant and recurring problems in England, such as
widespread extortion of secret settlements and fraudulent or
malicious prosecution of innocent defendants.29 As a result, common
informers became one of the most vilified groups in England and
were repeated targets of mob violence.30 With the development of
alternative means of statutory enforcement, Parliament moved away
44,54-73 (1996).
27. Alan Watson uses the term "transplant" to describe the ubiquitous habit of
borrowing legal rules and practices from other countries. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 19 (University of Ga. Press
1993) (1974).
28. See Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 39 (1951) (Eng.).
29. See infra notes 213-47,322-28,373-74 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 196-206, 320 and accompanying text. Charles Dickens captured
the popular antipathy toward informers in The Pickwick Papers. CHARLES DICKENS,
THE PICKWICK PAPERS (Signet Classic 1964) (1837). In that story, Pickwick and his
traveling companions are mistaken for informers and are physically assaulted by their cab
driver, only narrowly escaping further indignities at the hands of a mob. See id. at 30-31
("[Tihere is no saying what acts of personal aggression [the crowd] might have committed
had not the affray been unexpectedly terminated .... ).
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from qui tam legislation in the nineteenth century, finally opting in
1951 to abolish all remaining English qui tam statutes.3'
Part IV argues that the difficulties plaguing qui tam enforcement
in England and analogous problems observed under the FCA arise
from a conflict of interest inherent in the structure of a qui tam
statute. The informer sues on behalf of the public and theoretically
represents the public interest. The statute, however, offers the
informer a personal financial stake in the outcome of the litigation.
When these personal and public interests collide, informers tend to
pursue pecuniary gain at the expense of the common good.32 The
consequence of the informer's bounty is to eliminate the exercise of
disinterested prosecutorial discretion-an important protection for
both the public and the individual-and to transform law
enforcement into a business pursued for the private enrichment of
profit-motivated bounty hunters.33
Part V advocates a modification to the FCA that would preserve
certain benefits of qui tam enforcement and ameliorate the informer's
conflict of interest. An informer still would be permitted to file a
fraud action on behalf of the government and receive a bounty if the
suit resulted in a recovery. As under current law, the Department of
Justice would have the option of intervening and pursuing the action
filed by the informer. If the Justice Department chose not to
intervene, however, the FCA claims would be dismissed. This
statutory reform would preserve the primary advantage of qui tam
enforcement in this context-providing a financial incentive for the
disclosure of fraudulent conduct-and would create a record to aid in
congressional oversight of Justice Department refusals to prosecute.
At the same time, many of the consequences of the informer's conflict
of interest would be mitigated, and a disinterested exercise of
prosecutorial discretion would be incorporated into the FCA
enforcement process.
I. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES AND THE NATURE OF Q ui TAM
LEGISLATION
Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
provide a convenient starting point for our inquiry into qui tam
legislation.34 By the time Blackstone's Commentaries were published,
31. See infra notes 329-78 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 411-509 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 387-94,429-88 and accompanying text.
34. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; see also
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qui tam enforcement had been in common use for centuries.35 The
Commentaries therefore offer a mature explication of the nature of
qui tam enforcement in England in the period preceding the
American Revolution.
Surprisingly, Blackstone addressed qui tam actions in the course
of discussing the law of contracts. To a modem reader, the discussion
may seem out of place. After all, qui tam actions enforce legislative
mandates, the antithesis of contractual obligations assumed by
consensual agreement. In Blackstone's view, however, these seeming
opposites converged. It was from the fundamental social contract, he
argued, that the obligation to obey a penal statute derived 6.3  The
person who violated a penal statute was "bound by the fundamental
contract of society to obey the directions of the legislature, and pay
the forfeiture incurred to such persons as the law requires. '37
Blackstone identified three categories of litigants who might
bring an action under the terms of a particular English penal statute.
In one group were those aggrieved by the defendant's statutory
violation-the victims of the misconduct. It was not uncommon for
English statutes to give a cause of action to persons injured by the
defendant,38 a method of enforcement still prevalent today.
Blackstone also identified the King as a potential litigant under a
penal statute, presumably meaning that public officials could pursue a
recovery on the King's behalf.3 9 This category of litigant also mirrors
modern practice, which frequently permits government officials to
enforce statutory requirements.
The focus of this Article is the remaining category of litigants
mentioned by Blackstone, which is less familiar to modem law.
WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, THE HISTORIANS OF ANGLO-AMERIcAN LAW 22 (Archon
Books 1966) (1928) (calling Blackstone's Commentaries "the best history of English law as
a whole which had yet appeared").
35. The Commentaries were published between 1765 and 1769. See Stephen M.
Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism,
50 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1395 (1997); Robert J. Cottrol, Structure, Participation,
Citizenship, and Right: Lessons from Akhil Amar's Second and Fourteenth Amendments,
87 GEO. LJ. 2307, 2313 n.29 (1999) (book review). Qui tam statutes came into common
use during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. See infra notes 129-70 and
accompanying text.
36. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *161.
37. Id
38. See id. at *161; Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U.
L.Q. 81, 85-86 (1972) (noting that some English statutes permitted suit by an aggrieved
party).
39. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *162; see also 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 4-13 (1938) (discussing officials who represented the King
in various courts).
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Under many English penal statutes, a claim could be prosecuted by
"any of the king's subjects" who would bring the action.4 ° Statutes
frequently permitted a person to sue for a penalty even if the person
had not been injured by the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture.
Blackstone explained this type of statute as follows:
[M]ore usually, these forfeitures created by statute are given
at large, to any common informer; or, in other words, to any
such person or persons as will sue for the same; and hence
such actions are called popular actions, because they are
given to the people in general. Sometimes one part is given
to the king, to the poor, or to some public use, and the other
part to the informer or prosecutor; and then the suit is called
a qui tam action, because it is brought by a person "qui tam
pro domino rege, &c., quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequitur."
41
Translating the Latin, an informer in a qui tam action is one " [w]ho
sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself."'4
At least two important implications flow from the proposition
that the qui tam informer sues "on behalf of the King." First, the
informer serves as the advocate for public interests that would
otherwise be advanced by public officials. If the informer succeeds in
a qui tam action, a portion of the recovery usually goes to the public
treasury or to the fulfillment of some public purpose.43 Second, by
pursuing a qui tam action, the informer forecloses a subsequent action
by government prosecutors alleging the same statutory violation.
Except in cases of collusion, "the verdict passed upon the defendant
in the [qui tam] suit is a bar to all others, and conclusive even to the
king himself."'  Thus, the qui tam informer stands in the shoes of a
government attorney. The informer is a self-appointed prosecutor,
statutorily empowered to enforce the social contract in place of public
officials.
Blackstone revisited qui tam actions in the context of criminal
proceedings. A criminal prosecution could be commenced by
"information," a procedure available to both the King and a qui tam
informer.45 Thus, a qui tam action could be either civil or criminal,
40. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *161; see, e.g., Statute of York, 12 Edw. 2, ch. 6
(1318) (Eng.) (permitting action for forfeiture by "he that will sue for it").
41. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *161.
42. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
43. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *161-62.
44. Id. at *162.
45. Blackstone discussed criminal qui tam actions in the following passage:
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often at the informer's election.46  English penal statutes typically
offered the informer a variety of procedural means for collecting a
statutory forfeiture, including a criminal information or an "action of
debt"-a form of action often used in civil contract cases.47
Blackstone's discussion suggests the following criteria by which
to identify a qui tam statute:
(1) The statute defines an offense against the sovereign or
proscribes conduct contrary to the interests of the public;48
(2) A penalty or forfeiture is imposed for violation of the
statute;4
9
(3) The statute permits a civil or criminal enforcement action
pursued by a private party;50
(4) The private informer need not be aggrieved and may initiate
Informations are of two sorts: first, those which are partly at the suit of the king,
and partly at that of a subject; and secondly, such as are only in the name of the
king. The former are usually brought upon penal statutes, which inflict a penalty
upon conviction of the offender, one part to the use of the king, and another to
the use of the informer, and are a sort of qui tam actions, (the nature of which
was explained in a former book) ... only carried on by a criminal instead of a
civil process ....
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *308.
46. See Note, supra note 38, at 88-89 (discussing the fact that an informer could bring
a criminal information or, alternatively, could choose a civil action).
47. See, e.g., 29 Geo. 2, ch. 23, § 12 (1756) (Eng.) (providing that an informer could
sue for a penalty in a manner authorized under any law of excise or "by action of debt, bill,
plaint or information"); 28 Hen. 8, ch. 5 (1536) (Eng.) (stating that an informer may seek
recovery "by action of debt, information or otherwise"). Likewise, early qui tam statutes
in the United States typically permitted the informer to elect between civil and criminal
proceedings. See Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341-42 (1805) ("Almost every
fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recovered by an action of debt as well as
by information .... ).
48. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *161-62 (noting that an action could be
brought by the King or by an informer on behalf of the King). The proscribed conduct
may or may not have had an adverse impact on private interests of particular citizens.
49. See id. (discussing forfeiture). Typically, the penalty consisted of a monetary fine.
However, in some qui tam statutes, the defendant forfeited specified property, such as
goods offered for sale in violation of statutory requirements. See, e.g., Statute of York, 12
Edw. 2, ch. 6 (1318) (Eng.) (providing for forfeiture of wine or "victuals" illegally sold by
certain local officials).
50. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *161-62 (discussing popular actions); 4 id. at
*305 (discussing qui tam actions pursued through criminal rather than civil processes).
This authorization of private citizen enforcement distinguishes qui tam statutes from the
vast majority of modem criminal legislation. Few American jurisdictions continue to
allow a private citizen to bring a criminal prosecution without the consent of a public
prosecutor. See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 529 (1994) (noting that "Alabama, Montana, and Ohio
allow private prosecutors to participate without the consent or supervision of the district
attorney").
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the action in the absence of any distinct, personal injury arising from
the challenged conduct;51
(5) A successful informer is entitled to a private benefit
consisting of part or all of the penalty exacted from the defendant;52
and
(6) The outcome of the private informer's enforcement action is
binding on the government 3
While many types of legislation exhibit some of these characteristics,
the combination of all these features serves to distinguish a qui tam
statute from other models of statutory enforcement.
II. THE Q ui TAM PROVISIONS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Qui tam enforcement has never been as widespread in this
country as it once was in England. Early American Congresses
continued the English practice by enacting a few qui tam statutesM
51. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *161 (noting that forfeiture action is given
"to any such person or persons as will sue for the same," or, in other words, "given to the
people in general"). Of course, the informer may be presumed to share in whatever injury
has been inflicted on the public at large. In this country's federal courts, however, outside
the context of qui tam statutes Article III generally is held to require a "particularized"
injury to the plaintiff, distinct from any injury suffered by the public as a whole. See supra
note 15 (discussing standing requirements). Nevertheless, all of the appellate courts that
have addressed the issue have concluded that a qui tam statute satisfies the requirements
of Article HI despite the informer's lack of any particularized injury. See supra note 21
and cases cited therein. This feature distinguishes a qui tam statute from a private-
attorney-general or citizen-suit provision. A citizen-suit provision cannot confer standing
unless the private litigant herself satisfies Article III standing requirements. See, e.g., Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 106-07 (1998) (involving a case in which the
government presumably would have had standing to sue for civil penalties, but a private
environmental organization suing under a citizen-suit provision was held to lack standing
to pursue the penalties because it did not satisfy the redressability requirement of Article
III).
52. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *161-62 (discussing an informer's
entitlement to a share of any forfeiture). Certain statutes provide for the successful
private prosecutor to keep the entire statutory penalty. See, e.g., 1 Geo. 2, ch. 13, §§ 8, 17
(1714) (Eng.). Such statutes clearly provide for "popular actions" as explained by
Blackstone, but arguably do not satisfy his technical definition of a qui tam action because
the plaintiff does not share the recovery with the sovereign or anyone else. See 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *161. These statutes nevertheless raise many of the same
issues as statutes that provide for division of the forfeiture and, therefore, will be treated
as qui tam statutes in this Article.
53. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *162 (noting that the result in a qui tam suit
"is a bar to all others, and [is] conclusive even to the king himself").
54. The first federal qui tam provision appeared in a statute providing for collection of
duties. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 29, 44-45 (repealed 1790). Informers
could sue for a penalty if government officials failed to publish "a fair table of the rates of
fees, and duties demandable by law." Id. at 45; see also Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 55, 1
Stat. 145, 173 (repealed 1799) (enacting a later statute on the same subject). Another
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Most of these passed out of existence long ago, and only a smattering
of qui tam provisions still linger in the United States Code. For
instance, an informer may sue to enforce penalties imposed by
Title 25, concerning relations with Indians and Indian tribes.5 5 A qui
early federal qui tam provision, also directed at public officials, punished fraud or neglect
of duty by marshals participating in the first census. See Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1
Stat. 101, 102 (obsolete); Act of July 5, 1790, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 129 (obsolete).
As under English law, most early congressional qui tam statutes regulated
economic affairs. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 21, 1 Stat. 55, 60 (governing
registration of ships); Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, §§ 1, 4, 1 Stat. 131, 131, 133 (imposing
penalties for employing a seaman without a written contract and for harboring a seaman
who should be on board ship); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137, 137-38
(concerning unlicensed trade with Indians); Act of Feb. 25,1791, ch. 10, §§ 8-9, 1 Stat. 191,
195-96 (expired) (prohibiting the Bank of the United States from trading in "goods,
wares, merchandise, or commodities" and restricting loans to foreign and domestic
governments); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209 (enforcing duties on
"distilled spirits"); Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 18, 1 Stat. 469, 474 (governing trade with
Indian tribes).
Perhaps the most interesting qui tam statute of the nation's infancy was a 1794
enactment directed at slave trade with foreign nations. See Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, 1
Stat. 347. The Act made it illegal for any person to prepare a ship in the United States or
to sail from any U.S. port for the purpose of carrying on "trade or traffic in slaves" with a
foreign country or for carrying persons between foreign countries to be sold as slaves. Id.
§ 1, 1 Stat. at 349. Any person violating these prohibitions was subject to a forfeiture of
$2000, half payable to any informer who would sue for it. See id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 349.
Another provision imposed a forfeiture of $200 for each person transported for the
purpose of selling the person as a slave. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 349. This statute was the
subject of a Supreme Court decision in which Chief Justice Marshall held that a qui tam
action was barred by the statute of limitations. See Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
336, 341-42 (1805) (holding that because qui tam forfeiture could be recovered by either
civil action of debt or criminal information, the statute of limitations applicable to criminal
informations applied to a qui tam suit pursued as an action of debt).
Another qui tam statute that deserves special mention prohibited certain forms of
theft or embezzlement "within any of the places under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States, or upon the high seas." Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 36, § 16, 1 Stat. 112,
116. A person convicted under the statute was to be fined and "publicly whipped, not
exceeding thirty-nine stripes." Id.
For further discussion of the history of qui tam enforcement in this country, see
Caminker, supra note 18, at 341-42 & n.3; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over
Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 296-303
(1989); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 174-75 (1992); Robert W. Fischer, Jr., Comment, Qui
Tam Actions: The Role of the Private Citizen in Law Enforcement, 20 UCLA L. REV. 778,
778-79 (1973); Note, supra note 38, at 91-101; Dan D. Pitzer, Comment, The Qui Tam
Doctrine: A Comparative Analysis of Its Application in the United States and the British
Commonwealth, 7 TEX. INT'L L.J. 415,424-36 (1972).
55. See 25 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). Title 25 also contains a qui tam provision covering
certain contracts with Indians and Indian tribes. See id. § 81. A panel of the Eighth
Circuit rejected a qui tam case under § 81 on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing.
See Schmit v. International Fin. Management Co., 980 F.2d 498, 498 (8th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam). Because it is unlikely that the court intended in a three paragraph per curiam
opinion to declare the highly debatable proposition that qui tam informers must comply
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tam action also may be filed when a person falsely marks an item to
suggest patent protection or to imply consent of a patentee 6
Likewise, a qui tam action will lie against someone who takes
property from a shipwreck off the Florida coast and transports it to a
foreign port 7 Despite the availability of qui tam actions under these
statutory provisions, only the False Claims Act has generated a large
number of federal qui tam cases5
A. Enactment of the False Claims Act
Congress enacted the FCA in 1863, midway through the Civil
War, in response to frauds perpetrated in connection with Union
military procurement 9 The War and Treasury Departments had
urgently requested legislation to facilitate prevention and punishment
of procurement fraud.' According to Senator Howard, the chief
spokesman for the legislation in the Senate, the country had been
"full of complaints respecting the frauds and corruptions practiced in
obtaining pay from the Government during the present war. ' 61 The
Army had received small arms that inspection revealed to be useless
and artillery shells filled with sawdust rather than explosives.62
The original FCA prohibited various acts designed to
fraudulently obtain money from the government. Among other
penalties, the legislation imposed a forfeiture of $2000 for each
with normal rules of Article III standing, the more likely explanation for the decision is
that the court simply did not realize it was dealing with a qui tam statute. A district court
subsequently compounded the Eighth Circuit's error, however, extending the reasoning of
Schmit to actions under § 201, as well as those under § 81. See In re United States ex reL
Hall, 825 F. Supp. 1422, 1425-27 (D. Minn. 1993), affjd on other grounds, 27 F.3d 572 (8th
Cir. 1994). But see United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943)
(identifying 25 U.S.C. § 201 as a statute permitting suit by common informer with no
interest in the controversy except that given by statute).
56. See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (1994).
57. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 723 (1994). Another statute may provide for qui tam
forfeiture of a vessel fitted out to conduct hostilities against a nation friendly to the United
States. See 18 U.S.C. § 962 (1994) (providing that any such vessel and related property
"shall be forfeited, one half to the use of the informer and the other half to the use of the
United States").
58. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
59. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat. 696, 696-99 (1863) (current version at
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994)).
60. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955-56 (1863).
61. Id. at 952 (statement of Sen. Howard). For example, one court noted that "[o]ne
enterpriser bought defective rifles from the government for $17,486 and immediately
resold them to a different quartermaster for $109,912." United States ex reL Marcus v.
Hess, 127 F.2d 233, 236 n.14 (3d Cir. 1942) (citing MATrHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER
BARONS 61 (1934)), rev'd, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
62. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955 (1863) (statement of Sen. Howard).
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violation plus double the government's actual damages.' Individuals
could pursue this remedy through a qui tam action, and the informer
was entitled to half the total recovery. The provision for qui tam
enforcement was designed to encourage participants in fraudulent
schemes to bring the wrongdoing to light.64 Of course, one did not
need to participate in a violation of the Act to sue as an informer.6
B. World War 11 and the Near Abolition of the FCA Qui Tam
Provisions
The False Claims Act's qui tam provisions remained in force
until World War II, when abuses by informers led to their restriction
and near-repeal. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess66 triggered the
statutory retrenchment. The defendants in that case were contractors
who were indicted and pleaded nolo contendere to a bid-rigging
conspiracy.' 7 Realizing that the government had already made a case
for him, a quick-thinking qui tam informer purportedly copied the
allegations of the government's indictment into an FCA complaint
and ultimately obtained a judgment for $315,000.1
On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that because the United
States was not a party to the public works contracts in question, the
defendants had not submitted any claim " 'against the United States
Government[ or a department or officer thereof,' " as required by
the FCA.69 The court observed that "[q]ui tam actions have always
63. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, § 3, 12 Stat. at 698 (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)
(1994)).
64. Senator Howard explained the purpose of the qui tam provision as follows:
The effect of [the qui tam provision] is simply to hold out to a confederate a
strong temptation to betray his coconspirator, and bring him to justice. The bill
offers, in short, a reward to the informer who comes into court and betrays his
coconspirator, if he be such; but it is not confined to that class.... In short, sir, I
have based the [qui tam provision] upon the old-fashioned idea of holding out a
temptation, and "setting a rogue to catch a rogue," which is the safest and most
expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955-56 (1863) (statement of Sen. Howard).
65. Senator Howard even anticipated that a federal district attorney might be an
informer "and entitle himself to one half the forfeiture under the qui tam clause, and to
one half of the double damages." Id.
66. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
67. See id. at 539 & n.1, 545. The public works projects at issue in the case were
managed by local officials, but funded by the federal Public Works Administration. See id.
at 539.
68. See id. at 540,545.
69. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 127 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1942) (quoting 18
U.S.C.A. § 80 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994))) (omission in original), rev'd, 317
U.S. 537 (1943).
[Vol. 78556
QUI TAM STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT
been regarded with disfavor. '7° Accordingly, the court suggested that
a statute providing for qui tam enforcement be strictly construed,
requiring the informer to satisfy the precise statutory requirements.7'
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit decision,
concluding that courts should not construe substantive provisions of a
statute narrowly simply because they disapprove of one of the
statutory enforcement mechanisms.72 The Supreme Court's decision
in Hess rested on deference to congressional authority, and its
endorsement of qui tam enforcement was tepid at best.73 The Court
noted that Congress had the power to choose qui tam litigation as a
means of preventing fraud upon the government;7 4 thus, the Court
reasoned that "to nullify the criminal statute because of dislike of the
independent informer sections would be to exercise a veto power
which is not ours."75 The Court summarily rejected the government's
policy arguments against qui tam enforcement with the observation
that they were "addressed to the wrong forum."76
The Justice Department had anticipated the Supreme Court's
70. Id at 235.
71. See id. Later the same year, Judge Learned Hand presided over a Second Circuit
panel that narrowly construed the FCA on grounds similar to those offered by the Third
Circuit in Hess. According to the Second Circuit, the FCA "is not only penal, but
drastically penal.... Furthermore, so far as it perpetuates the odious and happily nearly
obsolete qui tam action, it should be regarded with particular jealousy." United States ex
reL Brensilber v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 131 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1942) (per
curiam) (citations omitted).
72. See Hess, 317 U.S. at 540-41.
73. The Court pointed out, however, that qui tam statutes "have been frequently
permitted by legislative action," and the Court noted that such statutes "have not been
without defense by the courts." Id. In support of the former point, the Court cited its
decision in Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212,225 (1905), which recognized the long history of
qui tam enforcement in England and the early adoption of qui tam legislation in this
country. See Hess, 317 U.S. at 541 n.4. With respect to the latter observation, the
Supreme Court noted an FCA case wherein a court opined that qui tam enforcement
provided an effective means of deterring frauds upon the Treasury. See id at 541 n.5
(citing United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885)). At the same time,
however, the Supreme Court recognized judicial support for the more disparaging view of
qui tam legislation reflected in the Third Circuit's Hess opinion. See id (citing Taft v.
Stephens Lith. & Eng. Co., 38 F. 28 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1889)).
74. See Hess, 317 U.S. at 542.
75. Id
76. Id at 547. The government argued that
effective law enforcement requires that control of litigation be left to the
Attorney General; that divided control is against the public interest; that the
Attorney General might believe that war interests would be injured by filing suits
such as this; that permission to outsiders to sue might bring unseemly races for
the opportunity of profiting from the government's investigations; and finally
that conditions have changed since the Act was passed in 1863.
Id at 546-47.
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advice to address its concerns to federal legislators. Following the
Third Circuit decision in Hess, Attorney General Francis Biddle sent
a letter to Congress complaining that informers in recent FCA cases
had not provided new information to the government. Instead, qui
tam suits had become" 'mere parasitical actions, occasionally brought
only after law-enforcement officers [had] investigated and prosecuted
persons guilty of a violation of law and solely because of the hope of a
large reward.' "7 In response to the Attorney General's letter, both
Houses of Congress voted to repeal the FCA qui tam provisions. The
repeal bills, however, passed during different congressional sessions.
The Senate voted to repeal the qui tam provisions at the end of the
77th Congress with only minimal discussion and without recorded
opposition.78  Early in the 78th Congress, the House of
Representatives passed a materially identical bill in similar fashion. 9
When the House bill from the 78th Congress reached the Senate
Judiciary Committee, it ran into strong opposition from Senator
William Langer of North Dakota.80 In this more contentious
environment, the Judiciary Committee stepped back from the
outright elimination of qui tam suits endorsed the previous year and
sought instead to restrict their usage.81 In support of the proposed
77. S. RnP. No. 77-1708, at 2 (1942) (Sup. Does. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 10659) (quoting an
Aug. 28, 1942, letter from Attorney General Francis Biddle).
78. See S. 2754, 77th Cong., 88 CONG. REC. 9138 (1942) (passed by Senate).
79. See H.R. 1203,78th Cong., 89 CONG. REC. 2800-01 (1943) (passed by House).
80. Senator Langer might be described as a colorful politician. When the first qui tam
repeal bill was considered in 1942, Langer had only recently survived a drawn-out
proceeding in which the Senate debated whether to allow him to take his seat. See Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,554-59 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). The chief concerns
related to Langer's removal from office as North Dakota governor by the state supreme
court. See id. at 554 (Douglas, J., concurring). The removal litigation followed Langer's
indictment for "conspiring to interfere with the enforcement of federal law by illegally
soliciting political contributions from federal employees." Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
Langer did not take his removal from office lying down: "When it became clear that the
court would order his ouster, he signed a Declaration of Independence, invoked martial
law, and called out the National Guard. Nonetheless, when his own officers refused to
recognize him as the legal head of state, he left office in July 1934." Id. (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Langer was re-elected Governor in 1937 and then elected to the Senate in
1940, leading to the controversy over whether he should be seated. See id. at 554-55
(Douglas, J., concurring). Other allegations against Langer included misappropriation of
public funds, interference with the judicial process through bribery and jury tampering,
and professional misconduct as an attorney. See id. at 555 & nn. 16-18 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). A Senate committee, by a vote of 13 to 3, recommended that Langer not be
seated, but the full Senate voted to seat Langer by a margin of 52 to 30. See id. at 555, 559
(Douglas, J., concurring).
81. Under the legislation proposed by the Senate Judiciary Committee, a qui tam
plaintiff first would have to disclose his evidence to the Attorney General and request
action by the Justice Department. Only if the Attorney General declined the suit or failed
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reforms, a majority of the Committee emphasized that the
government had been given adequate resources to enforce the law, so
that qui tam enforcement authority was no longer needed.82 Senator
Langer's minority report, on the other hand, argued that the Justice
Department had not been sufficiently aggressive in prosecuting war
frauds.83  Langer's vociferous opposition apparently deterred the
majority from seeking wholesale eradication of the qui tam
provisions.84 With American troops in combat around the globe, it
was not politically prudent to appear solicitous of the interests of
defense contractors, some of whom, according to Langer, were
"endanger[ing] the lives of our soldier boys."85
The debate on the Senate floor largely mirrored the positions
taken in the Judiciary Committee. Chairman Van Nuys served as the
principal spokesman for the bill, and his remarks foreshadowed
themes that would be sounded in England eight years later in
connection with Parliament's decision to abandon qui tam
enforcement.86 Van Nuys argued that the qui tam provisions
originally served a useful purpose, but had become unnecessary given
the resources of the Department of Justice and the .Federal Bureau of
to act within six months could the informer file an action. See S. REP. No. 78-291, pt. 1, at
2 (1943) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 10756).
82. According to the majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee:
[The qui tam mechanism of the FCA] was enacted during Civil War time, to meet
a situation then existing, which does not now exist. At that time the office of the
Attorney General was not staffed sufficiently to handle the many matters which
arose and was not possessed of investigative facilities now at the disposal of that
office. Now adequate facilities in respect to handling such matters exist and
through the Federal Bureau of Investigation and many other investigative
agencies of the Government, adequate investigations of frauds against the
United States are being made.
83. According to Senator Langer:
The records show that in all the lawsuits brought against corporations their
employees or officers and against other individuals who have cheated or
defrauded the Government not a single individual has been sent to jail. This is so
despite the fact that some persons have come in and pleaded guilty.
Id pt. 2, at I (minority views).
84. See 89 CONG. REc. 7572 (1943) (statement of Sen. Van Nuys) (explaining the
Committee's decision not to seek outright abolition of the qui tam provisions).
85. S. REP. No. 78-291, pt. 2, at 1 (minority views) ("Some have endangered the lives
of our soldier boys by the furnishing of materials such as wire not up to specifications, and
... they have defrauded the Government in war contracts or W. P. A. contracts, and in
every other way that human ingenuity could devise."). In scheduling floor debate, Senator
Taft noted that the bill seemed "highly controversial" and that he had received many
letters opposing it. 89 CONG. REC. 7347 (1943) (statement of Sen. Taft).
86. See infra notes 352-78 and accompanying text (discussing parliamentary debate
over the Common Informers Act).
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Investigation.8 Moreover, the FCA had become a source of
"racketeering" reminiscent of Al Capone in the days of Prohibition,
as "racketeers and blackmailers" filed qui tam actions in order to
negotiate nuisance settlements. 88 Senator Langer, on the other hand,
argued that defense contractors made Al Capone look like "a
gentleman, ... a statesman, a scholar, and a patriot" because the
contractors defrauded the government and endangered American
troops.89 Additionally, Senator Langer expressed skepticism about
the Justice Department's willingness to enforce the statute
vigorously.90 In any event, he argued, additional help enforcing the
statute could not hurt.91
The final legislation enacted by Congress in 1943 reflected a
compromise between the positions of those advocating abolition of
the qui tam provisions and those arguing for their full retention. 92
The FCA ultimately retained the common informer, but in a
considerably restricted role. The informer could file an FCA action,
but had to provide the supporting evidence to the Justice
Department, which had sixty days in which to intervene and take
exclusive control of the suit.93 Moreover, the legislation deprived the
courts of jurisdiction over any qui tam action based upon information
or evidence already possessed by the government at the time the suit
was commenced. 94  Significantly, the informer was denied the
assurance of a fixed minimum recovery.95  If the government
prosecuted the suit, the court could award the informer "fair and
87. See 89 CONG. REC. 7571 (1943) (statement of Sen. Van Nuys).
88. Id. at 7571 (statement of Sen. Van Nuys), 7608 (statement of Sen. Van Nuys); see
also id. at 7439 (statement of Sen. Van Nuys) (reporting that racketeers were "springing
up like mushrooms all over the United States, ... taking advantage of this antiquated
statute").
89. Id. at 7579 (statement of Sen. Langer).
90. See id at 10,697 (statement of Sen. Langer) ("I ask any Senator to name one case
from 1863 until 1942, in which the Attorney General of the United States tried to enforce
the statute. From the day the statute went on the statute books to the present, the
Attorneys General, whether Democrats or Republicans, fought it."). For other
expressions of skepticism about the Justice Department's willingness to aggressively
enforce the statute, see id at 7575 (statement of Sen. Murray), and id. at 7614 (statement
of Sen. Wheeler).
91. See id. at 7606 (statement of Sen. Langer).
92. See Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (1943) (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 3730 (1994)).
93. See id. § 3491(C), 57 Stat. at 608 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)).
The informer could regain control of the action if the Justice Department failed to carry
on the litigation with due diligence over a period of six months. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. § 3491(E).
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reasonable compensation" not to exceed 10% of the proceeds.96 If
the informer conducted the action, however, the legislation provided
that the informer's award could not exceed 25% of the recovery.97
C. The 1986 Revival of the FCA Qui Tam Provisions
In the early 1980s, the Department of Defense experienced a
series of scandals involving excessive prices paid for items procured
from defense contractors. This was the era of the $435 hammer, the
$640 toilet seat cover, and the $7622 coffee maker.98 Although these
particular incidents may have had more to do with an inefficient
procurement system than with fraud, high-profile expos6s by the
national media helped to generate pressure for Congress to amend
the False Claims Act.99
Congress significantly altered the FCA in 1986.100 Several of the
changes applied to FCA actions generally, regardless of who sued for
the government. The penalty was increased to a minimum of $5000
96. See id. § 3491(E)(1).
97. See id. § 3491(E)(2).
98. See, e.g., James Gerstenzang, Admiral Removed over High-Priced Ashtrays, L.A.
TIMES, May 31,1985, at 1, available in 1985 WL 2069170; Weinberger Demands New Effort
to Cut Costs, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1983, at A17.
99. See False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 295
(1986) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 4.J89/1:99148) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Rep.
Stark) (drawing a connection between Civil War frauds leading to the original enactment
of the FCA and "absurd, sweetheart deals for coffeemakers, toilet seats, and other
excessive costs" chronicled in the 1980s); False Claims Reform Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong. 15 (1985) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 4J8912:s.hrg99-452) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("Over the past several years it seems like we have been
treated to monthly scandals as we pick up the newspaper with our morning coffee."); S.
REP. No. 99-345, at 13 (1986) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 13676), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5278 ("Evidence of rampant fraud in Government programs since
[1980] has renewed the effort to legislate a more effective statute."); 132 CONG. REC.
10,862 (1986) (statement of Sen. McClure) (introducing into the congressional record,
Paul Craig Roberts, Editorial, Open-Ended Assault on Liberties, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22,
1986, at A28, which described bills to amend the FCA as "legislative responses to
sensational reports of defense contractors billing the Pentagon for $600 toilet seats and
$100 screwdrivers"). The Justice Department had been criticized for alleged laxity in its
handling of white-collar criminal prosecutions. In September 1985, Attorney General
Edwin Meese III responded with a package of proposals intended to fight defense fraud,
adding momentum to the drive for revision of the FCA. See Howard Kurtz, Meese Unveils
Plan to Fight Defense Fraud, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1985, at A3.
100. See False Claims Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994)). The 1986 FCA amendments also prompted
the enactment of parallel qui tam legislation at the state level. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 12650-12655 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 68.081-.092 (West
Supp. 1997).
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and a maximum of $10,000 for each violation, plus treble the
government's actual damages.' Congress also eliminated any
requirement of specific intent to defraud the government, imposing
liability based upon "reckless disregard of the truth or falsity" of
information provided to the government by the defendant10
Despite the Justice Department's reservations, 13 Congress also
made several changes to the statute for the purpose of encouraging
qui tam litigation. Under the amended statute, the informer is
guaranteed costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees as well as 15% to 25%
of the proceeds of the litigation when the Justice Department
intervenes, and 25% to 30% if the Justice Department does not.104
Even if the Justice Department does intervene, the informer can
continue as a party. 05  The fact that the government already
possessed the information underlying the qui tam suit is no longer a
jurisdictional bar unless the information had been "public[ly]
disclos[ed]" and the informer fails to prove that she was "an original
source of the information."50 6
Supporters of the 1986 FCA amendments offered three primary
justifications for increased reliance on qui tam enforcement: (1) the
need to provide incentives for disclosure of fraudulent conduct;
(2) the Justice Department's unwillingness to aggressively prosecute
101. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
102. Id § 3729(b).
103. The Justice Department took the position that changes to the qui tam provisions
were unnecessary and that the proposed amendments could create problems in
government prosecution of fraud cases. Nevertheless, because the Justice Department
wanted other changes to the FCA, it did not object to the qui tam amendments in the
context of the overall bill. See House Hearings, supra note 99, at 135-41 (statement of
Richard K. Willard, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division); Senate Hearings, supra
note 99, at 26 (testimony of Jay Stephens, Deputy Associate Attorney General); S. REP.
No. 99-345, at 36, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5301 (letter dated Dec. 11, 1985, from Phillip D.
Brady, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Sen. Thurmond, Chairman, Committee on
the Judiciary).
104. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2). The statute permits a lower award when the suit is
based primarily on publicly disclosed information, when the informer plans and initiates
the conduct giving rise to the claim, or when the informer is convicted of a criminal
offense arising from her role in the violation. See id. § 3730(d)(1), (3).
105. See id. § 3730(c)(1).
106. Id. § 3730(e)(4). It is not entirely clear how Congress intended the changes in
rules regarding the jurisdictional bar in § 3730(e)(4) to relate to § 3730(d)(1), which
reduces the informer's award when the suit is based primarily on publicly disclosed
information. The Tenth Circuit has reconciled these provisions by construing the
jurisdictional bar of § 3730(e)(4) to apply when the government has not intervened in a
qui tam action and the award modifier in § 3730(d) (1) to apply when the government does
proceed with the action. See United States ex reL Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., 971 F.2d
548,553 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992).
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fraud cases; and (3) the limited enforcement resources available to
the federal government.1' 7  With respect to the first of these
justifications, many legislators and other advocates of qui tam
litigation viewed the informer's bounty as a means of encouraging
whistleblowers.'0  Government investigators in some cases can
uncover fraud by their own efforts, but in other circumstances, they
need inside information to detect and punish fraudulent schemes.
The difficulty in obtaining inside information is that a person who
sees or participates in fraudulent activity may have little to gain, and
much to lose, from exposing the illegal conduct. 9 Congress believed
the large rewards made available to informers under the amended
FCA would encourage those with knowledge of fraud to undertake
the risks of disclosure."0
The remaining two justifications for encouraging qui tam
enforcement flowed from Congress's perception that the Justice
Department failed to adequately enforce the False Claims Act.
Several participants in the legislative deliberations claimed that, even
when presented with evidence of illegal conduct, the Justice
Department did not aggressively investigate and prosecute those who
107. See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in
Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1821-25 (1996) (discussing the
benefits of qui tam actions); infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text (discussing the
justifications for qui tam actions).
108. See House Hearings, supra note 99, at 325 (testimony of Sen. Grassley) ("In short,
S. 1562 would shift the incentives for individuals to come forward by allowing them more
involvement in the litigation process as well as increased portions of damage awards.");
Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 29 (testimony of Jay Stephens, Deputy Associate
Attorney General) (stating that through the incentive of personal recovery, qui tam
enforcement encourages individuals with information to bring that information to the
appropriate authorities, thereby assisting in the prosecution of fraud); id. at 102 (testimony
of John Phillips, Co-Director, Center for Law in the Public Interest) ("What this law will
do, is create inducements and encouragement to the very people seeing the fraud going on
day in and day out in these defense establishments. It will help the Justice Department
ferret out the information."); 132 CONG. REC. 22,339 (1986) (statement of Rep. Berman)
("These provisions improve the incentives for citizens with knowledge of fraudulent
claims against the Federal Government to go public with the information, and afford such
whistleblowers protection against retaliation by their employers.").
109. According to the Senate committee responsible for the FCA legislation,
"[d]etecting fraud is usually very difficult without the cooperation of individuals who are
either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity. Yet in the area of
Government fraud, there appears to be a great unwillingness to expose illegalities." S.
REP. No. 99-345, at 4 (1986) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 13676), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,5269.
110. See H.R. REP. No. 99-660, at 23 (1986) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 13702). The
1986 FCA amendments also sought to reduce the risks of disclosure by creating statutory
protection against job-related retaliation for whistleblowing activities. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(h).
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were defrauding the public."' This alleged prosecutorial timidity was
explained in two ways, one sinister and the other benign. The sinister
explanation was that the Justice Department failed to act as a result
of "political" considerations.1  Indeed, some thought the Justice
Department to be "on the side of the defense contractors.1 1 In this
view, qui tam enforcement was justified as a corrective measure for
the Justice Department's unwillingness to enforce the law. 4
The benign explanation for the Justice Department's failure to
prosecute more fraud claims was the need to ration enforcement
resources. In the midst of the Gramm-Rudman budget pinch,' some
supporters of the FCA amendments argued that the Justice
111. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 99, at 174 (statement of Rep. Berman)
(noting that because of institutional and practical constraints, the Justice Department is
unable to bring cases for every act of fraud and that "qui tam offers a real potential ... to
provide that prodding, that nudging, that will get the Justice Department into some of
these areas"); id at 177-79 (statement of Rep. Hertel) (citing recover per conviction
statistics and noting "an apparent failure of legal deterrence"); id. at 296-98 (statement of
Sens. Cohen, Roth, and Levin); id. at 326 (statement of Sen. Grassley) (stating that
"[p]essimism about the likelihood of disclosures leading to results is not surprising" when
one considers that more than 2000 fraud investigations were completed in 1984, "[y]et the
Justice Department successfully prosecuted in that same year just 181 cases, including only
one against one of the top 100 defense contractors"); id. at 325 (statement of Sen.
Grassley); H.R. REP. No. 99-660, at 22-23 ("[T]he Committee is concerned that there are
instances in which the Government knew of the information that was the basis of the qui
tam suit, but in which the Government took no action.").
112. 132 CONG. REC. 22,340 (1986) (statement of Rep. Bedell) ("[I]n many cases, the
authorities will not prosecute for political reasons.... [T]he Justice Department has
neither the political will nor the resources to always enforce all of the laws.").
113. Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 27 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("[T]he
American people have lost confidence in their Government's willingness and ability to act
effectively against defense contractors. Day after day, they read about cases that are
washed under the rug, wiped out.... [T]hey believe the Government is not on their side
114. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 99, at 179 (statement of Rep. Hertel) ("It
could be a very effective anti-waste weapon allowing individuals to proceed where the
government has not."); id. at 330-31 (statement of Rep. Bedell) ("[We need some type of
a guarantee, so that if there are problems and ... the Justice Department refuses to do
anything about them, there should be some opportunity for the people of our country to
see that something is done. That is really the purpose of this legislation."); Senate
Hearings, supra note 99, at 112 (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("Private citizen involvement
in uncovering fraud against Government would be a desirable discipline on the
enforcement process.").
115. See House Hearings, supra note 99, at 417 (testimony of John Phillips, Co-
Director, Center for Law in the Public Interest) (noting that the Justice Department is
"the first to say we need larger budgets, but [required budget cuts are] going to confront
their staffs as well"); S. REP. No. 99-345, at 7 (1986) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:Serial 13676),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5272 ("[W]ith current budgetary constraints, it is
unlikely that the Government's corps of individuals assigned to anti-fraud enforcement
will substantially increase.").
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Department simply did not have the means to investigate and
prosecute many of the fraud allegations brought to its attention." 6
The Department necessarily allocated resources to high-priority cases
and, therefore, could not pursue other claims involving problems of
proof or fewer dollars."7 Thus, the third justification for increasing
qui tam enforcement was that private litigants and their attorneys
would supplement government enforcement resources. Increased qui
tam enforcement was touted as "an opportunity without adding one
more person to the Federal payroll of enlisting support of thousands
of people in ferreting out fraud against the Government.""n8
In deciding to expand qui tam enforcement of the FCA,
Congress's debate over the 1986 amendments focused on the scandals
of the moment without acknowledging the deeper concerns raised by
qui tam statutes. Congress paid little or no attention to the English
experience drawn from centuries of qui tam enforcement. Part III
analyzes this English history and finds that there are significant
concerns about qui tam enforcement that recur inevitably over time.
III. THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE WrIH QuI TAM ENFORCEMENT
The English have an extensive history of qui tam enforcement
spanning hundreds of years. Prior to the advent of modern law
116. See House Hearings, supra note 99, at 95 (statement of Rep. Berman) ("Whether
as a result of lack of resources, or worse, the Department of Justice has not done an
acceptable job of prosecuting defense contractor fraud."); id at 324-25 (statement of Sen.
Grassley) ("[Tihe Government needs help-lots of help-to adequately protect the
Treasury against growing and increasingly sophisticated fraud."); id at 416-17 (testimony
of John Phillips, Co-Director, Center for Law in the Public Interest) (noting the lack of
government resources to investigate fraud); Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 22
(statement of Sen. Grassley) (noting that although the government operates with
enormous resources, private citizen involvement is necessary for proper enforcement of
anti-fraud statutes); S. REP. No. 99-345, at 7, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272 ("In addition to
detection, investigative and litigative problems which permit fraud to go unaddressed,
perhaps the most serious problem plaguing effective enforcement is a lack of resources on
the part of Federal enforcement agencies.").
117. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 7, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272 ("Taking into
consideration the vast amounts of Federal dollars devoted to various complex and highly
regulated assistance and procurement programs, Federal auditors, investigators, and
attorneys are forced to make 'screening' decisions based on resource factors."); see also
House Hearings, supra note 99, at 157 (testimony of Richard K. Willard, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division) ("We endeavor to target [our] resources as best we can
on the cases that involve the largest amount of money .... As a result, there are some
smaller cases that simply can't be pursued profitably because if we go after the small cases
it means leaving the bigger case unworked.").
118. House Hearings, supra note 99, at 417 (testimony of John Phillips, Co-Director,
Center for Law in the Public Interest); see also id at 325 (statement of Sen. Grassley)
("The False Claims Act does not create any new Federal enforcement bureaucracy.").
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enforcement and the development of the regulatory state, England
relied heavily upon qui tam informers to perform many tasks that
today are the work of police officers, prosecutors, and administrative
officials." 9 Nevertheless, Parliament abandoned qui tam enforcement
midway through the twentieth century, and the legislative debates
make clear that Parliament considered the abolition of qui tam
legislation a positive legal reform.' While Congress in 1986 moved
to supplement public enforcement with qui tam enforcement of the
False Claims Act, 2 the movement in England was in precisely the
opposite direction: toward purely public implementation of penal
statutes.12
What did Parliament know that Congress did not?
Consideration of the long English experience with qui tam legislation
and the recurring problems that this form of law enforcement created
is instructive in answering that question. This Part will review the
history of qui tam litigation in England to show why Parliament came
to consider elimination of qui tam enforcement-and its replacement
with a regime of exclusively public enforcement-as an important and
progressive modification of its legal system.
A. Roman and Anglo-Saxon Antecedents
English qui tam statutes had historical antecedents in Roman and
Anglo-Saxon law. Roman criminal law relied on a system of
prosecution by private citizens, known as delatores.12 Beginning no
later than the Lex Pedia, which retroactively made criminals of
Caesar's assassins, it became common for Roman criminal statutes to
offer a portion of the defendant's property as a reward for a
successful prosecution.'24
119. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 133(b), at 569 (1985); see also Pitzer, supra note 54, at 417 ("In England the qui tam
doctrine was initially instituted as a legal adjunct to supplement England's insufficient
legal machinery in order to bring more offenses to the cognizance of the courts.").
120. See infra notes 348-78 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 348-78 and accompanying text.
123. See O.F. ROBINSON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OFANCIENT ROME 100 (1995).
124. See 10 THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY 402 n.19 (2d ed. 1996). Such statutes
qualify as qui tam legislation because they define an offense against the public and permit
an uninjured private party to sue for a share of a statutory forfeiture. See supra notes 48-
53 and accompanying text.
Pecuniary rewards were provided, for instance, under the laws prohibiting treason,
see 10 THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY, supra, at 212-13, and adultery, see id. at 891-
92. Criminal prosecutions brought by private-citizen delatores exerted significant
influence over Roman politics and often were initiated for political purposes. Cato, for
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An example of private qui tam enforcement can also be found in
Anglo-Saxon England." In 695 A.D., Wihtred, King of Kent, issued
a law prohibiting labor on the Sabbath, which included the following
qui tam enforcement provision: "If a freeman works during the
forbidden time [between sunset on Saturday evening and sunset on
Sunday evening], he shall forfeit his healsfang, and the man who
informs against him shall have half the fine, and [the profits arising
from] the labour.1 26  This Anglo-Saxon provision foreshadowed
subsequent developments in English law, as the backlash against
obnoxious conduct of informers enforcing the Sunday closing laws
1250 years later helped generate the political consensus for England's
elimination of qui tam legislation. 7
B. Qui Tam Statutes in Medieval England
The English experiment with qui tam enforcement began in
earnest 250 years after the Norman Conquest." Legislation
important to the national sovereign was not always a high priority to
local officials; in fact, enforcement of national law was particularly
difficult when such national legislation undermined local officials'
interests. Faced with limited public enforcement resources and the
difficulty of implementing national policies over numerous,
geographically separated, local jurisdictions, Parliament began during
the fourteenth century to turn increasingly to qui tam enforcement as
the most practical means to police compliance with regulatory
requirements.
The 1318 Statute of York,'2 9 an early English qui tam provision,
instance, was acquitted 44 times and also brought charges against his political opponents.
See 8 THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY 178-82, 453-54 (2d ed. 1989). Delatores
appear in the historian Tacitus's accounts "as an almost unmitigated pest." ROBINSON,
supra note 123, at 100; see, e.g., 2 TACITUS, THE HISTORIES bk. 4, § 44, at 85 (Clifford H.
Moore trans., 1962) ("[T]he informers' abilities, wrath, and power, which they used to evil
ends, were what men feared."). Dissatisfaction with the institution of financially
interested private prosecutions apparently led to legal reform. By the time of Justinian's
Digest, persons could be barred from bringing criminal prosecutions "because of their
unsavory method of making money, such as those who have lodged two actions against
two accused." DIG. 48.2.8 (Macer, De Publicis Judiciis 2).
125. See T.F.T. PLUCKNETr, EDWARD I AND CRIMINAL LAW 31-32 (1960). Professor
Plucknett identified a qui tam enforcement provision adopted prior to the consolidation of
authority in a single English monarch. See id.
126. THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 3, 27 (F.L. Attenborough ed. &
trans., 1963). "Healsfang" was a fine paid to avoid punishment. 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 1050 (2d ed. 1989) (defined under "halsfang"/"healsfang").
127. See infra notes 345,350-52,375 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 129-69 and accompanying text.
129. 12 Edw. 2, ch. 6 (1318) (Eng.).
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demonstrates the potential for conflict between national policies and
local interests. The legislation related to the "assizes of wine and
victuals," which required uniform prices for certain consumer goods,
set by reference to established criteria. 3 ° Parliament was concerned
that enthusiasm for enforcing the price restrictions could wane if local
officials were themselves selling the regulated commodities. The
Statute of York addressed this problem by providing that "no Officer
in City or in Borough, that by Reason of his Office ought to keep
Assises of Wines and Victuals" could sell the regulated items, "and if
any do, and be thereof convict[ed], the Merchandize whereof he is
convict[ed] shall be forfeit[ed] to the King.' ' 31
This prohibition on sale of regulated commodities by regulatory
officials could have its intended effect only if the threat of forfeiture
was supported by a realistic likelihood of enforcement. The King, of
course, could not be in all places at all times. Nor did he have an
extensive network of paid royal officials whose loyalty to the interests
of the Crown could be assumed. 32 The question, therefore, was how
to assure that city and borough officers would take seriously the
threat of forfeiture posed by the statute. Parliament's solution was to
permit qui tam enforcement of the penalty: "[T]he third Part [of the
forfeited merchandise] shall be delivered to the Party that sued the
Offender, as the King's Gift. And in such Case he that will sue [for a
thing so forfeited,] shall be received. 133 While the King retained
authority to "assign his Justices to execute" the statute "when and
where it pleaseth him,"'" the default method of enforcement was to
induce the cooperation of local citizens to act as the King's agents.
Similar concerns about local underenforcement of national
regulations explain a 1331 qui tam statute 35 that was intended to
enforce a provision of the 1328 Statute of Northampton regulating the
length of fairs. 3 6 An important avenue of commerce in fourteenth
century England, a fair could be conducted only "in virtue of a royal
grant, or by long and immemorial usage and prescription which
presupposes such a grant.' 3 7 The Statute of Northampton required a
130. See 1 E. LIPSON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND 293-94 (12th ed. 1959)
(discussing assizes of bread and ale, under which prices were set by reference to prices of
wheat, barley, and oats).
131. 12 Edw. 2, ch. 6.
132. See 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 39, at 355.
133. 12 Edw. 2, ch. 6 (footnote omitted).
134. Id.
135. See 5 Edw. 3, ch. 5 (1331) (Eng.).
136. 2 Edw. 3, ch. 15 (1328) (Eng.).
137. 1 LIPSON, supra note 130, at 226; see id. at 221 ("For many centuries [fairs and
[Vol. 78
QUI TAM STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT
lord to keep a fair open "for the Time that they ought to hold it, and
no longer," consistent with a royal charter or established usage. 138 A
lord holding a fair open past the specified closing time risked a fine,
and a merchant ignoring the deadline could be "grievously
punished.1 39
Of course, the economic incentive for merchants was to continue
selling their wares as long as customers lingered. Likewise, the lord
conducting the fair had little incentive to enforce the closing time,
particularly if he collected tolls based on total sales.'4 Once again,
the challenge was implementing royal policy, which here required
strict adherence to the authorized closing time. In 1331, Parliament
adopted a qui tam provision that put teeth into the Statute of
Northampton, at least as it applied to merchants:
[I]f it be found, that any merchant from henceforth sell any
Ware or Merchandize at the said fairs after the said time,
such merchant shall forfeit to our Lord the King the double
Value of that which [is sold;] and every man that will sue for
our Lord the King, shall be received, and [also have] the
Fourth Part of that which shall be lost at his Suit.''
By offering the statutory reward of a quarter of any recovery,
Parliament deputized those on site at each fair to act as the King's
eyes and ears and to initiate enforcement actions against merchants
who ignored the published deadline. 142 Thus, merchants faced a
realistic economic threat if they failed to observe the statutory
requirements. Any sale after the fair's official close could become a
net loss; indeed, the larger the sale, the more the merchant stood to
markets] were the chief centres of traffic and the main channels of commercial
intercourse.").
138. 2 Edw. 3, ch. 15.
139. Id The statute indicates that at least some fairs were held "for yielding certain
ferm for the same to the King." Id It appears, then, that the King received revenue in
exchange for the privilege of conducting a fair he chartered.
140. See 1 LIPSON, supra note 130, at 246.
141. 5 Edw. 3, ch. 5 (1331) (Eng.) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). This qui
tam statute was the most enduring of them all. It was adopted in 1331 and stayed on the
books until Parliament abandoned qui tam enforcement in 1951.
142. This statute was discussed during the House of Commons debate over the
Common Informers Act of 1951. The sponsor of the Common Informers Bill commented:
Thus it can be seen how, in those days, in the absence of police, civil servants or
officials of local authorities, such as inspectors, and so on, of whom it cannot be
said that there is any dearth today, it was not only useful but necessary to provide
what we might call this amateur machinery, and also to rely upon incentives to a
public conscience less developed than it is, in some respects, today.
483 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2082 (1951) (statement of Mr. Heald).
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forfeit, with the customer potentially acting as the informer.'43
A much more ambitious regulatory undertaking is reflected in
two Statutes of Labourers, enacted in 1349'" and 1350.' 41 The 1349
legislation was adopted to address economic effects of a labor
shortage caused by the plague. Exhibiting the bias of the wealthy,
Parliament saw rising wages as a sign of economic opportunism by the
working classes' 46 and enlisted common informers to police a system
of wide-ranging wage and price controls.4 7 Under these laws, if a
worker requested or a master agreed to wages exceeding levels that
prevailed three years before the statute's enactment, and no
aggrieved party brought suit, an informer could commence an action
and keep the entire penalty.'48 Likewise, a food merchant who
charged unreasonable prices forfeited double the amount received to
the aggrieved party or to anyone else who chose to pursue the issue.'49
These controls also allowed informers to seek forfeitures from a town
mayor or bailiff who failed to enforce the price regulations issued by
Parliament 50
Over the next 150 years, what began as a trickle of qui tam
statutes gradually became a flood. The bulk of these enactments
regulated economic activities in a wide array of industries.1 ' One
143. Four years later, Parliament again turned to common informers to enforce
economic regulations with the passage of the Statute of Money, which regulated
counterfeiting and other currency offenses. The statute imposed forfeitures for prohibited
exports of silver, for bringing "false Money or Counterfeit sterling" into the country, for
using a form of currency known as "black money," and for melting down certain English
coins. 9 Edw. 3, ch. 2-4 (1335) (Eng.). All of the forfeitures were enforceable by common
informers, who were entitled to a quarter of whatever was recovered for the King. Id. ch.
5. "Black money" was a type of coin "issued as silver but containing a high alloy of base
metal." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 227 (3d ed. 1976). For a
subsequent statute using qui tam provisions to enforce regulations relating to
counterfeiting and unlawful use of coins by gold and silver workers, see 17 Edw. 4, ch. 1
(1477) (Eng.) (establishing the informer's share at one-third of any forfeiture).
144. Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. 3 (1349) (Eng.).
145. Statute of Labourers, 25 Edw. 3 (1350) (Eng.).
146. See Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. 3, pmbl. ("Because a great Part of the People,
... died of the Pestilence, many seeing the Necessity of Masters, and great Scarcity of
Servants, will not serve unless they may receive excessive Wages, and some [are] rather
willing to beg in Idleness, than by Labour to get their Living .... ).
147. See id. ch. 3, 6. Besides the wage and price controls, the statute also required
labor by able-bodied men and women and made it illegal to give anything to a beggar who
could work. See id- ch. 1, 7.
148. See id. ch. 3.
149. See id. ch. 6.
150. See id The 1350 Statute of Labourers sought to prevent disregard of the prior
year's enactment, see 25 Edw. 3, pmbl., and again provided for qui tam suits to police
excessive wages, see idL ch. 5.
151. Of particular interest is a 1455 statute addressing an oversupply of lawyers in the
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finds qui tam provisions, for instance, in a 1381 statute regulating the
price of wine,'152 a 1416 statute' 53 prohibiting "patenmakers" from
using the timber "aspe" in making "patens" or "clogs,' 54 and a 1423
statute providing for forfeiture of defectively tanned leather and
prohibiting cordwainers from acting as tanners. 55 Numerous other
qui tam statutes touched upon a wide variety of British commercial
activities. 56
city of Norwich and the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk. See 34 Hen. 6, ch. 7 (1455)
(Eng.). Previously only six to eight attorneys practiced in the King's courts in the region,
and, as a result, there had been "great tranquility." Id. The number of attorneys had since
grown to 80 or more, and most of the lawyers were undereducated in the law. See id.
These underemployed and unqualified attorneys had taken to haunting public gathering
places such as fairs and markets, "exhorting, procuring, moving and inciting the people to
attempt untrue and foreign suits for small trespasses, little offences, and small sums of
debt." Id. As a result, there had been "many suits more of evil will and malice, than of
truth of the thing, to the manifold vexations and no little damage of the inhabitants of the
said city and counties." Id. Consequently, the statute limited the number of "common
attornies" in the region to 14 (six in each county and two in the city) to be selected and
admitted by the justices of the King's courts. Id. Any person who presumed to act as an
attorney without proper admission was subject to a qui tam prosecution for a forfeiture of
20L See id.
152. See 5 Rich. 2, ch. 4 (1381) (Eng.).
153. See 4 Hen. 5, ch. 3 (1416) (Eng.). The stated purpose of the statute was "so that
the [arrow makers] through the realm shall sell their arrows at a more easy and reasonable
price from henceforth than they were wont." Id The concern, apparently, was that
pattenmakers would create too much demand for asp and drive up the price paid by arrow
makers, then known as fletchers. A subsequent statute relaxed the regulation and
permitted pattenmakers to use asp that could not be used for arrow shafts. See 4 Edw. 4,
ch. 9 (1464) (Eng.).
154. "Clogs" and "pattens" are wooden-soled shoes. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 425, 1657 (3d ed. 1976).
155. See 2 Hen. 6, ch. 7 (1423) (Eng.).
156. See, e.g., 22 Edw. 4, ch. 8 (1482) (Eng.) (channeling trade with Scotland through
the towns of Berwick and Carlisle); 22 Edw. 4, ch. 5 (1482) (Eng.) (prohibiting the fulling
of hats, caps, and bonnets in a "fulling mill"); 22 Edw. 4, ch. 4 (1482) (Eng.) (restricting the
price of bows); 22 Edw. 4, ch. 3 (1482) (Eng.) (restricting silk imports for four years); 12
Edw. 4, ch. 7 (1472) (Eng.) (prohibiting mills, dams, and other structures that impeded
navigation); 7 Edw. 4, ch. 3 (1467) (Eng.) (prohibiting the export of woolen yarn and cloth
that had not been shrunk properly to make it thicker); 4 Edw. 4, ch. 4 (1464) (Eng.)
(prohibiting any but cloth and yarn makers from purchasing unshorn wool from specified
counties); 4 Edw. 4, ch. 3 (1464) (Eng.) (prohibiting certain wool shipments from
Newcastle); 3 Edw. 4, ch. 4, §§ 4-5 (1463) (Eng.) (authorizing "masters and wardens... of
every craft and mystery" to seize a merchant's wares on the ground that they were "not
pure, lawful, and able.., and duly wrought and made, as they ought to be"); 3 Edw. 4, ch.
4, § 1 (1463) (Eng.) (permitting qui tam seizure of various imported wares, such as saddles,
tennis balls, and playing cards); 3 Edw. 4, ch. 3 (1463) (Eng.) (restricting silk imports for a
five-year period); 3 Edw. 4, ch. 2 (1463) (Eng.) (prohibiting grain imports if market prices
became depressed); 3 Edw. 4, ch. 1 (1463) (Eng.) (restricting wool exports and prohibiting
use of foreign vessels to transport merchandise if domestic ships were available); 34 Hen.
6, ch. 5 (1455) (Eng.) (restricting silk imports); 34 Hen. 6, ch. 4 (1455) (Eng.) (limiting beer
and ale production); 28 Hen. 6, ch. 1 (1449) (Eng.) (permitting seizure of goods from
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In addition to the many statutes regulating economic affairs, a
few qui tam statutes enforced non-economic, social regulations.15 7
Other statutes, such as the 1318 Statute of York, discussed
previously,58 employed qui tam suits to police the conduct of public
officials and to ensure the integrity of governmental processes.
Another early qui tam statute directed at public officials is the 1350
Statute of Cloths,159 which governed the conduct of "the King's
aulneger and his deputies," officials responsible for enforcing
regulations concerning cloth sold by English merchants. 6 The 1350
statute required the aulneger to measure wares sold as "whole
cloth.' 6' Merchandise that did not satisfy statutory requirements was
forfeited to the King. 62 An aulneger convicted of failing to do his
office "well and lawfully" was subject to "prison of one year, and
ransomed at the King's will, and put out of his office for ever." 63 The
statute also contained a qui tam provision permitting a "buyer of such
cloth, or other that will sue" to prove that the aulneger "hath done
any fraud or deceit in his office," with the informer entitled to one-
half of the statutory forfeiture.' 64
The use of qui tam provisions to regulate the performance of
public functions became increasingly common in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. In 1360, Parliament permitted informers to sue
"Brabant, Holland, and Zealand" in retaliation for an ordinance barring English wool
imports); 23 Hen. 6, ch. 3 (1444) (Eng.) (prohibiting export of woolen threads, called
"thrums"); 8 Hen. 6, ch. 17 (1429) (Eng.) (requiring export of certain goods through Calais
to enable the King to collect customs); 8 Hen. 5, ch. 3 (1420) (Eng.) (restricting items
which could be gilded with silver); 3 Hen. 5, ch. 1 (1415) (Eng.) (prohibiting use of certain
coins).
157. See, e.g., 7 Hen. 4, ch. 14 (1405) (Eng.) (restricting the granting of liveries).
Another statute sought to keep commoners in their place by permitting wealthy
landowners to seize swans in the possession of those with incomes below specified levels.
See 22 Edw. 4, ch. 6 (1482) (Eng.). A 1477 statute permitted qui tam suits against those
playing the games of "closh, kailes, half-bowl, hand in and hand out, and queckboard," or
permitting those games to be played on their property. 17 Edw. 4, ch. 3 (1477) (Eng.).
158. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
159. 25 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1350) (Eng.).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The aulneger held office at some peril, since the statute also made him
answerable for the conduct of his deputies. See id. A subsequent statute provided a qui
tam remedy against aulnegers when cloth had been "plaited and tacked together." 11
Hen. 4, ch. 6 (1409) (Eng.). Another law permitted suit if an aulneger sealed cloth that did
not meet statutory requirements, refused to seal cloth that did, charged more than the
statutory fees, or refused to exhibit his commission. See 4 Edw. 4, ch. 1, § 5 (1464) (Eng.).
Still another statute provided a qui tam remedy for sealing cloth from Norfolk, Suffolk, or
Essex that failed to comply with certain regulations. See 8 Edw. 4, ch. 1 (1468) (Eng.).
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jurors who accepted bribes.165  Shortly thereafter, another law
authorized qui tam suits if a person responsible for procuring and
arranging for carriage of provisions for the King's household accepted
a bribe.16 A 1391 statute permitted suits against mayors, sheriffs, and
bailiffs who failed to implement a rule concerning measurement of
grain. 67 A 1442 statute prohibited customs officials and other public
employees from engaging in businesses related to their public
duties. 168 The value of qui tam suits as a check on public officials had
become so well accepted by 1444 that Parliament adopted no fewer
than five such statutes in that single year.1 69
C. Qui Tam Reform in the Early Tudor Period
The conclusion of the War of the Roses in the late fifteenth
century brought to the throne the first Tudor monarch.'7 At this
stage, concerns began to develop over the burgeoning system of qui
165. See 34 Edw. 3, ch. 8 (1360) (Eng.).
166. See 36 Edw. 3, ch. 3 (1362) (Eng.). A subsequent statute suggests why a merchant
might pay to avoid doing business with the King's purveyors. That enactment regulated
purveyor abuses such as demanding a nine bushel quarter of grain (the legal standard was
eight bushels) and requiring merchants to transport grain without compensation. See 1
Hen. 5, ch. 10 (1413) (Eng.). The 1413 statute can be read to permit suit only by an
aggrieved party, but qui tam enforcement was clearly authorized when the statute was
reenacted 20 years later. See 11 Hen. 6, ch. 8 (1433) (Eng.).
167. See 15 Rich. 2, ch. 4 (Eng.) (1391) (defining a "quarter" of grain as eight bushels
rather than nine and requiring punishment of those who traded in "quarters" of nine
bushels); see also 11 Hen. 6, ch. 8 (1433) (Eng.) (reaffirming the earlier statute).
168. See 20 Hen. 6, ch. 5 (1442) (Eng.).
169. The 1444 statutes enforced a one-year term limit for sheriffs, see 23 Hen. 6, cl. 8
(1444) (Eng.), governed the procedure for levying wages for knights of a shire, see id. ch.
11, addressed fraud and irregularities in parliamentary elections, see id. ch. 15, governed
inquests by "escheators," see id ch. 17, and protected wine importers from levies or other
disturbances by public officials. See id ch. 18. Another statute the same year prohibited
the agent of a lord from taking goods against a merchant's will. See id clh. 14. Other qui
tam statutes permitting suit against public officials followed. See 17 Edw. 4, ch. 2 (1477)
(Eng.) (limiting the jurisdiction of the "court of pipowder" conducted in connection with a
fair and permitting a suit if an official exercised jurisdiction over a case not arising at the
fair or failed to require plaintiff or attorney to swear that the act complained of occurred
at fair); 17 Edw. 4, ch. 1 (1477) (Eng.) (permitting suit against officials who
inappropriately marked silver products); 34 Hen. 6, cli. 6 (1455) (Eng.) (permitting suit
against court officials who failed to afford protections to an abbot who had been the victim
of an onslaught of lawsuits); 34 Hen. 6, ch. 3 (1455) (Eng.) (making Exchequer officials
liable for misconduct, including the charging of "great and excessive gifts, fees and
rewards, for execution of their offices"); 28 Hen. 6, ch. 5 (1449) (Eng.) (permitting suit
against customs officials who made unlawful "distresses, arrests, charges, and
impositions"); 27 Hen. 6, ch. 3 (1448) (Eng.) (targeting customs officials who permitted
foreign merchants to carry gold or silver-rather than English goods-out of the country).
170. See GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, A SHORTENED HISTORY OF ENGLAND
182-84 (1942).
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tam enforcement.
1. Reform Legislation Under Henry VII
Early in Henry VII's reign, it had become apparent that qui tam
enforcement of penal statutes had created serious problems, yet
Parliament gave no sign that it had become disillusioned with qui tam
enforcement in general.' Indeed, a 1487 reform statute began with a
recitation of the benefits of these "popular" actions, which could be
"much profitable ... to the King" when pursued properly.172 The
difficulty, however, arose from collusion between defendants and
informers, which had frustrated enforcement of penal statutes.7
Because the outcome in a qui tam suit was binding on the
government, persons subject to penal statutes had learned how to
turn the system of private prosecution to their advantage. A potential
qui tam defendant could effectively immunize himself from
prosecution with the assistance of a friendly informer. The informer
would bring an action alleging violation of the statute and either take
the case to judgment or execute a release, presumably recovering
little or nothing from the defendant. The judgment or release in the
collusive action would then bar good faith attempts to enforce the
statute. 7 4
To counter such actions, the reform legislation rendered
ineffective any release given by a commoner. 75 If a defendant pled a
recovery in a prior action as a bar to a good faith suit, the plaintiff was
entitled to allege "that the said recovery ... was had by
[collusion].' 1 76 A person found guilty of colluding with a qui tam
informer was subject to two years' imprisonment. 177
2. The Injustices of Empson and Dudley
Rampant oppression infested the Court of Exchequer during
Henry VI's reign, instigated by two acquisitive Exchequer officials,
Sir Richard Empson and Edmund Dudley.7 8 These two officials,
according to a seventeenth century historian, "turned Law and Justice
171. See 4 Hen. 7, ch. 20 (1487) (Eng.).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See SIR RICHARD BAKER, A CHRONICLE OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND 247
(London, printed for H. Sawbridge 1684). For background on the Court of Exchequer,
see 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 39, at 231-46.
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into Rapine."'179 Among other tactics, they extorted fines by leaving
defendants in prison without trial, conducted summary non-jury
proceedings in their private homes, and punished juries that reached
what they considered to be the "wrong" verdict. Their abuses
centered around enforcement of penal statutes, in which they were
aided and abetted by a number of qui tam informers, also known as
"promoters." One observer reported that Empson and Dudley
"considered not whether [a penal statute] was obsolete, or in use; and
had ever a rabble of Promoters and leading Jurors at their command,
so as they could have any thing found, either for fact or valuation.""18
Upon assuming the throne, one of Henry VIII's first official acts was
to imprison Empson, Dudley, and the common informers who had
assisted them. Empson and Dudley were both beheaded later for
high treason, and the informers all died in prison.'
Perhaps as a result of the abuses of Empson and Dudley,
Parliament enacted a minor qui tam reform during the reign of Henry
VIII.Y2 The statute of limitations for a qui tam action was reduced
temporarily to one year. 3 This contrasted with the three-year statute
of limitations that applied to actions brought by the King.18
D. Qui Tam Reforms Under Elizabeth land James I
Notwithstanding the problem of collusive litigation and reports
of corrupt informers, qui tam legislation thrived throughout the
Tudor period."M As these statutes became even more commonplace,
179. BAKER, supra note 178, at 247.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 254.
182. See JOHN G. BELLAMY, CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATE MEDIEVAL AND
TUDOR ENGLAND 105-06 (1984).
183. See 1 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1509) (Eng.).
184. See id.
185. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. A statute enacted under
Edward VI deserves special mention as the most draconian of all English qui tam statutes.
The Vagabonds Act, 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3 (1547) (Eng.), which was drafted by a university
professor, was aimed at preventing "idleness and vagabondry," identified as "the mother
and root of all thefts, robberies, and all evil acts, and other mischiefs." Id; see 2 LEON
RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
FROM 1750, at 140 (1957). An informer could bring charges against a "runagate servant,
or any other" for living "idly and loiteringly." 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3. If convicted, the defendant
was subject to branding, beating, and bondage. See iU. (directing that the defendant be
branded with a "mark of V" and allowing the informer to "take the said slave and give
him bread, water or small drink, and refuse meat, and cause him to work, by beating,
chaining or otherwise, in such work and labour as he shall put him unto, be it never so
vile"). A slave who ran away again was subject to further branding and was consigned to
slavery for the rest of his life. See id. The statute was partially repealed two years after its
enactment. See 3 & 4 Edw. 6, ch. 16 (1549) (Eng.).
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a class of professional informers arose, making their living by
pursuing qui tam litigation throughout the country. This proliferation
of professional informers gave rise to a host of abuses in the process
of qui tam enforcement. The government initially responded through
ad hoc intervention by the Privy Council. ls6 Nevertheless, the need
for a systemic overhaul eventually became apparent, leading
Parliament to adopt several significant reform statutes.'8
1. Professional Informers as "Viperous Vermin"
Reliance upon qui tam legislation was perhaps a matter of
necessity given the shortage of police, prosecutors, and other
regulatory officials in Tudor England."as If the laws were to be
enforced, someone had to bring violations to the attention of the
courts. Without the inducement of the statutory reward, there could
be no assurance that enough enforcement actions would be filed to
produce the desired deterrent effect.
As in the medieval period, qui tam statutes in Tudor England
often sought to control the activity of participants in the marketplace
and to police the conduct of market regulators.189 During the reign of
Henry VIII, qui tam statutes were also used to regulate the clergy and
the Church. One statute employed informers to enforce limitations
on the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, restricting their
authority to summon persons residing in different dioceses.190 This
186. See infra notes 224-33,240-47 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 260-82 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 119; infra notes 370-71 and accompanying text.
189. For instance, the Apprentices Act of 1536 operated as an early antitrust statute by
prohibiting a master or craft guild from requiring an oath that barred an apprentice from
opening a competing shop when the apprenticeship ended. See 28 Hen. 8, ch. 5 (1536)
(Eng.). In effect, the statute prohibited a particular type of contract in restraint of trade.
See id. An earlier statute also addressed misuse of the economic power to confer
apprenticeships, limiting fees that apprentices could be charged by masters and guilds. See
22 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1530) (Eng.); see also 31 Eliz., ch. 12, § 2 (1588) (Eng.) (regulating the
sale of horses at markets and fairs and imposing forfeitures on public officials, parties, and
witnesses to such transactions); 4 & 5 Phil. & M., ch. 5, § 34 (1557) (Eng.) (regulating the
manufacture of woolen cloths); 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ch. 7, § 6 (1555) (Eng.) (regulating the
sale of horses at markets and fairs); 5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch. 6, § 51 (1552) (Eng.) (regulating the
manufacture of woolen cloths); 33 Hen. 8, ch. 27 (1541) (Eng.) (prohibiting oaths by any
person connected with a hospital, college, deanery, or corporation promising to be bound
by a rule permitting a minority vote to frustrate a grant, gift, lease, or election by the
institution); 28 Hen. 8, ch. 14 (1536) (Eng.) (regulating the prices of wines); 19 Hen. 7, ch.
8 (1503) (Eng.) (prohibiting local officials from levying a custom called "scavage" or
"shewage" on merchants).
190. See 23 Hen. 8, ch. 9, § 3 (1531) (Eng.). Use of qui tam legislation to control the
judicial system was also reflected in a statute prohibiting "maintenance" of litigation. See
32 Hen. 8, ch. 9, § 3 (1540) (Eng.). "Maintenance" is "[a]n officious intermeddling in a
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statute was among several enacted during Henry VIII's reign that
dealt with "clerical jurisdiction and offenses committed by the
clergy.' 191
With numerous qui tam statutes on the books, each promising a
reward for a successful private prosecution, it was inevitable that
some would be lured to set aside other labors and take up careers in
law enforcement. Professor Elton traces the activities of George
Whelplay, a London haberdasher who turned to a career as a
common informer in 1538.Y2 Elton concludes that Whelplay "must
have employed something like a small detective agency; it is out of
the question that he should have personally rushed about the country
in the necessary fashion, on the off chance of getting evidence for a
breach of the law."' 93
Professional informers like Whelplay provided the backbone of
enforcement for English penal statutes, making up for the absence of
a large corps of public investigators and prosecutors.9 4 The extent of
the activity of common informers is suggested by Professor Davies'
enlightening study examining 675 selected cases from the reign of
Elizabeth I in which violations of the apprenticeship statutes were
alleged. Professor Davies found that approximately three-quarters of
these cases were brought by professional informers."-,
Such professional informers quickly developed an unsavory
reputation. They were described variously as "varlets, '19 6 "lewde"'1
lawsuit by a non-party by maintaining, supporting or assisting either party, with money or
otherwise, to prosecute or defend the litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 954 (6th
ed. 1990) (citation omitted); see also 1 Jam., ch. 5 (1604) (Eng.) (limiting the extent to
which "court barons" could profit from the imposition of fines).
191. BELLAMY, supra note 182, at 101.
192. See G.R. Elton, Informing for Profit: A Sidelight on Tudor Methods of Law-
Enforcement, 11 CAMBRIDGE HIST. J. 149,150 (1954).
193. Id at 157; see also M.J. Ingram, Communities and Courts: Law and Disorder in
Early-Seventeenth-Century Wiltshire, in CRIME IN ENGLAND 1550-1800, at 110, 122-23
(J.S. Cockburn ed., 1977) ("[Common informers ... were often organized in syndicates
backed by substantial Londoners."). Court records refer to associates who worked with
Whelplay. See Elton, supra note 192, at 162 & n.42 (noting that Whelplay was assisted by
Ellis Brooke and John Dower).
194. See MARGARET GAY DAVIES, THE ENFORCEMENT OF ENGLISH
APPRENTICESHIP: A STuDY IN APPLIED MERCANTILISM 1563-1642, at 18-19 (1956);
Elton, supra note 192, at 149-50.
195. See DAVIES, supra note 194, at 18-19. I am indebted to Professor Davies's
informative study for alerting me to a number of the sources cited in this portion of the
Article.
196. WILLIAM HARRISON, THE DESCRIPTION OF ENGLAND 175 (Georges Edelen ed.,
Cornell Univ. Press 1968) (1587). Harrison lamented the daily abuse of the poor "by
sundry varlets that go about the country as promoters or brokers between the pettifoggers
of the law and the common people, only to kindle and espy coals of contention whereby
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and "evil."'1 98 One highly placed critic of informers was Sir Edward
Coke.'99 In his Institutes of the Laws of England, Coke listed "the
vexatious informer" as one among several "viperous Vermin" preying
upon the Church and the Commonwealth.0 0 Indeed, informers
harassed and impoverished citizens, particularly those in the lower
classes, "for malice or private ends, [but] never for love of Justice.""2 1
Coke's attitude toward informers was similar to that expressed in
an opinion of the Court of Star Chamber. Sir John Stafford had
initiated an action as a common informer, perhaps lured by the
potential for easy money. Stafford" 'was greatly blamed by the court
that [despite] being so worthy a gentleman, ... he would stoop to so
base an office as to be an informer, who albeit they be necessary in
every well-governed state, yet for the most part they are of the
meaner and worst [sort].' ,,21
The antipathy toward informers was even stronger among the
lower and middle classes, who suffered most from the informers'
activities. Indeed, common informers were occasional targets of mob
violence. In 1566, informers triggered riots in the vicinity of the
Westminster courts.203 Queen Elizabeth issued a proclamation noting
that "great routs and companies" had "assembled themselves
together against such as be informers upon penal laws and statutes,
commonly called promoters." 204  The angry citizens "made great
outcries" against the informers and beat them severely.2 5 The
proclamation threatened imprisonment for anyone participating in
the one side may reap commodity and the other spend and be put to travail." Id.
197. 22 AcTs OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND 1591-92, at 404, 404-05 (John
Roche Dasent, L.B., ed., Mackie & Co. 1901) (entry dated Apr. 25, 1592) [hereinafter
PRIVY COUNCIL 1591-92]; DAVIES, supra note 194, at 63.
198. DAVIES, supra note 194, at 50 (internal quotation omitted).
199. Coke served as Solicitor General and Attorney General under Elizabeth I, as
Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, as a Member of Parliament, and on the
Court of King's Bench under James I. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 242-45 (5th ed. 1956).
200. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *194.
201. Id. Informers were, according to Coke, "turbidum hominum genus"-a wild or
disordered class of men. Id. at *191.
202. See WILLIAM BRADFORD WILLCOX, GLOUCESTERSHIRE: A STUDY IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 1590-1640, at 57 (1940) (quoting JOHN HAWARDE, LES REPORTES DEL
CASES IN CAMERA STELLATA 1593 TO 1609, at 331-32 (William P. Baildon ed., London,
private printing for Alfred Morrison, esq. 1894)); see also DAVIES, supra note 194, at 63
n.1 (quoting same).
203. See Proclamation Protecting Informers (Nov. 11, 1566), reprinted in 2 TUDOR
ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS 288 (Paul L. Hughes & James F. Larkin, c.s.v., eds., 1969).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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such riots, along with further punishment "by whipping, standing
upon the pillory or otherwise" as ordered by the Court of Star
Chamber.0
2. Problems Arising from Qui Tam Enforcement
The disdain for common informers in Tudor England arose from
their motives and methods. Informers were widely perceived as self-
interested at best and malevolent at worst 2 7 The charge of self-
interest was a natural inference from the bounty provision of a qui
tam statute. The Privy Council208 in 1552 created a "Committee of
Ten" to encourage those informers who acted from love of country
and a desire to see the laws enforced.3 9 The Committee's instructions
criticized informers who acted "parteleye for theire owne singular
gayne, parteleye for malice, corrupcion and other devilisshe
affection. 2 1
0
These motives impacted informers' methods of law enforcement.
Because anyone could be an informer, the profession did not always
attract the most scrupulous citizens. Most informers tended to act in
ways that would improve their bottom line, often at the expense of
competing considerations such as the relative culpability of the
defendant, the fairness of the proceedings, or the broader interests of
the public' Some of the informers' objectionable methods are
discussed in the subsections that follow.212
206. Id.; see also WILLIAM CAMDEN, THE HISTORY OF THE MOST RENOWNED AND
VICTORIOUS PRINCESS ELIZABETH, LATE QUEEN OF ENGLAND 87 (London, 4th ed.
printed for R. Bentley at the Post Office in Covent Garden 1688) ("About this time was
restrained by wholsome Severity the Insolency of certain bad people, which here and there
offered violence, beat, and openly in the Streets cried out against, those Informers whome
the vulgar sort calleth Promoters.").
207. See, e.g., COKE, supra note 200, at *194 (complaining that informers enforced the
law "for malice or private ends, and never for love of justice").
208. The Privy Council was a body of royal advisors that exercised both executive and
judicial functions. See generally 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 39, at 477-525 (discussing
the history and responsibilities of the Privy Council).
209. See M.W. Beresford, The Common Informer, The Penal Statutes and Economic
Regulation, 10 ECON. HIST. REV. 221,223-25 (2d ser. 1957-1958).
210. Id. at 225 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
211. See, e.g., THE BOOK OF PENALTIES; OR, SUMMARY OF THE PECUNIARY
PENALTIES INFLICTED BY THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, ON THE COMMERCIAL,
MANUFACTURING, TRADING, AND PROFESSIONAL CLASSES, IN THEIR SEVERAL
OCCUPATIONS AND BUSINESSES at vi (London, Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange 1834)
(characterizing informers as "mostly needy pettifoggers,... who pursue their vocation not
for justice, but for gain" and noting that they did not care "whether they receive[d] a
penalty for the infraction of a law or an equivalent bribe ... their purpose not being to
give impartial efficiency to the laws, but to fill their pockets").
212. See infra notes 213-47 and accompanying text.
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a. Unlicensed Compositions
Just as today, it was common in Tudor England for parties to an
action under an English penal statute to conclude that a settlement-
then called a "composition"-would advance the interests of all
involved. A qui tam informer could seek a license from the court to
"compound" (i.e. negotiate a settlement) with the defendant for a
lesser fine than that called for by the statute .21  A composition
benefited both parties by avoiding the expenses of litigation and the
risk of an adverse verdict.
Despite the availability of licenses for compositions, it became
common for informers to enter into unlicensed compositions with
present or prospective defendants.214 In the case of a licensed
composition, the court ensured that the government received its
portion of the proceeds 1 s In contrast, an unlicensed composition
permitted the informer to keep the entire recovery without giving the
government a share.2 16 Thus, it was in the economic self-interest of an
unscrupulous and financially motivated informer to settle a case
without bringing the settlement to the court's attention.
The economic forces pressing informers and defendants toward
unlicensed compositions are easy to envision. Suppose that a penal
statute imposed a fine of 10E for a particular offense, half going to the
informer and half to the Crown. Suppose further that an informer
obtained persuasive evidence of a statutory violation, so that the
defendant would likely lose 10£ if he defended the action. In such
circumstances, the defendant might well be willing to pay the
informer 7f to drop the prosecution. The defendant would save 3£
and the costs of litigation. Likewise, the informer could pocket the
entire 7E, putting him in a better position than if he pursued the
action to judgment and received half of the statutory forfeiture.1 In
an unlicensed composition, the informer and the defendant split the
government's share of the statutory penalty. This arrangement
213. See DAVIES, supra note 194, at 51. To "compose" and to "compound" are
synonyms, both referring to the act of bringing disparate elements together into a unified
whole. Compare 3 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 591-92 (2d ed. 1989) (defining
"compose"), with id. at 627-29 (defining "compound").
214. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
215. See Elton, supra note 192, at 152 (noting that Exchequer barons took half of the
forfeited sum for the King).
216. See 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 39, at 356 ("Threats to sue were easy means of
levying blackmail.").
217. Of course, the defendant in an unlicensed composition risked a subsequent
prosecution by another informer or public officials. Thus, such secret settlements were
more likely when the chances of a further prosecution were small.
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benefited everyone except the government, which was usually none
the wiser. The chances that the government would find out about the
collusion were diminished further if the informer never filed an action
in the first place. Thus, a palpable incentive existed for informers to
threaten suits against merchants and other potential defendants and
then compound prior to commencing a prosecution. This collection
of payments in return for a promise not to prosecute was, in essence,
a form of blackmail or extortion.218
The practice of negotiating unlicensed compositions appears to
have been common. In 1574, an investigation by the Court of the
Exchequer resulted in the imprisonment of nine informers for
unlicensed compositions.219 Professor Davies' investigation of qui tam
prosecutions under the apprenticeship statutes revealed that in cases
filed by professional informers, court records were "inconclusive"
four-fifths of the time, likely because many cases were resolved
informaliy. 2 The fact that professional informers continued filing
apprenticeship actions-despite the large number of cases that
resulted in no judgment or reported composition-suggests that
informers were receiving compensation directly from the
defendantsP 1 Moreover, the four-fifths figure refers to cases actually
filed with the court.' Other cases likely were never filed because the
informer and the potential defendant reached a secret settlement
before the initial pleading.3
b. Fraudulent and Malicious Accusations
A common criticism of informers was that they pursued
fraudulent or malicious prosecutions. 4 An unprincipled informer
218. The Model Penal Code defines a crime of "compounding," which is committed if a
person "accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit in consideration of refraining
from reporting to law enforcement authorities the commission or suspected commission of
any offense or information relating to such an offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5
(1985). This provision "carries forward a modem version of the traditional offense of
compounding" and has the purpose of reaching "obstruction of justice bordering on
extortion." Id. Explanatory Note for §§ 242.1-.8, at 180, 182; see also SEYMOUR F.
HARRIS, PRINcIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 93-94 (1877) (describing the crime of
compounding informations upon penal statutes). For a discussion of the law of extortion
and blackmail, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTt, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 8.12
(2d ed. 1986).
219. See DAVIES, supra note 194, at 43, 67.
220. See iL at 59.
221. See iL
222. See id-
223. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
224. For instance, in a letter to the Bishop of Exeter, the Privy Council authorized
continued imprisonment of an informer named Andrewe Holmer for "false informacions"
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who hit a dry spell on meritorious cases might be tempted to pursue
false or unfounded accusations in hopes of misleading the court or
intimidating the defendant into a settlement. For instance, in
October 1619, the Privy Council considered a letter from justices of
the peace of Wiltshire County complaining of "intollerable abuses
and wrongs" committed by common informers, causing "trade and
comerce betweene that county and other neighbour counties [to be]
almost quite overthrowne." According to the justices, informers
had driven defendants to compound even though the defendants had
been lawfully licensed by the court. 6  The letter named William
Hackett as the informer "most notorious for extortion and other
misdemeanors." 2 7  The Privy Council appointed a committee,
including Sir Edward Coke, to conduct hearings into alleged abuses
by Hackett and others.' The committee was later expanded and
ordered to examine a number of other misbehaving informers.229
On another occasion, the Privy Council intervened to order the
arrest of a common informer named Richard Ayre upon a petition
from "the woollbuyers of Hallifax." 0  Ayre was accused of filing
informations against several petitioners for violation of a particular
penal statute, even though the petitioners' actions were specifically
exempted by the statutory language231 Ayre would "not joyne any
issue" with the petitioners, "but insiste[d] upon nycities in pleadinges
to overtake them that way," causing great expense to the
defendants.232 Consequently, the Council ordered Ayre committed to
until he acknowledged his fault and give bond for good behavior. PRIVY COUNCIL 1591-
92, supra note 197, at 404, 404-05 (entry dated Apr. 25, 1592). Holmer had allegedly
prosecuted "clamorous complaintes" against a certain innocent vicar. Id. The Council
concluded that the prosecutions resulted from "splene and malice and without any juste
cause given by" the defendant. Id.
225. 37 AcTs OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND 1619-21, at 42, 42 (His Majesty's
Stationery Office 1930) (entry dated Oct. 20, 1619) [hereinafter PRIVY COUNCIL 1619-21].
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. A warrant was issued for Hackett's arrest, see id. at 63, 63 (entry dated Nov. 17,
1619), and Hackett was temporarily imprisoned, see id. at 85, 85 (entry dated Dec. 6,
1619); DAVIES, supra note 194, at 71-72. The ultimate outcome of his case, however, is
uncertain. See DAVIES, supra note 194, at 72.
229. See PRIVY COUNCIL 1619-21, supra note 225, at 128, 128-29 (entry dated Feb. 11,
1620). Another case concerned a common informer who filed a "multiplicite of
informacions" in the Court of the Exchequer against wool buyers in Cornwall. See id. at
227, 227 (entry dated June 23, 1620). The Council ordered the withdrawal of pending
informations against the Cornwall merchants, who were not covered by the qui tam
statute, and the rejection of any such information filed in the future. See id. at 228.
230. Id. at 63, 65 (entry dated Nov. 17,1619).
231. See id- at 65.
232. Id.
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prison until he withdrew all actions against the wool buyers 3
c. Selection of Inconvenient Venues
One method employed by common informers to encourage
favorable settlements of qui tam litigation was to file the case in a
location that made defense impossible or inconvenient. Coke relates
that a favorite tactic of informers was to file all cases at Westminster,
regardless of the nature of the offense or the place were it was
committed, resulting in excessive burdens on defendants.' As noted
by Professor Davies: "An accused country craftsman or farmer, faced
with the prospect of an expensive and time-consuming journey to
London and an indefinite wait there for trial, would have been likely
to submit promptly."235 Even if the informer did not file the action in
London, he might try to deprive the defendant of any "home court
advantage" by filing in a county where the parties and witnesses were
not known to the potential jurors.z 6
d. Selection of Inappropriate Defendants
A further defect in the system of qui tam enforcement related to
selection of targets for prosecution. Ideally, a public prosecutor
exercises discretion in choosing prosecution targets in order to avoid
applying a statute in ways that undermine the public interestp 7 A qui
tam statute eliminates any incentive for a benevolent exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. The common informer has little reason to
consider broader issues of public policy raised by a particular
prosecution, and in fact has a strong financial incentive not to take
such considerations into account. The result is that informers pursue
litigation that disinterested prosecutors would consider contrary to
the public good 3s In Tudor England, for example, Parliament had
allowed the accumulation of numerous outdated penal statutes that
233. See id. The Council also instructed him not to execute any judgment previously
obtained. See id
234. See COKE, supra note 200, at *192 ("[Common informers, and many times the
kings attorny drew all informations for any offence, in any place within the realm of
England against any penall law to some of the kings courts at Westminster, to the
intolerable charge, vexation, and trouble of the subject....").
235. DAVIES, supra note 194, at 27.
236. See COKE, supra note 200, at *192.
237. See infra notes 387-92 and accompanying text.
238. It is difficult to imagine a public prosecutor, for instance, taking the course
attributed to informer William Hackett and others, who filed so many actions against
persons transporting commodities into Wiltshire County that commerce with neighboring
counties was "almost quite overthrowne." PRIVY COUNCIL 1619-21, supra note 225, at 42,
42 (entry dated Oct. 20, 1619).
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no longer served their original purposes.P9 By enforcing outdated
statutes or targeting technical violations, informers on occasion
interfered both with individual liberty and with important avenues of
commerce.
One example of informers creating economic hardship through
their selection of prosecution targets appears in a Privy Council
record from 1620.240 The Council had received a letter from justices
of the peace in Kent recounting the economic distress of farmers
caused by "the cheapnes and want of vent of come. ' 241  An
overabundance of grain in Kent apparently had resulted in depressed
prices, a complaint the Council also had heard from other regions of
the country 42 In reply, the Council alerted the justices to a related
problem caused by informers-"disturbance given by informers in
carrying come from port to porte within the kingdome for the supplie
of such partes where come is most scarce. 243 A public prosecutor
could exercise discretion to relax enforcement of statutes directed at
grain shippers until the economic crisis passed. The informers,
however, lacked any incentive to take into consideration these
distributional problems in the English grain markets and had
effectively halted shipment of grain from region to region simply by
wielding the threat of a qui tam suit.
Another example of a common informer's disinclination to
consider the public good appears in a letter from the Privy Council to
the Lord Treasurer.2 The letter concerned a complaint by East
Indies merchants about an information filed in the Court of
Exchequer under a statute for the "garblinge," or sifting of spices.24
The merchants argued that the necessities of their trade made it
difficult to comply with the literal terms of the statute, but that they
did comply with its intent.246 Perhaps because the spice trade was
239. See COKE, supra note 200, at *191 ("Many penall laws obsolete, and in time grown
apparently impossible, or inconvenient to be performed, remained as snares, whereupon
the relator, informer or promooter did vex and entangle the subject .... ").
240. See PRIVY COUNCIL 1619-21, supra note 225, at 114, 114 (entry dated Jan. 28,
1620).
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. See 34 Acrs OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND 1615-16, at 512, 512 (His
Majesty's Stationery Office 1925) (entry dated Apr. 20, 1616) [hereinafter PRIVY
COUNCIL 1615-16].
245. See 1 Jam., ch. 19 (1604) (Eng.), repealed by 6 Anne, ch. 16 (1707) (Eng.); PRIVY
COUNCIL 1615-16, supra note 244, at 512, 512 (entry dated Apr. 30, 1616).
246. See PRIVY COUNCIL 1615-16, supra note 244, at 512 (entry dated Apr. 30, 1616).
According to the merchants, the manner of their business and the sheer volume of spices
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important to the national economy, the Council endorsed the
merchants' position, ordering a stay of the informer's case in the
Exchequer and punishment of the informer for his
presumptuousness.247
3. Governmental Responses to Abusive Qui Tarn Enforcement
As observed in the previous subsection, the Privy Council
responded to qui tam abuses through ad hoc intervention in judicial
proceedings.2' In addition, royal officials sought to counteract the
problem of unlicensed compositions by awarding patents that granted
particular individuals special enforcement authority under designated
penal statutes 49 These patents created problems of their own,
however, because they granted monopolies to favorites of the Crown
and because they continued to treat law enforcement as a profit-
making enterpriseY ° Parliament eventually responded with a series
of measures designed to restrict common informers and a related
statute controlling issuance of royal patents.
a. Royal Patents
Unlicensed compositions worked to the detriment of the royal
treasury because the Crown received no part of the settlements.21' As
the unreliability of informers became more apparent, the Crown
increasingly resorted to issuing patents or commissions for
enforcement of penal statutes. A royal patent might authorize the
patentee to prosecute violations of the law in return for a share of the
proceeds, to compound with violators, or even to sell dispensations
that relieved the purchaser of the obligation to comply with statutory
requirements. 2 Professor Holdsworth notes that, over time, such
commissions "were sought for and issued in wider and wider
terms."23 Like common informers, royal patentees enforced the law
they brought into the country "inforceth them to speedie sales and retornes, whereby they
may haply fall in dainger of the literall sence of the lawe, howsoever they may with all
carefuilnes indeavour to performe the intendment and purporte of the same." Id
247. See id.
248. See supra notes 224-33, 240-47 and accompanying text.
249. See 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 39, at 357.
250. See id at 357-58; infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text; infra note 254.
252. See 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 39, at 357 ("Persons were not only empowered to
sue for penalties and allowed to keep the proceeds; they were also allowed to compound
with offenders, and even to dispense (doubtless for a pecuniary consideration) with the
observance of the statutes.").
253. Id.
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for the sake of personal enrichment, but they could, in theory, be
trusted more than common informers because they faced the loss of
their patents if they fell out of royal favor. Moreover, the patentee
could be required to pay for the patent at the time of issuance,
ensuring that the Crown received a return from the enforcement of
penal statutes.z 4
Royal patents, however, were greatly criticized in Parliament,- 5
particularly when they permitted patentees to confer dispensations
authorizing disregard of legislative enactments. These "dispensing
patents" allowed a citizen to bargain with a patentee for the right to
violate the lawl 6 A dispensing patent was condemned "by all the
Judges of England" in the Case of Penal Statutes.257 The judges held
that "[w]hen a Statute is made by Parliament for the good of the
Commonwealth, the King cannot give the penalty, benefit, and
dispensation of such act to any subject; Or give power to any subject
to dispense with it." 8  In deference to this decision, the Crown
254. See DAVIES, supra note 194, at 32 ("[T]he pleasant jingle of ready money passing
from the patentee to the Crown replaced the uncertainties of dependence on informers'
honesty."). These justifications seemed to underlie a Privy Council letter written in 1620
in defense of the grant of a compounding patent. The patent was issued "to draw some
reasonable benifite to his Majestie by composition for such penalties," because "every
common informer ... did prosecute them for his owne advantage without regard of his
Majesty's profitt." PRIVY COUNCIL 1619-21, supra note 225, at 275, 275 (entry dated Aug.
16,1620).
255. Holdsworth explains the opposition to royal patents and commissions as follows:
It was one thing to supplement the activity of the common informer by
delegating persons to look into the infringements of statutes, and to sue for
penalties on behalf of the crown. It was quite another to confer upon them these
further prerogative rights; and matters were made worse when the Council
interfered on behalf of the grantee to prevent any one else from suing for the
penalty. The abuse was growing so rampant that Parliament, Coke tells us,
ceased to give the forfeiture from the breaches of statutes to the crown, and gave
them instead "to the relief of the poor and other charitable usesfl which cannot
be granted or employed otherwise."
4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 39, at 357-58 (quoting The Case of Penal Statutes, 7 Coke's
Reports 37a (1604)) (omission in original).
256. See WILLIAM HYDE PRICE, THE ENGLISH PATENTS OF MONOPOLY 12 (1906). A
Privy Council record from 1623 concerns a patent to compound with Irish farmers who
drew plows "by the tailes of horses." 39 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND
1623-25, at 152, 152 (His Majesty's Stationery Service 1933) (entry dated Dec. 8, 1623)
[hereinafter PRIVY COUNCIL 1623-25]. The patentees had deliberately set the fines low,
"seeking rather to nourish then abolish that uncivle custome." Id.
257. The Case of Penal Statutes, 7 Coke's Reports 36b (1604).
258. Id. According to Coke,
[W]hen a Statute is made pro bono publico, and the King (as the head of the
Commonwealth, and the fountain of Justice and Mercy) is trusted by the whole
Realm with it, this confidence and truth is so inseparably joyned and annexed to
the person of the King in so high a point of Soveraignty, that he cannot transferr
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stopped issuing dispensing patents, but it ignored any broader
implications of the case and continued to issue patents permitting the
holder to compound with offenders in the name of the King.2 9
b. Legislative Reform of the Enforcement of Penal Statutes
Legislative efforts at qui tam reform took many decades to reach
fruition. Legislative reform proposals were introduced and rejected
in the period 1543-1547.260 Between 1566 and 1571, Parliament first
rejected reform legislation offered by royal officials, and the Queen
then vetoed a bill passed by Parliament.l6 Queen Elizabeth I and
Parliament finally reached agreement in 1576 with passage of the first
of several significant qui tam reform statutes enacted during her reign
and that of King James I.
The 1576 statute dealt with the mounting problem of unlicensed
compositions by subjecting offenders to corporal punishment.2 62 The
act prohibited compounding for an alleged violation of a penal statute
until after the defendant answered the suit, and it precluded any
composition without consent of the court.263 An informer convicted
of violating the act, in addition to paying a fine, had to stand in the
pillory for two hours and was disqualified from acting as an informer
in future litigation.26 The statute also sought to discourage meritless
qui tam cases by requiring the informer to pay costs and damages if
the case was discontinued by the informer or resulted in a verdict for
the defense.265 Moreover, the act required the informer to sue in
the fame to the disposition or power of any private person, or to any private use:
for it was committed to the King by all his Subjects for the good of the
Commonwealth.
Id.
259. See DAVIES, supra note 194, at 31-33; PRICE, supra note 256, at 12; supra note 254
and accompanying text (discussing Privy Council letter of 1620 defending a compounding
patent). Interestingly, royal proclamations recognized that patents and monopolies were
frequently abused and harmful to the public good. See, e.g., Proclamation Concerning
Monopolies (Nov. 28, 1601), reprinted in PRICE, supra note 256, at app. J; Proclamation
Suspending Monopolies (May 7, 1603), reprinted in PRICE, supra note 256, at app. L.
Nevertheless, it proved easier to condemn "abuses" of the system than to abandon the
practice altogether.
260. See Beresford, supra note 209, at 225.
261. See G.R. ELTON, THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 1559-1581, at 73, 103 (1986);
FREDERIC A. YOUNGS, JR., THE PROCLAMATIONS OF THE TUDOR QUEENS 137-38
(1976).
262. See An Act to Redress Disorders in Common Informers, 18 Eliz., ch. 5, § 4 (1576)
(Eng.).
263. See id. § 3.
264. See id. § 4.
265. See id. § 3. A separate fee typically was charged for each significant service
rendered by a clerk, bailiff, or sheriff, so court costs could mount quickly in a case that
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person or through an attorney; informers were forbidden to employ
deputies.2 66
A second reform statute, enacted in 1587, took a limited step
toward correcting the problem of suits brought in London against
out-of-town defendants.267 The statute recited that subjects living in
remote areas had been "maliciously troubled" by penal actions filed
in the various London courts, and were consequently forced to attend
and make bail "to their great trouble and undoings."21 However, the
statute merely provided that if an offense was bailable or was such
that a court might grant leave to appear through an attorney, the
defendant was permitted to make his initial appearance through an
attorney without bail.2 69
In 1589, Parliament passed a third statute providing that
informers could file an action under a penal statute only in the county
where the offence was committed or the relevant contract was
formed.2 7 The defendant could defend on the ground that the
offense was not committed in the county alleged,271 and the act also
provided a one-year statute of limitations for most actions brought by
common informers.272 Any person who previously had been ordered
not to pursue a qui tam action because of a misdemeanor was
disqualified from bringing further penal actions except in cases where
the plaintiff was personally aggrieved.273
Notwithstanding the adoption of these three reform statutes
during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, Parliament continued to
grumble about the conduct of informers.274 King James I addressed
this and other grievances relating to the administration of justice in a
1621 proclamation.275  While sympathizing with Parliament's
went to trial. See DAVIES, supra note 194, at 55-57. The 1576 act also addressed the
issuance of process in qui tam cases and provided that a jury could not be compelled to
appear at Westminster for an offense committed more than thirty miles away. See 18 Eliz.,
ch. 5, § 2.
266. See 18 Eliz., ch. 5, § 1.
267. See An Act for the Continuance and Perfecting of Divers Statutes, 29 Eliz., ch. 5
(1587) (Eng.).
268. I& § 21.
269. See id-
270. See An Act Concerning Informers, 31 Eliz., ch. 5 (1589) (Eng.).
271. See id. § 2.
272. See id-. § 5. In addition, the legislation perpetuated prior statutes for "reformation
of disorders" by common informers. Id. § 1, cl. 2.
273. See id. § 1, cl. 3.
274. See A Proclamation Declaring His Majesties Grace to His Subjects, Touching
Matters Complained of, as Publique Greevances (July 10, 1621), reprinted in 1 STuART
ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS 512-13 (James F. Larkin, c.s.v., & Paul L. Hughes eds., 1973).
275. See id. (acknowledging "the complaint of His Commons, of the great damage and
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grievances concerning informers' vexatious conduct, the proclamation
stopped short of offering concrete legal reforms. It stated only that
the King had given "provident and good Directions" to his courts,
"accompanied with his strictest Charge and Commandment for due
observance of the same. 276
Two years later, Parliament adopted a pair of statutes that went
much further. The Statute of Monopolies prohibited most royal
monopolies and patents, including those authorizing the holder to
dispense with the requirements of a penal statute or to compound
with violators.2 A second statute noted that commoners had been
"grievously charged, troubled, vexed, molested, and disturbed" by
informers, who forced them to answer charges in the Westminster
courts "or else to compound with them for the same." '278 Responding
to the apparent failure of the Elizabethan legislation to drive
informers out of London, the act provided that penal actions could be
prosecuted only in a court with jurisdiction over the county where the
offense was committed. Actions pursued in the courts at Westminster
were ineffective.279 Moreover, the informer had to swear that the
offense was not committed in any county other than the one alleged
in the pleadings and that it had occurred less than one year before the
action was filed. 0 If the informer failed to prove that the offense was
committed in the county alleged, the defendant was to be found not
guilty. 81 The same Parliament also repealed a large number of
obsolete penal statutes that had been used by informers to ensnare
the unsuspecting.m
E. Qui Tam Enforcement into the Nineteenth Century
Parliament adopted only a few qui tam statutes in the
seventeenth century, but much qui tam legislation remained in force.
Common informers were able to continue their operations, although
without the access to the London courts that they had enjoyed
previously. Qui tam legislation, however, experienced a resurgence in
disquiet of His honest and good Subjects, proceeding from the troublesome and restlesse
spirits, and dispositions of Informers, and such as have vexed them by Informations, and
Supplicavits, in his Majesties Courtes at Westminster").
276. Id.
277. 21 Jam., ch. 3 (1623) (Eng.).
278. 21 Jam., ch. 4, § 1 (1623) (Eng.).
279. See id.
280. See idL § 3.
281. See id. § 2. The statute also permitted the defendant "to plead the general issue"
while at the same time introducing "special matter" in evidence. Id- § 4.
282. See 21 Jam., ch. 28, § 11 (1623) (Eng.); COKE, supra note 200, at *192.
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the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as Parliament adopted
a number of new statutes enforceable by common informers. This
Section will briefly overview qui tam legislation enacted from the
seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries. More detailed
attention will then be focused on two legal contexts in which
extensive documentation of informers' activities has survived: laws
restricting religious dissenters and laws aimed at controlling liquor
sales. Qui tam enforcement of religious duties came to play a
particularly significant role in subsequent debates over qui tam
legislation in England.
1. Abatement and Resurgence in Qui Tam Legislation
Common informers continued to experience official disfavor
following the reign of James I. In 1635, Charles I issued a
proclamation accusing informers of extorting secret settlements,
notwithstanding the Elizabethan legislation directed at unlicensed
compositions. 3 The proclamation sought to ensure that all qui tam
informations would be a matter of public record so that royal officials
could collect the King's money. The proclamation also sought to
afford relief to low-income defendants by providing for mitigation of
forfeitures imposed on those who could demonstrate poverty.85
Parliament enacted fewer qui tam statutes in the seventeenth century
than in previous centuries.8 6 Informers continued to operate under
the existing legislation, however, as well as under new statutes that
targeted religious dissenters.2 Having been barred from the London
courts for most offenses, informers shifted the locus of their activities
to the courts of the outlying counties.218
283. See A Proclamation for Prevention of Abuses of Informers, Clerkes, and Others
in Their Prosecutions upon the Lawes, and Statutes of this Realme (Sept. 6, 1635),
reprinted in 2 STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS 472-80 (James F. Larkin, c.s.v., ed.,
1983).
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See Gerald Hurst, The Common Informer, 147 CONTEMP. REV. 189, 189 (1935)
("Coke's influence caused a marked decline in the statutory recognition and
encouragement of common informers."). The seventeenth century nevertheless saw a few
qui tam statutes enacted. See, e.g., 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 8 (1695-96) (Eng.) (regulating the
collection of silver plate and the production of silver coin); Bank of England Act, 1694, 5
& 6 W. & M., ch. 20, § 27 (Eng.) (prohibiting the governor and the company of the Bank
of England from trading in goods, wares, or merchandise).
287. See infra notes 294-315 (discussing enforcement of laws regulating religious belief
and practice).
288. See THOMAS GARDEN BARNES, SOMERSET 1625-1640: A COUNTY'S
GOVERNMENT DURING THE "PERSONAL RULE" 54-56 (1961) (discussing the role of
common informers in Somerset quarter sessions); Ingram, supra note 193, at 124-25
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Qui tam legislation again came into favor in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries.0 9 The qui tam statutes in this period
resembled those of earlier centuries in their focus on economic
regulation,29° but also included laws designed to promote public safety
and to protect the environment.2 1 As in earlier periods, a variety of
qui tam provisions enforced statutory duties of public officials. 2 2 An
(noting that informers continued to practice in Wiltshire County after the 1623 Act,
although their activities were diminished).
289. Hurst suggested that "[t]he tide turned again in favour of the common informer in
the reign of George III." Hurst, supra note 286, at 190. Some qui tam legislation,
however, had been enacted during the reign of George II. See, e.g., Linen (Trade Marks)
Act, 1743, 17 Geo. 2, ch. 30 (Eng.); Gold and Silver Thread Act, 1741, 15 Geo. 2, ch. 20
(Eng.); Plate (Offences) Act, 1738, 12 Geo. 2, ch. 26 (Eng.).
290. See, e.g., Seal Fishery Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 18 (Eng.) (providing for
regulation of seal fishing in specified areas); Hosiery Manufacture (Wages) Act, 1874, 37
& 38 Vict., ch. 48, § 3 (Eng.) (prohibiting employers in the hosiery manufacture trade from
deducting charges from artificers' wages and from neglecting to pay wages in the coin of
the realm); Larceny Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 96, § 102 (Eng.) (prohibiting the
advertisement of a reward for return of lost or stolen property that suggests no questions
will be asked); North American Fisheries Act, 1819, 59 Geo. 3, ch. 38 (Eng.) (prohibiting
American and other foreign fishermen from taking, drying, or curing fish near certain
English territories in North America); Apothecaries Act, 1815, 55 Geo. 3, ch. 194, § 25
(Eng.) (regulating the licensing and practice of apothecaries and their assistants); Gold
and Silver Thread Act, 1788, 28 Geo. 3, ch. 7 (Eng.) (regulating the use of metals inferior
to silver in manufacture of threads, lace, and similar ornamental apparel); Plate Assay
(Sheffield and Birmingham) Act, 1772, 13 Geo. 3, ch. 52, §§ 4, 13, 15, 19, 23 (Eng.)
(regulating the marking and quality of Sheffield and Birmingham silver and the conduct of
assayers); White Herring Fisheries Act, 1771, 11 Geo. 3, ch. 31, §§ 11, 13 (Eng.)
(prohibiting charges and other hindrance of fishermen wanting to use certain ports and
shorelands); 5 Geo. 3, ch. 49 (1765) (Eng.) (regulating the issuance of bank notes); 29 Geo.
2, ch. 23, §§ 12, 17 (1756) (Eng.) (regulating Scottish fisheries and providing for customs
officers to act as qui tam informers); Disorderly Houses Act, 1751, 25 Geo. 2, ch. 36 (Eng.)
(enacting a penalty for maintaining a "disorderly house," i.e., an unlicensed place for
"publick dancing, music, or other publick entertainment of the like kind"); Linen (Trade
Marks) Act, 1744, 18 Geo. 2, ch. 24 (Eng.) (establishing penalties for improper marking of
linens); Universities (Wine Licenses) Act, 1743, 17 Geo. 2, ch. 40 (Eng.) (prohibiting
unlicensed wine sales at universities); Linen (Trade Marks) Act, 1743, 17 Geo. 2, ch. 30
(Eng.) (enacting penalties for linen bearing counterfeit stamps); Gold and Silver Thread
Act, 1741, 15 Geo. 2, ch. 20 (Eng.) (regulating the manufacture of gold and silver wire and
thread); Plate (Offences) Act, 1738, 12 Geo. 2, ch. 26 (Eng.) (regulating the quality and
marking of gold and silver products); Plate Assay Act, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, ch. 4 (Eng.)
(regulating goldsmiths, silversmiths, and assayers of gold and silver).
291. See Lighting and Watching Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 90, § 50 (Eng.)
(establishing a penalty for the pollution of waterways by gasworks); Fires Prevention Act,
1785, 25 Geo. 3, ch. 77 (Eng.) (prohibiting the boiling or distillation of more than ten
gallons of tar, turpentine, or oil within a specified distance of a building).
292. See, e.g., Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 50, § 159 (Eng.)
(penalizing clerks of a burrough court if a clerk or a clerk's partner is employed or
interested in prosecution of an offender); Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict.,
ch. 43, § 30 (Eng.) (penalizing clerks of peace for charging higher than established fees);
Commissioners Clauses Act, 1847, 10 & 11 Vict., ch. 16, § 15 (Eng.) (permitting suit
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important innovation in this area was the use of common informers to
enforce statutory disqualifications that prevented certain categories
of individuals from serving in the House of Commons.293
2. Qui Tam Enforcement of Religious Duties
Because religious disputes were also political disputes in this era
of English history, religious matters were subject to public
regulation.29 4 Starting in the sixteenth century, Parliament turned to
common informers to enforce penalties directed against various
categories of religious non-conformists. For instance, an Elizabethan
statute imposed penalties for saying or hearing a Catholic mass,
refusing to attend Anglican services, or even employing a
schoolmaster who refused to attend Anglican services.295 All of these
prohibitions were enforceable by qui tam actions.
Parliament continued to enact qui tam statutes relating to
religious belief and practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Much of the legislation targeted Catholics,296 although
against commissioners who act while incapacitated, not duly qualified, or without
subscribing required declaration); Juries Act, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, ch. 50, § 46 (Eng.) (specifying
the duties of court clerks and sheriffs in connection with the summoning and service of
jurors); Levy of Fines Act, 1822, 3 Geo. 4, ch. 46, § 10 (Eng.) (penalizing public officials
for failure to comply with statutory duties connected with levying of fines); Sale of Offices
Act, 1809,49 Geo. 3, ch. 126, § 6 (Eng.) (prohibiting advertisements relating to the sale of
offices); Land Tax Commissioners Act, 1798, 38 Geo. 3, ch. 48 (Eng.) (prohibiting non-
residents of a city or town from acting as its land tax commissioner).
293. See, e.g., House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1821, 1 & 2 Geo. 4, ch. 44
(1821) (Eng.) (disqualifying certain Irish officials from sitting in the House of Commons);
House of Commons (Clergy Disqualification) Act, 1801, 41 Geo. 3, ch. 63 (Eng.)
(disqualifying clergy of the Church of Scotland from sitting in the House of Commons);
House of Commons (Disqualifications) Act, 1801, 41 Geo. 3, ch. 52 (Eng.) (declaring
which persons would be disqualified from a seat in the House of Commons of the United
Kingdom following union with Ireland); House of Commons (Disqualification) Act, 1782,
22 Geo. 3, ch. 45 (Eng.) (disqualifying persons who held public service contracts or
commissions from sitting in the House of Commons); House of Commons Disqualification
Act, 1742,15 Geo. 2, ch. 22 (Eng.) (listing office holders who could not sit in the House of
Commons).
294. See infra notes 296-315 and accompanying text.
295. See 23 Eliz., ch. 1, §§ 4-6, 11 (1581) (Eng.); see also 35 Eliz., ch. 1, §§ 8-10 (1593)
(Eng.) (establishing a penalty for maintaining a non-relative who refuses to attend
Anglican services). Another statute from Elizabeth I's reign prohibited various forms of
simony, the sale of ecclesiastical positions, by the clergy. See 31 Eliz., ch. 6 (1589) (Eng.).
296. One statute adopted in the reign of James I permitted qui tam prosecution of any
Catholic who entered a house occupied by the King or the heir apparent, see 3 Jam., ch. 5,
§ 2 (1605) (Eng.), who remained living within ten miles of London (except those who
worked there or had no alternative residence), see id. §§ 2-3, who practiced law, medicine,
or held certain court or military offices, see id § 6, who married in a non-Anglican
ceremony or failed to have a child baptized by an Anglican minister or was buried
somewhere other than an Anglican church or church-yard, see iL § 10, or against anyone
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some qui tam statutes also affected Protestant dissenters. For
instance, the statute of Elizabeth's reign that required attendance at
Anglican services could ensnare Catholics and dissenting Protestants
alike.297 Parliament also permitted a qui tam action against anyone
administering the sacrament of the Lord's Supper who had not "been
made priest by episcopal ordination" in the form and manner
prescribed by the Book of Common Prayer 98 Some observers have
suggested that Parliament's provision for qui tam enforcement of
statutes like this one, at a time when qui tam legislation was generally
out of favor resulted from a distrust of the Crown's commitment to
religious uniformity.2 99
One qui tam statute that caused great distress among dissenting
Protestants was the 1670 Act to Prevent and Suppress Seditious
Conventicles. 0 0  The statute imposed a fine on anyone attending a
religious assembly conducted "in other manner than according to the
liturgy and practice of the church of England. '30 1 More significant
penalties applied to preaching or teaching at such an assembly or
permitting such a meeting to occur in one's home. The act permitted
summary conviction before a justice of the peace, with a jury trial
only available upon appeal if the fine imposed exceeded ten
shillings.' 2 Moreover, the fines prescribed by the statute could be
"levied by distress and sale of the offender's goods and chattels. '30 3
The informer's hand was strengthened by a provision permitting qui
tam prosecution of any justice of the peace, constable, or other
official who failed to carry out duties imposed by the statute.' °
Informers enforcing this statute engaged in high-handed tactics
who sent their children overseas to prevent their education in England, see id. § 11, or who
printed or imported Catholic literature, see idt § 15. Other statutes enforced by qui tam
informers required public officials and others to receive Communion in Anglican
churches, swear oaths and sign declarations acknowledging the King's temporal and
spiritual authority, and reject particular Catholic doctrines such as transubstantiation. See
30 Car. 2, ch. 1, §§ 2-3, 6, 9 (1677) (Eng.); 25 Car. 2, ch. 2, §§ 1-2, 4 (1672) (Eng.); see also
3 Jam., ch. 4, § 3 (1605) (Eng.) (requiring all former Catholics who joined the Anglican
church to take Lord's Supper at an Anglican Church at least once a year).
297. See 23 Eliz., ch. 1. §§ 4, 8 (1581) (Eng.). The 1662 Act of Uniformity also reached
both Catholics and Protestants. 14 Car. 2, ch. 4 (1662) (Eng.).
298. 14 Car. 2, ch. 4, § 10.
299. See, e.g., 483 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2092 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hollis)
("[D]uring the reigns of the last two Stuart Kings, Parliament had very little confidence in
the will of the Executive to enforce the law that it had seen fit to pass.").
300. 22 Car. 2, ch. 1 (1670) (Eng.).
301. Id. §1.
302. See id. 99 3,6.
303. Id. § 2, cl. 2; see id §3.
304. See id. § 10.
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that further tarnished the reputation of their profession. In the 1670s
and 1680s, objectors churned out a host of pamphlets that castigated
informers for enforcing the statute against peaceable Quakers and
Puritans. 05  A particularly caustic diatribe appeared in London in
305. For instance, a 1682 tract described the activities of certain informers who had
recently "been Levying Distresses upon several Protestant-Dissenters, and in the
Management of it, behaved themselves with that Fury and unparalel degree of Violence
and Arbitrary Force, that it fills our Hearts with Sadness, and our Thoughts with no less
Terrour then Amazement." THE DEVOURING INFORMERS OF BRISTOL &C.: BEING AN
ADDITIONAL ACCOUNT OF SOME LATE PROCEEDINGS OF THOSE RAVENOUS BEASTS
OF PREY, AGAINST DISSENTING PROTESTANTS 1 (London, no publisher 1682).
Informers allegedly had received warrants to seize certain defendants' property by virtue
of clandestine convictions obtained in a tavern. The informers generally took twice as
much property as was needed to satisfy the statutory penalty and insisted on breaking
open furniture to look for cash, even if sufficient property was in plain view. See id. at 3.
Other tracts also sought to highlight the conduct of informers in enforcing penal statutes
directed at religious belief and conduct. See A JUST COMPLAINT OF THE OPPRESSED,
BECAUSE CONVICTED, FINED & DISTRAINED EXCESSIVELY, UNSUMMOND &
UNHEARD IN THEIR OWN DEFENCE; UPON THE CLAINDESTINE EVIDENCE OF
CONCEILED INFORMERS, IN THEIR PROSECUTION OF THE PEACEABLE PEOPLE CALLED
QUAKERS FOR THEmR RELIGIOUS MEETINGS 2, 4-5 (n.p., no publisher, n.d.) (discussing
Quakers convicted without being heard in their own defense, excesses in the process of
levying on property, and alleged perjury by informers); AN ELEGY UPON MARSH'S ONE
OF THE TWO PUBLICK SWORN INFORMERS AGAINST PROTESTANT RELIGIOUS
MEETINGS IN THE CITY OF LONDON, WHO LATELY DYED VERY MISERABLY IN THE
PRISON OF THE COUNTER (n.p., no publisher 1675) (containing a poem concerning the
death of an informer which is viewed as a sign of God's righteous judgment); HENRY
CARE, A PERFECT GUIDE FOR PROTESTANT DISSENTERS, IN CASE OF PROSECUTION
UPON ANY OF THE PENAL STATUTES MADE AGAINST THEM (London, printed for R.
Baldwin 1682) (describing the persecution of Protestant dissenters by "ignorant and
greedy Informers"); GEORGE FIDGE, THE ENGLISH GUZMAN: OR, CAPTAIN HILTONS
MEMOIRS, WITH SEVERAL OTHER OF THE GRAND INFORMERS (London, printed for R.
Oswel 1683) (accusing two informers of being Catholics); JOSEPH HARRISON, THE
LAMENTABLE CRY OF OPPRESSION OR, THE CASE OF THE POOR, SUFFERING &
PERSECUTED PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS IN AND ABOUT FAKENHAM IN NORFOLK 12-
13, 18 (n.p., no publisher 1679) (giving accounts of fines levied on the property of various
Quakers); PHILAGATHUS, THE INFORMER'S DOOM: OR, AN AMAZING AND
SEASONABLE LETTER FROM UTOPIA, DIRECTED TO THE MAN IN THE MOON 42-53
(London, printed for John Dunton at the Black Raven 1683) (describing an imaginary trial
of an informer by Judge Conscience); WILLIAM POOLEY, PART OF THE SUFFERINGS OF
LEICESTERSHIRE & NORTH-HAMPTONSHIRE, BY INFORMERS AND PRIESTS 3-5
(London, no publisher 1683) (accusing informers, inter alia, of perjury, levying on a
weaver's loom even though working tools were exempt, and levying on more property
than needed to satisfy the fine); THE INFORMERS LOOKING-GLASS, IN WHICH HE MAY
SEE HIMSELF WHILE HE IS MALICIOUSLY PROSECUTING DISSENTING PROTESTANTS
(n.p., no publisher 1682) (stating that an informer "will declare that he hath no prejudice
against you, and with the same Tongue he will swear your Goods from you, or your person
into Prison, if he can"). Of course, some publications defended the activities of informers.
See, e.g., A VIEW OF THE PENAL LAWS CONCERNING TRADE AND TRAFICK,
ALPHABETICALLY DISPOSED UNDER PROPER HEADS 2-3, 5-6 (London, printed by the
Assigns of Richard and Edward Atkins Esq. for John Walthoe 1697) (arguing that
informers are necessary to law enforcement and subject to legal constraints, that informers
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1675, under the title, The Character of an Informer, Wherein His
Mischeivous Nature, and Leud Practises Are Detected.0 6  The
informer was called "[a] mischeivous Vermin, bred out of the
Corruption of the Body Politique; that feeds (like Toads) only on
Poysons, and sucks the peccant Humours so long (like a Horse-leach)
till he burst with Venome. 30 7 The anonymous author portrayed the
informer as a hypocrite, pretending concern for the public interest,
but in fact pursuing only his own private gain:
[I]f ever he say any Prayers, they are only that Men may
daily encrease their Crimes, and Act more unlawful things;
that his Gains may rise proportionably. For though like a
Cunning Archer, he seem to make the Publique Service the
Mark of his aim, yet he squints aside at his own Ends, which
are the true Butt [i.e., target] all the Arrows of his
Prosecutions are shot at ....
Moreover, the author noted the irony in employing irreligious
informers in the purported service of the Church: "For as he takes
Wages to Fight against God, so he lays it out again in the Service of
the Devil, Consuming in Bawdy houses, what he gets by Surprizing
Meeting-houses .... ,,09
do not prosecute those who act reasonably and lawfully, and that those who criticize
informers are either ignorant or motivated by self-interest). The materials cited in this
footnote are on file with the author.
306. THE CHARACTER OF AN INFORMER, WHEREIN His MiscHEIvous NATURE,
AND LEUD PRACrISES ARE DETECTED (London, printed for T.P. 1675) [hereinafter THE
CHARACTER OF AN INFORMER] (on file with author); see also THE INFORMERS ANSWER
TO THE LATE CHARACTER, VINDICATING THEMSELVES FROM THE SCANDALOUS
TRUTHS OF THAT UNLUCKLY PAMPHLET (London, printed for T.C. 1675) (on file with
author) (purporting to respond to The Character of an Informer, but in fact supporting its
charges).
307. THE CHARACTER OF AN INFORMER, supra note 306, at 1.
308. Id. at 3. In addition to the charge of self-interest, the author accused informers of
lying to the courts. See id. at 4 ("He values an Oath no more than a Gamester, and
swallows Perjuries as fast and as easily as a Juggler does Pins and Daggers."). The charge
of perjury by informers is also made in THE INFORMERS LECTURE TO HIS SONS,
INSTRUCTING THEM IN THE MYSTERIES OF THAT RELIGION 1 (London, printed for
Joseph Collier on London Bridge 1682) (on file with author).
309. THE CHARACTER OF AN INFORMER, supra note 306, at 5. One popular strategy
of the anti-informer tracts is illustrated by a printed sermon of George Fox, a Quaker
leader. See G. Fox THE ELDER, THE DEVIL WAS AND IS THE OLD INFORMER AGAINST
THE RIGHTEOUS (London, printed by John Bringhurst at the Sign of the Book in Grace
Church Street 1682) (on file with author). Fox observed that "[h]e that is an Informer, is a
Persecutor, and Spoiler, and a Destroyer; and the DEVIL is the Head of all Informers,
Persecutors and Destroyers of the RIGHTEOUS." Id. at 1. The identification of the
Devil as an informer rested in part upon the New Testament passage describing Satan as
"the Accuser of the Brethren." Revelations 12:10. Having identified the Devil as the
father of all informers, Fox presented a detailed exposition of the fate that befell those
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Eventually, Parliament ended the practice of using informers to
persecute non-Anglican denominations. Nevertheless, in the area of
Sabbath observance, informers continued to enforce religious
obligations well into the twentieth century.31 °  The Sunday
Observance Act of 1780, which played a significant role in the repeal
of English qui tam statutes, provided:
[A]ny house, room, or other place, which shall be opened or
used for publick entertainment or amusement, or for
publickly debating on any subject whatsoever, upon any part
of the Lord's Day called Sunday, and to which persons shall
be admitted by the payment of money, or by tickets sold for
money, shall be deemed a disorderly house or place .... 311
The keeper of such a "disorderly house" was subject to qui tam
prosecution for a forfeiture of 200f.312 Lesser penalties applied to the
person managing or conducting the entertainment and any person
who informed against the people of God in the course of various persecutions recorded in
Scripture, concluding with a warning of certain judgment:
[T]herefore let all Murderers, Informers, and Sons of Belial, take heed, who seek
the Destruction of the Righteous, in that they bring Destruction upon
themselves, as you may see all along in the Scriptures, what was the End of such,
whether they were high or low, Priest, Professor or Prophane, the Righteous God
spared none ....
Fox, supra, at 12.
Other tracts pursuing a similar strategy include EDWARD BOURNE, A LOOKING-
GLASS DISCOVERING TO ALL PEOPLE WHAT IMAGE THEY BEAR (n.p., no publisher
1671); OWEN STOCKTON, A REBUKE TO THE INFORMERS: WITH A PLEA FOR THE
MINISTERS OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED NONCONFORMISTS, AND THEIR MEETINGS
(London, no publisher 1675); CHARLES HARRISS, A SCRIPTURAL CHRONICLE OF
SATANS INCENDIARIES, VIZ. HARD-HEARTED PERSECUTORS, AND MALICIOUS
INFORMERS (London, no publisher 1670); MARGARET LYNAM, THE CONTROVERSIE OF
THE LORD AGAINST THE PRIESTS OF THE NATIONS AND TEACHERS OF THE PEOPLE,
WHO ARE IN THE WAY OF CAIN AND BALAAM, IN SIN, PRIDE AND COVETOUSNESS,
YET LEANING UPON THE LORD, AND HAVE A PROFESSION OF RELIGION, A FORM OF
WORSHIP, BUT DENY THE POWER OF GOD (London, no publisher 1676); GEORGE
WHITEHEAD, JUDGMENT FIXED UPON THE ACCUSER OF OUR BRETHREN, AND THE
REAL CHRISTIAN-QUAKER VINDICATED FROM THE PERSECUTING OUTRAGE OF
APOSTATE INFORMERS; CHIEFLY FROM W. ROGERS, F. BUGG, T. CRISP, JOHN
PENNYMAN AND JEFFERY BULLOCK, THEIR MALICIOUS, CONFUSED AND UNJUST
OPPOSITION AND IMPUTATION OF APOSTACY, IMPOSITION, PEPERY, &C. IN THEIR
ABUSIVE-BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS HEREIN SPECIFIED (London, printed by Andrew
Sowle at the Crooked Bille in Holloway Lane near Shoreditch 1682); see also EDWARD
PEARSE, THE CONFORMIST'S FOURTH PLEA FOR THE NONCONFORMISTS (London,
printed by J.D. for Jonathan Robinson 1683) (describing the terrible judgments suffered
by contemporary informers and setting forth a letter from a penitent informer). All
sources listed in this footnote are on file with the author.
310. See infra note 374 (discussing the activities of a twentieth century informer
enforcing England's Sunday observance statute).
311. 21 Geo. 3, ch. 49, § 1 (1781) (Eng.).
312. See id.
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collecting money or tickets 13 The statute also authorized qui tam
suits against advertisers of prohibited entertainments.314 Informers
continued to enforce this statute until 1951.3' 5
3. Qui Tam Regulation of Spirituous Liquors
Another enlightening case study of problems arising from qui
tam enforcement relates to an eighteenth century statute designed to
address excessive consumption of alcohol.316 In 1736, Parliament
constructed a regulatory regime requiring retailers of alcoholic
beverages-those selling alcohol in quantities less than two gallons-
to obtain expensive licenses and to pay duties on their stock.317 The
legislation was targeted at eliminating street vendors and other minor
retailers who sold liquor from wheelbarrows, sheds, and comparable
locations.318 A person convicted of selling spirituous liquors in an
unlicensed establishment was subject to a penalty of 10E, with half
payable to the qui tam informer.1
The commoners of London repeatedly rioted to protest the
statute and its implementation. London newspapers from 1737 to
1738 contain numerous stories of altercations and spontaneous
demonstrations triggered by informers and constables who enforced
the legislation.' 2 Outrage was directed both at Parliament's attempt
313. See id
314. See id. § 3.
315. See infra notes 350-52 and accompanying text (discussing the abolition of qui tam
statutes and the concerns over the Sunday Observance Act).
316. The statute recited the following reasons for the legislation:
[T]he drinking of spirituous liquors or strong waters is become very common,
especially amongst the people of lower and inferior rank, the constant and
excessive use whereof tends greatly to the destruction of their healths, rendering
them unfit for useful labour and business, debauching their morals, and inciting
them to perpetrate all manner of vices ....
9 Geo. 2, ch. 23, § 1 (1736) (Eng.).
317. See id. Licenses were only available "to such persons ... who shall keep publick
victualling-houses, inns, coffee-houses, ale-houses, or brandy-shops, and use or exercise no
other trade whatsoever." Id § 10.
318. See iL § 13 (stating that it would be unlawful to sell liquor "about the streets,
'highways, or fields, in any wheelbarrow or basket, or upon the water in any ship, boat, or
vessel, or... on any bulk or bulks, stall or stalls, or in any shed or sheds").
319. See il
320. On one occasion, an informer was attacked on the way to the magistrate. When
the unlucky informer arrived at court, "he was ready to expire; being terribly beat, cut and
bruis'd, all over Mire," so that he seemed "one entire lump of Dirt." COMMON-SENSE:
OR, ENGLISHMAN'S J., Nov. 19, 1739, at 2. The magistrate read the Riot Act and
summoned soldiers to conduct the informer and his co-informer into court, while the mob
threatened to destroy the magistrate's home. See id. A similar account reports the death
of a female informer. See LONDON EVENING-POST, Jan. 3-5, 1738, at 1 ("[T]he Populace
used her with such Severity, by beating, kicking, and cramming Dirt into her Mouth, that
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to curb a popular vice and at the methods used by those enforcing the
statute.32' Accounts from the London Evening-Post and other
journals suggest that common informers engaged in unconscionable
we hear she is since dead of her Wounds; even her own Sex expos'd her to great
Indecencies."). On a different occasion, a crowd of over 1000 assembled and threatened
to kill two female informers and the magistrate, and to pull down the magistrate's house.
See LONDON EVENING-POST, Jan. 21-24, 1738, at 2. Comparable disturbances occurred
with frequency. See, e.g., COMMON-SENSE: OR, ENGLISHMAN'S J., Aug. 26, 1738, at 2
(recounting a celebration in which a female informer was burned in effigy); LONDON
EVENING-POST, May 20-23, 1738, at 1-2 (describing a riot against an informer arrested
for extorting money to stifle a prosecution); LONDON EVENING-POST, May 18-20, 1738, at
1-2 (detailing an assault upon constables and informers by a mob); LONDON EVENING-
POST, Mar. 4-7, 1738, at 1 (noting "the many notorious Riots upon Informers"); LONDON
EVENING-POST, Feb. 25-28, 1738, at 2 (reporting that "an Informer, and a Constable, who
were carrying a Person to Gaol convicted of retailing Spirituous Liquors, were set upon by
the Mob in Southwark, and so rudely treated that they are in great Danger of their
Lives"); LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 23-25, 1738, at 2 (recounting that "two Informers
were so severely pelted by the Populace near Golden Square, that [it is] thought they can
hardly recover"); LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 18-21, 1738, at 2 (reporting that one
informer had his clothes torn off and was dragged several times through a horse pond
while another was seated on an ass and led down the street while being beaten and
pelted); LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 14-16, 1738, at 2 (reporting that two persons who
were committed to prison for selling gin were "rescued out of the Hands of the Constable"
when they cried out, "Informers!"); LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 4-7, 1738, at 2
(reporting that two informers were "disciplin'd" by a mob, then "carried half dead to the
Round-House, all other Houses, both Publick and Private refusing to give them
Sanctuary"); LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 2-4, 1738, at 2 (detailing disturbances on the
Island of Guernsey following the passage of a law restricting the retail sale of spirituous
liquors); LONDON EVENING-POST, Jan. 7-10, 1738, at 2 (recounting a story that an
informer hid from the mob in a house and that the ringleader encouraged the mob to pull
the house down). See generally J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND
1660-1800, at 134-35 (1986) (discussing mob violence against informers enforcing the
alcohol statute). A well-known informer was arrested for walking about in women's
clothing, presumably hoping to disguise himself from the populace. See COMMON-SENSE:
OR, ENGLISHMAN'S J., Oct. 28, 1738, at 2.
The statute against unlicensed retailing of spirituous liquors provided that
someone who failed to pay the specified fine was to be imprisoned. See 9 Geo. 2, ch. 23,
§ 13. Some defendants chose prison rather than permitting informers to profit from their
prosecutions. See, e.g., LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 4-7, 1738, at 2. A newspaper
account reports that one convicted defendant was too poor to pay the fine, but was so
well-beloved in her neighborhood that the neighbors raised money to keep her out of jail.
See LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 28-Mar. 2,1738, at 1.
321. The statute targeted a segment of society that most needed the income provided
by liquor sales and that could least afford the penalties of the Act. As noted in one
account:
We hear that one very vigilant Superior Officer of Excise in Southwark has been
instrumental in convicting to the Number of 96 Persons for Offenses within the
Statute of the late Act against retailing Spirituous Liquors in less Quantities than
two Gallons; whereby, at 5E Penalty for each Person, his Share will amount to
480f a fine Sum rais'd out of the Ruin of several poor Families.
LONDON EVENING-POST, Jan. 3-5,1738, at 1.
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practices such as perjury, extortion, and entrapment.3z Because it
was easy to swear that a defendant sold liquor contrary to the statute,
perjury was commonplace. The outcome of the prosecution might
turn on the magistrate's determination of credibility. The following is
representative of many reported accounts of perjury by informers:
Last Tuesday one Mary Felton, an Informer against Persons
for selling Spirituous Liquors, was detected before Richard
Farmer, Esq; one of his Majesty's Justices of the Peace, for
falsely, maliciously, and spitefully swearing an Affidavit ...
wherein she unjustly accus'd one Mary the Wife of James
Wallis, (as the Wife of one William Goudge) with having
serv'd her with half a Pint of Geneva in the said Mr.
Goudge's Shop,... and at the same Time brought two more
Witnesses to prove her paying the said Money; but it
appearing on Oaths of several creditable Persons that the
said Mary Wallis had been ill for six Months past, and had
not been out of Doors, and also ... that she had not been in
Mr. Goudge's House for upwards of six Months, and never
did serve any Thing in the said Shop, besides several othere
circumstantial Proofs that she was not the Person, Mr.
Farmer committed her to Newgate, and the two Witnesses
to New Prison.32
3
Perhaps even more common than accounts of perjury were
reports that informers had engaged in extortion by soliciting
payments to refrain from filing informations. For instance, in April
1738, it was reported that "[w]ithin these few Days the Right Hon.
The Lord Mayor has committed several Persons to Gaol, for
extorting Money from People to stifle Informations which they were
going to lodge against them, for retailing Spirituous Liquors. ' 324
322. See, e.g., LONDON EvENING-POST, Feb. 4-7, 1738, at 2 (noting that some
informers appeared to have no qualms about perjuring themselves).
323. LONDON EVENING-POST, Jan. 31-Feb.2, 1738, at 2; see also COMMON-SENSE:
OR, ENGLISHMAN'S J., Sept. 16, 1738, at 2 (stating that male and female informers were
imprisoned and fined for "swearing against several innocent Persons for retailing
Spirituous Liquors, when the Jury found them guilty without going out"); COMMON-
SENSE: OR, ENGLISHMAN'S J., Sept. 9, 1738, at 2 (reporting that a charge by a female
informer against Mrs. Sparks, a widow, was dismissed based on evidence that the "Charge
was laid at a time when Mrs. Sparks was out of Town; that she kept no Publick-House, nor
dealt in any way in Liquors"); LONDON EVENING-POST, Jan. 28-31, 1738, at 1 (recounting
that informer Elizabeth Bromley was committed to Newgate after falsely claiming that
Letitia Broadhurst had served her a glass of brandy); id ("Yesterday Morning a Woman
was committed to Newgate, and a Man to New-Prison, for Perjury, in swearing falsely
against a Victualler in Wapping, that they bought Spirituous Liquors of him contrary to
Act of Parliament.").
324. LONDON EVENING-POST, Apr. 27-29, 1738, at 2; see also LONDON EVENING-
POST, May 20-23, 1738, at 2 (reporting that "[I]ast Week Thomas Hudson, who had made
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Interestingly, notwithstanding the repeated attempts to deal with
unlicensed compositions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
the practice apparently remained quite common in the eighteenth
century.3 25
Newspaper accounts also describe informers engaging in
"entrapment," perhaps not in the modem legal sense, but in the sense
of encouraging persons to violate the law for the purpose of bringing
a qui tam action. In many cases, it appears that informers based their
actions upon service of alcoholic beverages that they themselves had
ordered.326 Because any customer might prove to be an informer,
sellers of alcohol began looking for ways to service their customers
without being seen. One method was for the customer to enter an
empty room and give a pre-arranged signal. The customer would
then put money into a drawer, which would slide into another room
and slide out again with the requested beverage.3 27 This practice
himself obnoxious to the Populace by informing against several Retailers of Spirituous
Liquors, was detected in receiving Money from a Victualler ... to stifle an Information"
and was subsequently convicted); COMMON-SENSE: OR, ENGLISHMAN'S J., May 13,1738,
at 2 ("Monday two noted Informers were committed to the New Gaol in Southwark, for
extorting Money from several Persons under Pretence of stifling Informations lodg'd
against them for retailing Spirituous Liquors contrary to Act of Parliament."); LONDON
EVENING-POST, Apr. 27-29, 1738, at 2 (recounting the successful prosecution of an
informer who extorted money in exchange for a promise not to prosecute); LONDON
EVENING-POST, Feb. 28-Mar. 2, 1738, at 1-2 ("On Saturday last a Constable in
Shoreditch was try'd at Hicks's-Hall, for extorting a Guinea from a Victualler of that
Place, on Pretence of his retailing Spirituous Liquors .... "); LONDON EVENING-POST,
Feb. 2-4, 1738, at 2 ("On Monday last a Constable at Islington was committed to New
Prison by Justice Poulson, for extorting a Guinea from Mr. Mills, under Colour of
informing against him for selling Spirituous Liquors contrary to the late Act.").
325. For additional discussion of this problem, see Douglas Hay, Prosecution and
Power: Malicious Prosecution in the English Courts 1750-1850, in POLICING AND
PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, at 356-59 & n.56 (Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder
eds., 1989) (noting claims of perjury, extortion, and unlawful compounding by informers
enforcing turnpike laws).
326. See, e.g., LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 9-11, 1738, at 2 ("[T]wo Men went to a
Publick House ... and call'd for a Bowl of Punch, which the Landlord upon great
Importunity made, and they paid for it; but they prov'd to be two Informers, and one of
them.., gave an Information against the Landlord .... ").
One interesting account concerns a butcher who prosecuted one of his customers
after persuading her to violate the statute:
[The] Butcher ... came to the Widow Wallace's, ... of whom the good Woman
had bought Meat of four or five Years, and desir'd a Dram of Brandy, pretending
to be indispos'd; the poor Widow, not suspecting the Butcher's being an
Imposter, readily help'd him to one, who immediately after went and laid an
Information against her, and she was forced to pay Ten Pounds, which she and
her poor Family are in much want of.
COMMON-SENSE: OR, ENGLISHMAN'S J., Sept. 16,1738, at 2.
327. See, e.g., GENTLEMAN'S MAG., Feb. 1738, at 106, 106.
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made it impossible for the purchaser to testify as to who served
alcohol in violation of the statute. 28
F. The Abolition of Common Informer Actions in England
Reliance on qui tam legislation declined dramatically with the
development of alternate means of law enforcement. A decade after
Parliament created a permanent police force for the city of London, it
enacted legislation to restrict qui tam actions and remedy abuses
arising from qui tam enforcement.3 29 Halfway through the twentieth
century, Parliament moved to eliminate the remaining English qui
tam statutes, decisively preferring public enforcement of legislation
designed to protect interests of the public as a whole.
1. The Decline of English Qui Tam Enforcement
By the late nineteenth century, Parliament's enthusiasm for qui
tam statutes had cooled significantly. Professor Radzinowicz notes
that only twelve of the qui tam statutes repealed in 1951 had been
enacted between 1825 and 1895.330 Only one qui tam statute was
adopted in the twentieth century-directed at police officers who
interfered with voting for local offices331 -and this was merely a
recodification of a nineteenth century enactment.
3 32
The decline of qui tam enforcement coincided with the
development of modern police departments and the proliferation of
public prosecutors. Indeed, it may be that the desire to eliminate
common informers played a role in the development of professional
328. Parliament enacted a second statute on spirituous liquors in 1738 which addressed
the problem of clandestine sales by retailers that "are not seen, but are hid behind some
wainscot, curtain, partition, or are otherwise concealed." 11 Geo. 2, ch. 26, § 1 (1738)
(Eng.). Parliament provided that in the event of such sales, the occupants of the house
would be deemed the violators. See id. The statute also addressed the issue of violence
against informers, making it a felony for five or more persons "in a tumultuous and riotous
manner, [to] assemble themselves to rescue any offender" or to assault an informer. Id
§ 2. Another provision permitted the removal of actions arising out of enforcement of the
statute to the King's courts at Westminster. See id. § 3. This provision was perhaps
designed to counter the use of the courts to intimidate informers. For instance, in the case
in which a landlord was entrapped into providing a bowl of punch, the informers took the
bowl with them to court as evidence of the offense. After paying his fine for serving
spirituous liquors, the landlord accused the informers of stealing his bowl, whereupon they
were committed to the county jail. See LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 9-11,1738, at 2.
329. See infra notes 336-42 and accompanying text.
330. See 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 155 n.76.
331. See id.; The Representation of the People Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, ch. 58, § 87,
reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 573, 651-52 (2d ed. 1949).
332. See County and Borough Police Act, 1859, 22 & 23 Vict., ch. 32, § 3 (Eng.); 483
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2085 (1951) (statement of Mr. Heald).
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law enforcement institutions. Sir John Fielding, a magistrate who
presided over an early police force in London,333 believed that the
rewards offered to informers had the perverse effect of discouraging
public-spirited citizens from reporting evidence of crimes.334 In
describing the genesis of his "Bow Street Runners," he indicated that
one of his responsibilities as magistrate was "by all Means [to]
discourage common Informers, who are apt to [entrap] the Subject
into Offences for the sake of the Penalty. '335
Parliament first provided for a professional London police force
in 1829.336 A decade later, the Metropolitan Police Courts Act sought
to restrict the activities of common informers.3 37 Parliament found
that non-aggrieved parties often filed informations for pecuniary gain,
but later dropped the prosecutions or failed to produce sufficient
evidence for conviction.338  Awarding penalties to successful
prosecutors was also found to encourage "corrupt [p]ractices" by
333. See STANLEY H. PALMER, POLICE AND PROTEST IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND
1780-1850, at 69, 72, 78-79 (1988) (attributing to Fielding the first English use of the
French word "police" to refer to a body of men and discussing the history of Fielding's
Bow Street police force). Fielding was the half-brother of novelist Henry Fielding, who
preceded him as the Bow Street magistrate. See CLIvE EMSLEY, THE ENGLISH POLICE:
A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY 19 (2d ed. 1996).
334. Fielding explained his concern as follows:
The Legislature, by giving one half of the Penalty to the Informer, doubtless
intended to facilitate the Execution of the Penal Laws; but it certainly has a
contrary Effect; for those who make Informations before Magistrates from the
mere Motive of the Reward, are of the disreputable Kind; and the Advantages
annexed to Informers, have rendered the Office itself odious, and deterred many
reputable Persons from redressing Injuries and Inconveniences they have
laboured under, for Fear of the odious Imputation of an Informer.
SIR JOHN FIELDING, EXTRACrS FROM SUCH OF THE PENAL LAWS, AS PARTICULARLY
RELATE TO THE PEACE AND GOOD ORDER OF THIS METROPOLIS: WITH
OBSERVATIONS FOR THE BETrER EXECUTION OF SOME, AND ON THE DEFECTS OF
OTHERS 43-44 (London, H. Woodfall & W. Strahan for T. Cadell 1769); see also id. at 44
("But as Gain is the common idea of the Motive of all Informations, many ... Persons
[who bring informations out of good intentions] have been insulted for their good Offices
to the Public.").
335. Id. at 4-5. Fielding also warned merchants of the danger of entrapment by
informers: "[A]s there are many Persons who are wicked enough to teaze a[nother] to
lend them Cards, or to suffer them to Game in their Houses, merely that they may have an
Opportunity to inform against the House for the Sake of the Reward, no [one] can be
safe" from informers. Id at 105-06; see 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 142 & n.23.
336. See 10 Geo. 4, ch. 44 (1829) (Eng.).
337. See 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 71 (1839) (Eng.).
338. See id. § 32 ("Informations are often laid for the mere Sake of Gain, or by Parties
not truly aggrieved, and the Offences charged in such Informations are not further
prosecuted, or it appears upon Prosecution that there was no sufficient Ground for making
the Charge.").
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common informers.339 The new statute permitted the court to award
up to 5E to the defendant if the information was not prosecuted or
was found to lack a sufficient basis. 40 Unauthorized compounding
was subjected to fines of up to 10E.L1 Significantly, the magistrate
also was authorized to reduce or eliminate an informer's reward as he
saw fit.342
2. A First Attempt at Abolition
As the activities of police officers and public prosecutors
continued to expand, sentiment started to develop in Parliament that
informers were no longer a necessary component of law enforcement
in England. The push for abolition of qui tam statutes began on
November 6, 1934, when Sir Gerald Hurst, a member of the House of
Commons, received permission to introduce a bill to abolish common
informer actions. 3 Hurst realized that there was insufficient time to
complete action on the bill in that session of Parliament, but he hoped
to give the measure a head start in a future legislative session. In
explaining the purpose of the bill, Hurst spent most of his time
reciting the facts of cases pursued by common informers34 and noted
that informers had been most active under the Sunday observance
statute.345 Hurst decried the institution of qui tarn enforcement as
"legalised blackmail" and argued that "[t]he proper informer is
someone who represents the public." ' A few months later, Hurst
published an article expounding his reasons for opposition to qui tam
339. Id. § 34.
340. See id § 32.
341. See id § 33.
342. See id § 34.
343. See 293 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 843-46 (1934) (statement of Mr. Hurst).
344. For instance, Hurst strategically called the legislators' attention to a 1917 case in
which an informer sued a Member of Parliament "to recover penalties amounting to
£29,000 for having advertised Government bonds in his newspaper." Id at 844 (statement
of Mr. Hurst).
345. See id at 845 (statement of Mr. Hurst) ("[A]n action was brought against the
Brighton Aquarium for exhibiting fish on Sundays. It was pleaded ... that this could not
be deemed an entertainment as 17 bandsmen performed sacred music while the fish were
fed. The Court held that it was an entertainment .... "); id (statement of Mr. Hurst)
("[T]he Leeds Sunday Society were sued by a common informer... [for] having organised
a lecture by [a] French writer .... When the Court heard that he had told a story about an
Englishman, an Irishman and a Scotchman, they at once concluded it was an
entertainment and awarded the penalty."). But see id. (statement of Mr. Hurst) ("In 1869
a common informer sued for penalties under this Act with regard to some lectures upon
'Science as the handmaid of religion.' He sought to show that this was a public
entertainment. The judges who heard the case held, 'We are not amused' and the
informer lost....").
346. Id. at 845 (statement of Mr. Hurst).
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legislation:
[I]t is wrong for a free country to allow an informer to seek
redress for his own pecuniary advantage in respect of a
public wrong in which he has no direct personal interest or
concern. A wrong to the State should surely be atoned for
by a penalty payable to the State alone. 7
Hurst's proposal to abolish qui tam legislation was aided by the
obnoxious practices of common informers, which eventually lead to
the enactment of legislation eliminating qui tam enforcement.
3. The Common Informers Act of 1951
The occasion that caused Hurst's seeds of legal reform to sprout
was the 100th anniversary of the Great Exhibition of 1851. His
Majesty's Government began planning years in advance for a huge
extravaganza to be called the "Festival of Britain, 1951." The event
would have its serious side--"a national display illustrating the
British contribution to civilisation, past, present and future, in the
Arts, in science and technology, and in industrial design"---but
there would also be "amusements" of a less educational nature? 49
As plans for the Festival solidified, the concern arose that if the
Festival were open on Sundays, some informer might sue government
organizers or private parties participating in the events.3 0 The
precise application of the eighteenth century Sunday Observance Act
was unpredictable in the twentieth century, and Parliament did not
want the Festival of Britain to become a test case. The Government
therefore introduced a Sunday Openings Bill to exempt the Festival
from the Sunday observance statutes and to specify the permissible
scope of the Festival's Sunday exhibitions.351 During the debate over
347. Hurst, supra note 286, at 189.
348. 445 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 691 (1947) (statement of The Lord President of
the Council).
349. See Festival of Britain (Sunday Opening) Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 14 (1951)
(Eng.). The "amusements" of concern to Parliament were defined to include
any swings or roundabouts or other fairground amusements, but shall not be
taken to include any puppet or marionette show, or ... any children's pony-
carriage drives, or any special illuminations, or any children's zoo, or any
underground grotto or series of grottos or elevated tree walk if designed for
visual or scenic effect, or any boating lake, or any miniature railway adapted
wholly or mainly for children to ride in.
Id. § 3(b).
350. See 481 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 539-74 (1950) (debating a bill to permit the
Festival to remain open on Sundays despite the Sunday Observance Act).
351. See id. at 539. Parliament concluded that the Festival should remain open on
Sundays, but "without the amusements." See 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 14, §1(b); see also supra
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the Sunday Openings Bill, Members of Parliament (MPs) roundly
decried the use of common informers for law enforcement
purposes.352
The parliamentary dislike of informers quickly found new
expression as Members of Parliament lined up in support of a bill
introduced shortly before debate on the Sunday Opening Act. This
bill, the Common Informers Act of 1951, became the primary
legislative vehicle for abolition of England's remaining qui tam
statutes 3  Although the Common Informers Act was sponsored by
one of the minority Conservatives, the record suggests universal
support for this legal reform. In fact, the sponsor, Lionel Heald of
Chertsey,3m categorized the legislation as a matter "of public interest
... upon which there is no party difference."355 Attorney General
Shawcross arranged for his own parliamentary drafters to assist in
drawing up the bill and threw the Labour Government's support
note 349 (defining "amusements").
352. The Lord President of the Council, having described the Sunday observance laws
as "incredibly obsolete and obscure," considered it "a further embarrassment" that "the
main instrument of enforcement of the law is the common informer." 481 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 539 (1950) (statement of The Lord President of the Council). Another
Member of Parliament (MP) found it "very wrong that the activities of the common
informer should still be encouraged by some of the archaic legislation that is still on the
Statute Book." Id. at 549 (statement of Mr. Butler). Still another commented that "[t]he
common informer is odious, I think, to most Englishmen." Id at 568 (statement of Mr.
Hale). Another observed that "[h]ard things have been said about the common
informer." Id. at 570 (statement of Capt. Waterhouse).
Although there was much talk of the need to modernize and clarify existing
legislation, Parliament did not object in principle to laws restricting Sunday activities.
While opting to open the Festival of Britain exhibits on Sundays, the majority of the
House of Commons voted that Sunday proceedings should be conducted "without the
amusements." 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 14, § 1(b). Many Members of Parliament were offended
that enforcement actions under the Sunday observance legislation should be pursued by
prosecutors seeking private monetary gain; such a view was captured in the statement of
one MP that "[n]othing is more detestable and reprehensible than the use of common
informers for a reward to prosecute religious observances." 481 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) 574 (1950) (statement of Mr. Lang).
353. See Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 39 (1951) (Eng.); 480 PARt.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2041 (1950). Technically, although Parliament decided to abolish all
remaining English qui tam statutes in 1951, the Common Informers Act did not
completely effectuate that decision. Parliament retained qui ram enforcement of the
parliamentary disqualification statutes pending enactment of legislation to create an
alternative method of enforcing such statutes. See House of Commons Disqualification
Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 20, § 7 & General Note (Eng.), reprinted in 24 HALSBURY'S
STATUMS OF ENGLAND 425, 430-31 (3d ed. 1970) (providing for Privy Council review of
disqualification petitions and explaining that "the old proceeding by way of common
information is abolished" for disqualifications covered by the statute).
354. A short time later, Heald became Attorney General in the 1951 administration of
Winston Churchill. See 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 140-41 n.15.
355. 483 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2079 (1951) (statement of Mr. Heald).
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squarely behind the measure. 6
Debate over the qui tam abolition bill subjected the common
informer to criticism that was even more forceful than that voiced
during discussion over the Festival of Britain. Members of
Parliament described the informer as an "unnatural creature of
statute,' 357 "a parasite who is legally empowered to sue for money for
which he has not worked," 358 a "frightful beast," '359 a "malodorous
type."'36° A Scottish MIP suggested that the common informer
represented an English intrusion into Scottish law361 and that "any
informer ... is repugnant.""36 Enforcement of the law by common
informers was "a complete anachronism,"3 63 "an odious instrument of
the law,''361 "a form of legalised blackmail, '365  "thoroughly
objectionable and obnoxious to modem ideas,' 3 6 "antiquated ...
shameful, ' 367 "quite contemptible," and "a discreditable business. '368
After hearing some of the debate, one MP wondered why the
common informer had not been abolished earlier, "when it is so
obvious that he has been anathema and the object of strong language
of condemnation by all right thinking [persons]. 369
Several members were willing to grant that informers might have
been necessary at an earlier time in English history. Attorney
General Shawcross pointed out that law enforcement had not always
been the chief function of his office, and that it was not until 1856 that
all areas of the country had a police force.370 Similarly, Mr. MacCol
of Widnes explained that "[a]t one time the administrative machinery
of the State was so incompetent to secure law enforcement that this
field of activity had to be left in the hands of private enterprise. '371
356. See id. at 2106 (statement of Attorney General Shawcross); id. at 2079 (statement
of Mr. Heald).
357. Id at 2097 (statement of Mr. Hughes).
358. Id (statement of Mr. Hughes).
359. Id at 2110 (statement of Mr. Harris).
360. Id at 2112 (statement of Mr. Turner-Samuels).
361. See id at 2150 (statement of Mr. Ross) (stating that "before the Union of
Parliaments we had no common informer procedure in Scotland").
362. Id at 2152 (statement of Mr. Ross).
363. Id at 2091 (statement of Mr. Hollis).
364. Id at 2094 (statement of Mr. Hylton-Foster).
365. Id at 2100 (statement of Mr. Hughes).
366. Id at 2133 (statement of Mr. Fletcher).
367. 171 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1054-55 (1951) (statement of Viscount Simon).
368. Id at 1056 (statement of The Lord Chancellor).
369. 483 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2153 (1951) (statement of Mr. Houghton).
370. See id at 2101-02 (statement of Attorney General Shawcross).
371. Id at 2159 (statement of Mr. MacColl) ("As is the characteristic of private
enterprise, it was necessary that there should be some incentive and the common informer
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Expanding on his reference to informing as a form of "private
enterprise," MacColl teased the Conservatives for abandoning their
commitment to free market principles.372  Apart from polite
concessions to history and MacColl's jesting defense of informers,
however, the MPs had nothing positive to say about qui tam law
enforcement. Members repeatedly argued that qui tam enforcement
led to "blackmail"37 ; despite reform efforts beginning in the sixteenth
century under Elizabeth I, the problem of unlicensed compositions
had apparently continued into the twentieth century.
3 74
Much of the Parliamentary criticism of common informers
focused on their motivations in pursuing penal actions. On the one
hand, the informer was repeatedly accused of acting for reasons of
greed or worse:
[T]his sort of action may be brought from various motives,
none of which has any good purpose and all of which are
indeed very bad. Proceedings of this kind may be brought
out of spite, or purely for private gain or for even sheer
egotism.... A person may in fact bring these proceedings
purely and simply to do an ill-turn to a rival or competitor;
had to be able to obtain substantial financial inducement to carry out the important social
work of seeing that the law was maintained.").
372. Id. at 2160 (statement of Mr. MacColl) ("I could not help feeling a certain
sympathy for the common informer. He should have the attraction to the Conservative
Party that his is a profession or trade which does not lend itself to monopoly."); see also id.
at 2162 (statement of Mr. MacColl) ("I cannot help feeling that on the benches opposite
there are people who are working their way towards a new social philosophy."); id. at 2161
(statement of Mr. MacColl) (by preventing informers from reaching compositions with
potential defendants, "this Bill can only be regarded as an interference with the sanctity of
contract").
373. E.g., id. at 2081 (statement of Mr. Heald); id. at 2095 (statement of Mr. Hylton-
Foster); id. at 2140 (statement of Mr. Pannell).
374. Two MPs, for instance, referred to a celebrated informer named Mr. Green, who
worked to enforce the Sunday observance statutes. See id. at 2086 (statement of Mr.
Heald); id. at 2140 (statement of Mr. Pannell). Perhaps to reflect his improving financial
circumstances, Mr. Green changed his name to "the very much grander one," id. at 2086
(statement of Mr. Heald), of "Mr. Houghton le Touzel," id. at 2140 (statement of Mr.
Pannell). Mr. Houghton le Touzel was a notorious informer who stated to the press "that
he was not himself a Sabbatarian, that he was not interested in what people did on Sunday,
but that he had had his attention drawn to the common informer procedure, and that it
occurred to him that this promised quite a lucrative business if handled in the right way."
Id. at 2086 (statement of Mr. Heald).
Mr. Houghton le Touzel reportedly received thousands of pounds in annual
payments from merchants, some as high as 300f each, in exchange for promises not to file
qui tam actions. See id. (statement of Mr. Heald). One member analogized this scheme to
"the protection gangs which waged war in Chicago under Al Capone." Id. at 2140
(statement of Mr. Pannell). Cases litigated by Mr. Green/Houghton le Touzel include
Houghton-le Touzel v. Mecca, Ltd., 2 K.B. 612 (1950), and Green v Kursaal (Southend-on-
Sea) Estates, Ltd., 1 All E.R. 732 (K.B. 1937).
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and, what makes it even worse, it may have as its lever
nothing more or less than pure blackmail 75
On the other hand, the informer was berated for lacking public
spiritedness, because he demanded a reward to perform the duty of
every citizen.3 76 Moreover, "he is unconcerned about the public
interest, and he is actuated purely by mercenary motives and his own
cupidity. ' '377  With a host of charges laid against him and no one
willing to come to his defense, the common informer was expelled
from English law without recorded dissent.378
IV. THE Qui TAM INFORMER'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST
After a long experiment with qui tam legislation, the English
Parliament decisively and comprehensively rejected qui tam
enforcement in favor of public enforcement of penal statutes.
Parliament's decision is explicable by reference to the real-world
problems that stemmed from qui tam litigation in that country-
extortion of secret settlements,379  fraudulent accusations,3 8
unrestrained pursuit of defendants (often for minor offenses),38' and
the like. However, these problems also can be viewed as particular
manifestations of a more fundamental flaw at the heart of a qui tam
statute. By offering the successful informer a bounty, qui tam
legislation provides a personal financial interest in the law
enforcement process that often conflicts with other public interests at
stake in the litigation. This conflict of interest causes informers to
375. 483 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2113-14 (1951) (statement of Mr. Turner-
Samuels); see id. at 2152-53 (statement of Mr. Ross); iU at 2093 (statement of Mr. Hollis);
171 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1050, 1056 (1951) (statement of The Lord Chancellor); id.
at 1054 (statement of Viscount Simon). The Attorney General made reference in his
remarks to "motives of private greed," and noted that this was "a phrase which the [R]ight
[H]on. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) adopted the other night from a judgment of
Mr. Justice Rowlatt a few years ago." 483 PARt.. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2102 (1951)
(statement of Attorney General Shawcross).
376. See 483 PARE. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2087 (1951) (statement of Mr. Heald); id. at
2097 (statement of Mr. Hughes); 171 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1052 (1951) (statement
of Viscount Simon).
377. 483 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 2099 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hughes).
378. The vote on the bill was not recorded. However, the unanimity of support is
suggested by the absence of any stated opposition to the legislation. Indeed, upon the
third reading of the bill, one member congratulated the sponsor of the legislation that
"[tjhere has been no kind of opposition in any quarter to what he has suggested." Id. at
1519 (statement of Mr. Hollis).
379. See, e.g., supra notes 213-23, 262-64, 283-84, 324-25, 373-74 and accompanying
text.
380. See, e.g., supra notes 224-33,308,322-23 and accompanying text.
381. See, e.g., supra notes 237-47,324-26,335,344 and accompanying text.
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initiate, conduct, and terminate enforcement actions in ways that are
harmful to the broader community.3 2 A public prosecutor, by
contrast, lacks a direct financial interest in the outcome of a case and
is, therefore, more likely to take into consideration and to act upon a
broader range of public interests than a qui tam informer.
A. Public Interest and Private Gain in Qui Tam Enforcement
In evaluating methods of statutory enforcement, consideration
must be given to the goals of the law enforcement process. One
obvious aim of any regulatory regime is to deter undesirable conduct.
Related goals may include raising revenue or compensating the public
for injuries caused by the wrongdoer. In enacting the False Claims
Act, for instance, Congress sought to deter the submission of false
claims to the government and to compensate the treasury for harms
caused by schemes to defraud the public.383
If the goal is deterrence of illegal conduct, then qui tam
enforcement offers an obvious advantage: private informers
supplement the activities of public law enforcement personnel,
thereby boosting the number of enforcement actions filed.3 8  The
larger number of enforcement actions means a greater chance that
any particular offender will be apprehended, magnifying the
deterrent impact of the statute. If the statute serves a compensatory
function, qui tam enforcement likewise offers at least a potential for
greater recoveries by the public as long as cases are brought to court
and settled officially.3
But deterrence, or deterrence plus compensation, can never be
the exclusive goals of a regulatory regime. Regulators must balance
the pursuit of these objectives against competing goals that may be
equally important to the public. For instance, the public also has an
interest in minimizing the social costs created by a regulatory system.
At some point, additional enforcement efforts or stiffer penalties
impose costs on the public, on regulated individuals, or on third
parties that threaten to outweigh any corresponding deterrence and
compensation gains. A rational regulatory system seeks an optimal
level of enforcement-one that adequately fulfills the statutory
382. See infra notes 411-509 and accompanying text.
383. See United States ex reL Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 965 (9th Cir. 1995)
("We recognize that the FCA aims at achieving deterrence as well as restitution.").
384. See Wiener E-mail, supra note 10 (presenting statistics on cases pursued by
informers without Justice Department participation).
385. See id. (discussing recoveries in cases pursued by informers without Justice
Department participation).
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purposes while minimizing social costs." 6
One important mechanism for achieving an optimal level of
enforcement and avoiding unproductive social costs associated with a
regulatory regime is prosecutorial discretion. Public prosecutors are
expected to exercise judgment in balancing the various public
interests at stake in the enforcement process."' A prosecutor may
decide not to challenge conduct that falls within the terms of a statute
if she thinks the public would not be well served by an enforcement
action.31 In deciding who to prosecute, she may consider the
likelihood of a successful outcome in a particular case, the deterrent
value of the prosecution, the blameworthiness of the particular
defendant compared to other potential defendants, the extent to
which the defendant's conduct implicates the policies underlying the
statute, the effect of the prosecution on other interests of the public,
and other similar matters. 8 Prosecutorial discretion permits a case-
by-case balancing of competing public interests implicated by each
potential enforcement action.3" Additionally, it serves as a significant
protection of liberty interests, operating as a buffer between the
individual and the power of the state.39 Prosecutorial discretion also
386. See, e.g., Michael K. Block & Joseph Gregory Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust
Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 GEO. L.J. 1131, 1131 (1980)
(noting that "an efficient enforcement policy will not deter all antitrust violations because
the cost of deterring some of the violations will be greater than the harm averted"); Jeffrey
S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 760-61, 808-10 (1993)
(contending that rational enforcement must be adjusted for social costs incurred to
determine whether conduct is illegal).
387. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (noting that prosecutors
have broad discretion in charging decisions).
388. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 119, § 13.1(c), at 560 ("Even when it is clear
that there exists evidence which is more than sufficient to show guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, the prosecutor might nonetheless decide not to charge a particular individual with a
criminal offense.").
389. See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (discussing the fact that prosecutorial discretion is
broad because it is difficult for courts to review "[s]uch factors as the strength of the case,
the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and
the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan").
390. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 119, § 13.2(a), at 562-63 (noting that
discretion permits prosecutor to "individualize justice" and discussing considerations that
influence prosecutorial decisions); Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1971) (noting that discretion "permits
a prosecutor in dealing with individual cases to consider special facts and circumstances
not taken into account by the applicable rules").
391. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 119, § 13.2(a), at 562 (noting that the decision
not to prosecute can "relieve deserving defendants of even the stigma of prosecution");
Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427
(1960) (stating that without discretion in the law enforcement process to relax strict
enforcement of legal rules, "[1]iving would be a sterile compliance with soul-killing rules
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fosters public accountability in the decision-making process 92
Through provision of a bounty to a successful informer, a system
of qui tam enforcement eliminates the personal and public
protections afforded by prosecutorial discretion. A qui tam statute
operates by appealing to the pecuniary interests of informers. 93
Thus, because a reward is given only for a successful prosecution and
never for refraining from filing an action, the statute encourages the
informer to ignore any consideration apart from whether a
prosecution will result in a monetary recovery. To the extent the
informer's personal financial interest conflicts with public interests
affected by an enforcement action, the public interest typically will be
sacrificed? 94
and taboos").
392. See Abrams, supra note 390, at 3 (noting that prosecutorial discretion is
advantageous because "public attitudes change over time, and it is not always possible
immediately to adapt the statutory law to these changes"). Although federal prosecutors
are not directly accountable to the public, they are indirectly accountable to the extent
that they are supervised by an elected President. See Caminker, supra note 18, at 368
(stating that "because prosecutors within the executive branch are accountable to the
President and, through her, ultimately to the people, they are presumably less likely to
enforce the law oppressively or overzealously").
393. See supra notes 4,52,63-64, 110 and accompanying text.
394. In injecting a personal financial interest into the process of public law
enforcement, a qui tam statute departs from ethical principles that are vigorously enforced
in other sectors of the legal system. Our legal institutions reflect the judgment that those
representing the public generally should be "disinterested" in the sense that their material
well-being will not be affected by the decisions they make. For instance, Congress has
made it a crime punishable by up to five years in prison for a public employee to
participate "personally and substantially" in a "judicial or other proceeding" in which the
employee or a closely related person or entity has a financial interest. 18 U.S.C. §§ 208(a),
216(a)(2) (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 528 (1994) (permitting the Attorney General to
promulgate rules disqualifying officers or employees of the Department of Justice from
participating in investigations or prosecutions when they may have a conflict of interest).
Similarly, an executive order from the Bush administration repeatedly emphasizes the
theme that public service should not be pursued for private gain:
(a) Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the
Constitution, the laws, and ethical principles above private gain.
(b) Employees shall not hold financial interests that conflict with the
conscientious performance of duty.
(g) Employees shall not use public office for private gain.
Exec. Order No. 12,674, § 101, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (1989), amended by Exec. Order No.
12,731, § 101, 3 C.F.R. 306,307 (1990), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994).
Moreover, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated when an
adjudicative official has a personal financial interest in the outcome of a proceeding. See
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-25 (1986) (holding under the Due Process
Clause that an Alabama Supreme Court justice should not participate in a case when the
decision would directly influence a lower court case in which the justice had a substantial
financial interest); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973) (upholding a lower
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The Supreme Court recognized the potential for such a conflict
between public and private goals in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States ex rel. Schumer.395 The Court in that case declined to apply the
1986 FCA amendments retroactively.396 Critical to its decision was
the Act's expansion of qui tam enforcement, which the Court
analogized to the creation of a new cause of action. Significantly, the
Court noted that qui tam informers "are motivated primarily by
prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good. '' 397 As a
consequence, "a relator's interests and the Government's do not
necessarily coincide. 398
The conflict of interest inherent in a qui tam statute is analogous
to the conflict identified by the Supreme Court in the case of Young
v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.399 Young arose out of civil
litigation charging the defendants with imitating the plaintiff's
products. The underlying lawsuit settled, and the district court
entered a consensual injunction. The plaintiff subsequently
authorized a "sting" operation that uncovered evidence that the
defendants were continuing to manufacture counterfeit goods in
violation of the court order.40  The district court appointed the
plaintiff's attorneys to represent the United States in investigating
and prosecuting the asserted contempt of court.401  The Supreme
court ruling that the Alabama State Board of Optometry was disqualified from
participating in an administrative proceeding due to its pecuniary interest in the resolution
of the matter); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (holding that an Ohio statute
permitting a mayor to act as judge and impose fines in criminal prohibition cases violated
the Fourteenth Amendment due to the mayor's pecuniary interest in the fines collected).
The Supreme Court, however, has given mixed signals with respect to whether due process
ever requires a disinterested prosecutor. Compare Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,
249-50 (1980) ("Prosecutors are also public officials; they too must serve the public
interest.... A scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the
enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial
decision and in some contexts raise serious constitutional questions."), with Tumey, 273
U.S. at 535 ("[A] State may, and often ought to, stimulate prosecutions for crime by
offering to those who shall initiate and carry on such prosecutions rewards for thus acting
in the interest of the State and the people. The legislature may offer rewards or a
percentage of the recovery to informers."). For additional discussion of this issue, see
United States ex reL Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a
due process challenge to FCA); infra note 405 (discussing case law interpreting due
process to require a disinterested prosecutor).
395. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
396. See id. at 941-42.
397. 1d at 949.
398. Id. at 949 n.5.
399. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
400. See id. at 791.
401. See id. at 791-92.
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Court reversed the defendants' contempt convictions on the ground
that the prosecutors had a conflict of interest.' After explaining a
prosecutor's duties as a public official and reviewing legal and ethical
proscriptions designed to eliminate conflicting private interests, the
Court concluded that a conflict of interest exists where attorneys for
private parties are appointed to prosecute opposing litigants for
contempt:
The Government's interest is in dispassionate assessment of
the propriety of criminal charges for affronts to the
Judiciary. The private party's interest is in obtaining the
benefits of the court's order. While these concerns
sometimes may be congruent, sometimes they may not. A
prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported
prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal
rewards for the private client. Conversely, a prosecutor may
be tempted to abandon a meritorious prosecution if a
settlement providing benefits to the private client is
conditioned on a recommendation against criminal
charges.403
The Court explained a number of ways in which the appointed
prosecutors might be tempted to use governmental powers for the
pecuniary benefit of their private clients.4°4 Consistent with the
Young decision, a number of federal and state courts have ruled that
an attorney may not represent the government in a case where either
the attorney or a private client has a financial stake in the outcome.40 5
402. See id. at 802-14.
403. Id. at 805.
404. See id at 805-06. The basis for reversing the defendants' convictions in Young
was the Supreme Court's supervisory power over lower federal courts. See id. at 808-09.
The Court acknowledged that prosecutors are allowed to zealously seek convictions, see
i& at 807 (citing Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980)), but indicated that a
prosecutor who also represents an interested party suffers from an impermissible conflict
of interest because "the ethics of the legal profession require that an interest other than
the Government's be taken into account." Id at 807.
405. Some of these decisions are grounded on the Due Process Clause and others rely
on extra-constitutional ethical considerations, as in Young. See Polo Fashions, Inc. v.
Stock Buyers Int'l Inc., 760 F.2d 698, 704 (6th Cir. 1985) (invoking supervisory power to
reject a district court's appointment of attorneys for a private party to pursue criminal
contempt proceedings); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. United
States, 411 F.2d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that a criminal prosecution by private
attorneys representing private interests violated due process); Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d
709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that due process had been violated when a prosecutor
also represented an assault victim in private litigation against the defendant); People ex
reL Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347, 350-53 (Cal. 1985) (holding that a city
government could not hire a private attorney to prosecute a civil nuisance case on a
contingent-fee basis); People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d 705, 708 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that it
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Just as the financial interests of the client in Young potentially
conflicted with the government's interest "in dispassionate
assessment of the propriety of criminal charges, '40 6 the informer's
financial interest under a qui tam statute undermines the comparable
public interest in dispassionate assessment of whether and how to
prosecute violations of a penal statute. Lord Coke described this
conflict of interest in eloquent terms when he observed that informers
act "for malice or private ends, [but] never for love of Justice. '40 7
Coke may overstate the case in suggesting that informers
"never" act "for love of Justice." No doubt there are informers
actuated by high ethical standards and a sincere desire to see the
public interest advanced.408 But qui tam legislation by its nature
appeals to the lowest common denominator. No screening process
separates good informers from bad ones. For every informer who on
principle sacrifices his own interests for the common good, another
can be found whose principles are more accommodating. Even public
prosecutors do not always act from the purest of motives. Public
prosecutors sometimes act corruptly, egotistically, from partisan
motives, or for purposes of career enhancement.4 9 But a qui tam
is fundamentally unfair to permit prosecution of a corporate manager by a district
attorney who was counsel to and shareholder in the corporation).
The Ninth Circuit has rejected a due process challenge to the qui tam provisions of
the FCA. See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1993);
supra note 393. Baca v. Padilla, 190 P. 730 (N.M. 1920), is another interesting case in
which the court prohibited a contingent fee criminal prosecution:
To permit and sanction the appearance on behalf of the state of a private
prosecutor, vitally interested personally in securing the conviction of the accused,
not for the purpose of upholding the laws of the state, but in order that the
private purse of the prosecutor may be fattened, is abhorrent to the sense of
justice and would not, we believe, be tolerated by any court.
Id. at 732.
406. Young, 481 U.S. at 805.
407. COKE, supra note 200, at *194. Likewise, this conflict was recognized during
Parliament's debate on the Common Informers Act when an MP complained that an
informer "is unconcerned about the public interest, and ... actuated purely by mercenary
motives and his own cupidity." 483 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2099 (1951) (statement of
Mr. Hughes). The anonymous author of The Character of an Informer pointed to the
same conflict when he noted that an informer "seem[s] to make the Publique Service the
Mark of his aim, yet he squints aside at his own Ends, which are the true [target] all the
Arrows of his Prosecutions are shot at." THE CHARACTER OF AN INFORMER, supra note
306, at 3.
408. And even an informer who cares about no interest but his own may coincidentally
promote the public good in pursuing private gain.
409. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (explaining that the
system of broad prosecutorial discretion "carries with it the potential for both individual
and institutional abuse"). Of course, if the government prosecutor wants to keep his job
or advance in his career, it is important to maintain at least the appearance of working for
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statute intentionally turns prosecutorial decision-making into a
mercenary endeavor by purposefully inserting personal financial
concerns into a process that we normally seek to keep free from such
complicating influences.410
B. Manifestations of the Informer's Conflict of Interest
A qui tam statute affords the informer a personal financial
interest that will often conflict with public interests implicated by an
enforcement action.4 These conflicting interests explain many of the
the public interest. This need to maintain appearances perhaps serves as a constraint on
the behavior of public prosecutors and tends to minimize conduct with an obvious adverse
impact on the public. See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the
United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform,
54 OHIO ST. L.J 1325, 1338 (1993) ("American prosecutors are almost always elected
public officials who have to defend their record and the way they use their discretion to
the electorate." (footnote omitted)).
The opportunity for corrupt practices by public prosecutors, such as extortion of
secret payments from defendants, may be minimized by the greater scrutiny such
prosecutors endure, particularly those in the Justice Department. By the time an FCA
case is referred to a Justice Department attorney, there are frequently several other
government employees already involved in the matter who might notice suspicious
behavior. See DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 32 (1980) ("Typically, civil litigation conducted by the
Department of Justice is intimately related to the programs of other federal agencies--
referred to as the 'client agencies.' "). In addition, the Justice Department has
mechanisms in place to monitor the conduct of prosecutors, which tend to deter
corruption. See, e.g., 2 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-2.112 (1997) (describing
the role of the Office of Professional Responsibility in investigating alleged misconduct of
Justice Department employees). By contrast, qui tam enforcement is decentralized and
the informer may be the only person other than the wrongdoer who knows of a statutory
violation.
410. See supra notes 393-94, 399-404 and accompanying text.
411. Personal interests of the informer beyond the available bounty may also conflict
with public interests at stake in the litigation. Cf supra note 408 and accompanying text
(describing the personal interests of public prosecutors). English qui tam informers, for
instance, sometimes were accused of acting from "malice." See supra notes 201, 210, 216
and accompanying text. An informer who prosecutes a claim because of antipathy toward
the defendant is unlikely to make prosecutorial decisions based on a disinterested
evaluation of the public good. Similarly, the informers in United States ex rel. Sequoia
Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 1998), filed 34 qui tam
actions against competitors as part of a "war in the citrus industry." Id at 1141. An
informer attempting to harm competitors is unlikely to prosecute cases in a manner
benefiting the public. Indeed, the Justice Department intervened and dismissed the qui
tam claims presented in Sequoia Orange, believing the cases to be harmful to the industry.
See id. at 1142. This case appears to be the only one in which the Justice Department has
intervened for the purpose of dismissing a qui tam action.
Of course, it is quite possible that private causes of action could be brought for
malicious purposes, such as harming a competitor. See David Franklin, Comment, Civil
Rights vs. Civil Liberties? The Legality of State Court Lawsuits Under the Fair Housing
Act, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1607, 1630 (1996) ("According to Judge Posner, the existence of
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problems that beset qui tam enforcement in England. The informers
pursued the prosecution of statutory violations with a business
mindset, rather than that of disinterested public servants. If the
informer had evidence of statutory violations, he had no incentive to
consider the public impact of the litigation, the culpability of the
defendants, the fairness of a particular litigation strategy, or similar
matters that might influence a public prosecutor. For those informers
who were less than scrupulous, the goal of wealth maximization could
be pursued even more effectively by extorting secret settlements or
by claiming statutory violations that in fact did not occur. This
Section will discuss particular ways in which informers seeking the
largest possible bounty have undermined the public interest in
English qui tam cases and in cases brought under the FCA.
1. Diverting the Public's Share of the Qui Tam Recovery
Perhaps the clearest conflict between the interests of the
informer and the public concerns the allocation of moneys recovered
from a defendant. When dividing a fixed pot of money paid by a
defendant, every dollar that goes to the public necessarily will not go
to the informer. Thus, the informer has a financial incentive to
reduce the amount of money that the public receives. This aspect of
the informer's conflict of interest manifested itself in England in the
recurring extortion of secret settlements, i.e., unlicensed
compositions.412  Informers collected payments from statutory
violators in exchange for forbearance to file a qui tam action or
abandonment of a case already filed. The informer then pocketed the
entire settlement, sharing none of it with the public.413 This practice
provided the principal basis for the charge of "blackmail" leveled at
informers during the Parliamentary debate over the Common
the abuse of process tort is proof that some meritorious lawsuits are filed for ulterior
reasons-for example, to impose prohibitive litigation costs on a competitor ....").
However, the impact of such cases is limited by the requirement that the plaintiff make a
plausible showing of the damages it has suffered. Under the FCA, the plaintiff need not
show any injury to itself, suing instead for treble damages based upon alleged injury to the
government. See supra notes 17, 101 and accompanying text. This procedure makes it
easier to raise the stakes in the litigation by claiming that the defendant should be liable
for a large damage award. If the informer can make no plausible claim that the defendant
injured the government, the FCA might still permit a suit for recovery of civil penalties.
See infra notes 463, 475 and accompanying text (discussing large civil penalties imposed
under FCA, even in the absence of damage to the government).
412. See, e.g., supra notes 213-23, 262-64, 283-84, 323-25, 373-74 and accompanying
text.
413. See supra notes 214-23.
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Informers Act of 1951. 14
There are, of course, no published statistics on the incidence of
blackmail stemming from the 1986 FCA amendments.41 However,
given the incentives for both informers and defendants to negotiate
secret settlements and the recurrence of such conduct under English
qui tam legislation, it would not be surprising to find that similar
incidents have occurred under the American statute. Moreover, the
FCA has demonstrably given rise to a related problem. Even if FCA
informers have refrained from extortion, there is strong evidence that
they have undermined the public interest by structuring FCA
settlements to reduce the share recovered by the public.
The problem can be illustrated by the 1992 congressional
testimony of a Justice Department witness. The witness testified that
in FCA cases in which the government refused to intervene
("declined cases"), recoveries to the United States Treasury "[had]
been negligible," but that recoveries by informers and their attorneys
in those same cases "[had] not been negligible. '416 While the United
States had received only $225,000 from declined cases,417 informers
had entered into or requested approval of settlements providing for
another $6.1 million in payments to the relators and their attorneys-
money that would not be shared with the government.4 8 In other
words, the evidence suggests that, between 1986 and 1992, proposed
and final settlements in declined qui tam cases had been structured so
that the vast majority of settlement proceeds were allocated to
414. See supra notes 373, 375 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
note 346 (describing qui tam enforcement as "legalized blackmail"). It could be argued
that such extortionate settlements undermine public financial interests, but nevertheless
advance the public interest in deterrence by imposing a penalty on the defendant for
unlawful conduct. Because such settlements are secret, however, they cannot deter
anyone other than the particular wrongdoer in question. Moreover, it is likely that the
extortionate settlement will be substantially less than the full penalty provided for by
statute, weakening the deterrent impact. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 601 (4th ed. 1992) ("If blackmail were lawful, the public monopoly of
enforcement would be undermined. An alternative, and only superficialiy inconsistent,
possibility is that the blackmailer will subvert the statutory punishment scheme by
accepting from the offender a payment less, often much less, than the specified fine for the
offense.").
415. Racketeering was one of the complaints that led to the restriction of FCA qui tam
litigation in 1943. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
416. False Claims Act Technical Amendments of 1992: Hearing on H.R. 4563 Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House of
Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 28 (1992) (Sup. Docs. No.
Y4J89/1:102149) [hereinafter Gerson Testimony] (statement of Stuart M. Gerson,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
417. See id. at 26.
418. See id. at 28.
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informers and their attorneys rather than the government."' This
outcome, while perhaps not surprising, undercuts the FCA, which
specifies that the government should receive between 70% and 75%
of any sums recovered on FCA claims in declined cases.420
How do informers circumvent the statutory formula for division
of proceeds? They negotiate to allocate settlement dollars to claims
in which the government shares no interest.421 As the Justice
Department witness explained, "[t]his $6.1 million [in 'additional
payments'] has been variously characterized in settlement agreements
as 'attorney's fees' or 'wrongful termination settlements' or payment
for 'emotional distress.' " 422 In essence, informers use the
government's fraud claims as bargaining chips to increase recoveries
on personal causes of action.
The Justice Department believes this technique was employed in
United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp.,4 3 a qui tam case
in which the government chose not to intervene. The informer and
419. Gerson's testimony did not mention the amount paid to informers in statutory
bounties. On the other hand, neither did he indicate whether any of the pending
settlements provided for additional payments to the United States beyond the $225,000
already recovered. Thus, the testimony does not permit a determination of the exact
percentage of money allocated to informers and their attorneys in these proposed and
final settlements. See id.
420. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1994). Relators may have shared a larger percentage
of their recoveries with the government since 1992, but have still kept a relatively high
percentage of the money paid by defendants in declined cases. According to Justice
Department figures, the total dollar amount allocated to FCA claims in declined cases
through September 1999 has been $189 million. See Wiener E-mail, supra note 10. The
informers' bounty has not been calculated in all of these cases. See id. However, because
the statutory minimum bounty is 25% in most declined cases, see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-
(2), and the informer's bounty has averaged 29% in the declined cases where a bounty has
been calculated, see Wiener E-mail, supra note 10, it is reasonable to assume that if none
of these recoveries is reversed on appeal, at least 25% of the $189 million recovered in
declined cases, or $47.25 million, will eventually go to informers.
In addition, the Justice Department knows of another $64.3 million that has gone
to the informers in declined cases because it was characterized as something other than an
FCA recovery. The actual figure is probably higher than $64.3 million, because some of
the settlement agreements are confidential, so the Justice Department lacks access to
complete data. See iii Thus, of the $253.3 million ($189 million + $64.3 million) that the
Justice Department knows was recovered from defendants in declined cases, it appears
likely that at least $111.55 million ($47.25 million + $64.3 million), or 44%, will go to the
informers and their attorneys, in addition to any payments that have been kept secret from
the Justice Department. One published list of qui tam settlements shows a few settled
cases in which the government received nothing at all and a number of others in which the
amount allocated to the government seems suspiciously low. See List of Qui Tam
Settlements, 2 No. 10 DOJ ALERT 16 (Prentice Hall, Oct. 1992).
421. See Kovacic, supra note 107, at 1833.
422. Gerson Testimony, supra note 416, at 28.
423. 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994).
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the defendant reached an agreement that the defendant would pay $1
million to be shared by the informer with the government for an FCA
fraud claim and $3.2 million solely to the informer for a wrongful
termination claim, including costs and attorney's fees.424  The
government objected, arguing that the settlement had been structured
to reduce the amount recovered by the United States and that the
defendant had failed to pursue a potentially meritorious statute of
limitations defense applicable to the wrongful termination claim.'
The parties then agreed to shift $500,000 of the settlement amount
from the wrongful termination cause of action to the FCA claim.426
An even clearer case of an informer trying to cut the government
out of its rightful recovery is United States v. Texas Instruments
Corp.427 In that case, the informer and the defendant entered into a
settlement for $300,000, which was characterized as "legal fees" and
paid to the relators' attorneys. The attorneys then gave $124,500 of
the supposed legal fees back to the informer. The district court found
that the latter sum was simply a disguised recovery on the FCA claim
and that the government was entitled to receive its share of that
money.421
424. See id. at 718.
425. See id.
426. See id The Ninth Circuit ruled that the government was entitled to a hearing on
"whether the proposed settlement fairly and reasonably allocates the settlement funds."
Id at 725. On remand, the district court approved the settlement over the government's
objection and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal. See United States ex rel.
Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., No. 94-56599, 1995 WL 635100, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 26,
1995) (unpublished disposition).
In Searcy v. Philips Electronics North American Corp., 117 F.3d 154 (5th Cir.
1997), the Fifth Circuit provided additional protection to the United States, holding that
the FCA does not permit voluntary dismissal of an FCA claim over the objection of the
Justice Department. See id. at 155. The holding essentially gives the government a veto
power over settlements reached in declined cases, unless perhaps a defendant could pay an
informer not to prosecute an action that remained pending.
427. 104 F.3d 276 (9th Cir. 1997).
428. See id. at 277. The informer also may undermine the public interest in the
settlement process by impeding the negotiation of non-monetary settlements. At times, a
non-monetary settlement can provide greater value to the public than a cash settlement,
while simultaneously reducing the cost to the defendant. See James C. Freund, Bridging
Troubled Waters: Negotiating Disputes, in THE CORPORATE L1rIGATOR 253,261 (Francis
J. Burke, Jr. & Michael L. Goldblatt eds., 1989) (noting that settlements can be premised
on business arrangements between the parties because "the value to the recipient of goods
and services is always substantially higher than the cost to the furnisher, an economic fact
of life that can help to bridge large gaps"). Because the informer has a financial stake in
any recovery, however, the informer's incentive is for every settlement to be expressed in
dollars and cents, even when the public would be better served by more creative
settlement options. As explained by a veteran prosecutor:
"We may want to settle with a hospital, knowing that they are providing all of the
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The problem of unlicensed compositions in England and the
efforts of FCA informers to reduce the settlement dollars recovered
by the United States illustrate the inevitability of conflict between the
interests of informers and the interests of the public in certain
contexts. Empowering informers to represent the public promises to
undermine the public good in situations where their interests diverge.
Disagreement over the division of money paid by defendants is
simply the most visible expression of the informer's conflict of
interest. The discussion below suggests that the antagonism between
the goals of informers and those of the public extends beyond the
allocation of monetary recoveries to other matters that, while
sometimes more subtle, are no less important to the welfare of the
community.
2. Imposing Unproductive and Counterproductive Social Costs
In discussing the benefits of prosecutorial discretion, this Article
suggested that the public interest requires a careful balancing of the
goals of a statutory regime, such as deterrence and compensation,
with other important goals, such as minimizing the costs of the
enforcement process.429 The disinterested public prosecutor presents
a real advantage in this regard. In deciding whether to bring suit, the
public prosecutor can engage in a case-by-case consideration of the
regulatory benefits and the social costs of a particular enforcement
action.430
One can illustrate this advantage of prosecutorial discretion by
considering circumstances in which a prosecutor would advance the
public interest by declining to file enforcement actions arguably
authorized by the terms of a statute. At least three such
community's charity care and understanding that a multimillion-dollar settlement
will impair their ability to do that .... But I have a relator who knows the case is
worth millions, and he doesn't want to settle."
Brian McCormick, Law Opens Door to More Whistle-Blowing on Health Fraud, AM.
MED. NEWS, June 26, 1995, at 23, 23 (quoting James Sheehan, Chief of Civil Division,
United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania). Under the statute, the
informer cannot unilaterally block a Justice Department settlement, but he or she can
force a court hearing to determine whether the settlement is "fair, adequate, and
reasonable under all the circumstances." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (1994).
429. See supra notes 383-92 and accompanying text.
430. The Supreme Court made an analogous point in Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240
(1999), emphasizing the value of centralized decision-making in the pursuit of litigation
against states. See id. at 2267. The Court explained that cases pursued by the United
States government itself "require the exercise of political responsibility for each suit
prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a broad delegation to private
persons to sue nonconsenting States." Id
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circumstances come to mind. First, the public good would be
promoted by declining to prosecute in cases in which prosecution
would defeat the goals of the legislation. For example, because the
False Claims Act is supposed to protect tax dollars,4 31 enforcing the
statute in a manner that causes a net loss to the treasury undermines
the goals of the statute and harms the public.
Second, even when an enforcement action would not undermine
statutory goals directly, the public would be harmed and societal
resources wasted by enforcing an overly broad statute against conduct
bearing little or no relation to the purposes behind the legislative
scheme. The public has no reason to apply a legal rule when its
regulatory policies are not implicated. To the contrary, the common
good requires not enforcing a statute when doing so would create
unproductive social costs. Thus, in the context of the FCA, enforcing
the statute against conduct having only minimal potential impact on
the public fisc undermines the public interest. Invoking the statute in
this circumstance imposes unproductive social costs on members of
the society in the enforcement process itself and in the efforts of
regulated persons to avoid similar enforcement actions in the
future-without advancing the public purposes behind the legislation.
Third, even if the potential defendant's conduct has a significant
impact on the achievement of statutory goals, the public interest is
harmed when a statute's enforcement produces social costs that
exceed the regulatory benefits of enforcement. Applying the statute
in particular contexts, for instance, might create economic
dislocations with an excessive impact on innocent third parties.
Alternately, the costs of satisfying the statute in particular
circumstances might become so high that the public would be harmed
by requiring regulated parties to conform fully to legal requirements.
The cost of compliance is a particularly important issue under the
FCA because of its close relationship to the government contracting
process. Contractors facing greater costs from FCA enforcement will
either demand larger payments for goods or services supplied to the
government, or shift to more lucrative fields of economic endeavor,
thereby reducing competition in the procurement market.4 32
431. See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
432. Of course, the public may have little sympathy with respect to enforcement costs
imposed on a company that cheats the government. But many costs of complying with the
FCA, such as the cost of training employees or the cost of monitoring to prevent
violations, will be higher for companies that try in good faith to satisfy their statutory
duties. See, e.g., Katherine Simpson Allen, Note, Belly Up Down in the Dumps:
Bankruptcy and Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1037, 1040 n.13 (1985)
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In each of these three circumstances, then, and perhaps others as
well, a prosecutor would advance the public interest by refraining
from filing an enforcement actions notwithstanding statutory
authorization to do so. Recognizing and acting upon the public
interest in such circumstances requires evaluation of the policies
behind a statutory prohibition and the costs imposed by the
enforcement process. A qui tam informer, however, acts primarily for
the sake of the statutory bounty. The informer is a single-minded
automaton, programmed to seek out statutory violations and collect
forfeitures. The issues relevant to an informer's pursuit of forfeitures
are: (1) the likelihood that the informer could convince a court that
the defendant violated a statute; and (2) the ability of the defendant
to pay the resulting penalty. This focus on wealth maximization tends
to exclude competing considerations. The financially motivated
informer will be relatively insensitive both to the goals of a regulatory
regime and to the social costs imposed by enforcement because
neither directly impacts the collection of bounties. This insensitivity
to regulatory goals and social costs is borne out in both the English
history of qui tam enforcement and in modem experience under the
FCA.
a. Fraudulent and Meritless Claims
One common complaint under the eighteenth century English
statute regulating liquor sales was that informers prosecuted innocent
defendants.43 3  This problem illustrates in an extreme form the
informer's insensitivity to the goals of a regulatory regime and the
costs of enforcement. Parliament, of course, adopted the legislation
to punish the unlicensed sale of alcohol, hoping to reduce conduct
deemed socially harmful.4' Enforcement of the statute against
someone who had not actually sold alcohol imposed social costs on
the defendant while doing little to advance the policy goals of the
legislation.4 35 But whether a prosecution furthered the public goal of
punishing unlicensed liquor sales or whether it imposed unproductive
social costs on the defendant were matters of indifference to a
(noting that costs of compliance with EPA regulations are higher for honest waste haulers
and that illegal dumpers enjoy large profit margins due to non-compliance).
433. See supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 317-19 and accompanying text.
435. To the extent there may be some positive deterrent impact from an erroneous
conviction, the social costs of penalizing a defendant for an offense that was not in fact
committed outweigh the deterrence advantage. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at
*358 ("[1It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.").
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bounty-seeking informer. If an informer was not particularly honest,
and if he failed to detect enough statutory violations to meet his
financial goals, he could earn additional bounties by convincing the
courts that innocent persons had violated the statute. 6 The public
interest in protecting law-abiding citizens against unfounded
accusations was thus sacrificed in pursuit of the informer's personal
financial interests.
A less egregious but related form of overreaching has arisen in
enforcement of the FCA. A large proportion of qui tam cases filed
under the FCA have been dismissed by the courts, but have
nevertheless proven expensive to resolve. The bulk of the resulting
social costs have been borne either by the government or by
defendants. These social costs imposed by the informers' activities,
therefore, have failed to deter bounty-seeking informers from
bringing "lottery ticket" enforcement actions.
Statistics from the Department of Justice demonstrate that the
courts have dismissed a high percentage of qui tam actions filed since
the 1986 FCA amendments. As of September 1999, the Justice
Department had learned the final outcome in 1600 qui tam cases.4 37
Of these 1600 cases, the Justice Department categorized 1181, or
73.8%, as having been "[d]ismissed,.no recovery." The other 419
cases, or 26.2%, have produced a settlement or judgment.4 38 Based
on this data, it appears that in qui tam cases that have reached a
definitive conclusion, the courts have found more than seven out of
ten defective, either as a substantive matter or as a result of
procedural or jurisdictional deficiencies.4"
436. See supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
437. See Wiener E-mail, supra note 10 (combining figures for cases categorized as
"[s]ettled or judgment" and "[d]ismissed, no recovery").
438. See id The Justice Department characterizes 42 cases as "inactive" and another
71 cases as "unclear." Id. Even if we included these cases in our calculations, the figures
would still show that, among qui tam cases that may have run their course, at least 68.9%
(1181 of 1713) have been dismissed by the courts, and others have apparently been
abandoned by the informers. Of the 1600 cases described in the text, the Justice
Department indicates that it "[i]ntervened or otherwise pursued" 348 of them. Id. Out of
those 348 cases, only 8, or 2.3%, are classified as "[d]ismissed, no recovery." Id. Thus, the
Justice Department has done a much better job than informers generally of selecting
meritorious qui tam cases to pursue.
439. During the Bush administration, the Justice Department pointed to the large
number of meritless qui tam cases filed under the 1986 FCA amendments. In 1992,
Assistant Attorney General Stuart Gerson testified before Congress that "[a]n
uncomfortable number of the qui tam suits filed present no evidence, no information
based on personal knowledge, or are 'kitchen sink' complaints containing every
conceivable broad allegation without any specific evidence whatsoever." Gerson
Testimony, supra note 416, at 24. Of the 332 qui tam complaints that had been
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The pursuit of substantively or procedurally defective FCA
claims is an objective manifestation of the informer's conflict of
interest. Evidently, informers have concluded that these claims
create sufficient potential for financial reward to warrant the required
effort, even though seven out of ten cases result in no recovery. From
the standpoint of the informer, this conclusion is probably rational.
When there has been a recovery in a qui tam case, the average
amount paid to the informer has been $987,000, so there is a
significant upside if a particular claim pays off.440 An attorney will
usually pursue a qui tam action on a contingent-fee basis, so the
informer is insulated from most of the costs of prosecution. The
attorney bears the prosecution costs, but can cover her losses by
pursuing a large number of cases, some of which are likely to produce
a payout. 441 Moreover, it may be rational for an informer to pursue a
investigated by Gerson's office at the time of his testimony (many of which were
presumably still active), about 150 (45%) had been dismissed by the courts or abandoned
by the qui tam informers. See ic at 25. Former Attorney General William Barr likewise
indicated in a 1992 speech to corporate counsels that a "high proportion" of qui tam cases
lacked merit. William P. Barr, Remarks to the American Corporate Counsel Association
(Oct. 29, 1992).
440. See Wiener E-mail, supra note 10.
441. Addressing the issue of claims against innocent defendants, Judge Richard Posner
has recognized that a person in the position of a qui tam informer "is paid per offender
convicted, regardless of the actual guilt or innocence of the accused" and, therefore, "can
increase his 'catch,' and hence his income, by augmenting the supply of 'offenders' " with
fabricated claims. POSNER, supra note 414, at 597. On the other hand, he has noted that
"the private enforcer may be more sensitive to the costs of the unsuccessful prosecution"
and, therefore, may "screen out the innocent more carefully than the public enforcer
would, because resources devoted to prosecuting the innocent are likely to be less
productive than those devoted to prosecuting the guilty." Id. at 598.
Nevertheless, the FCA data collected by the Justice Department suggests that
informers as a class have engaged in only minimal "screening" to exclude non-meritorious
claims, perhaps because many FCA informers do not have a large supply of potential
claims to assert. A plausible FCA claim typically depends upon access to inside
information, so an informer who wants a chance at the large bounties under the statute
may have no alternative but to make the strongest possible claim from the information in
his possession. Certain informers have been in a position to file multiple qui tam actions
under the FCA. For instance, one retired employee of an Inspector General's office
reportedly has pursued at least seven qui tam cases. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine v.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (noting that Harold R.
Fine has pursued "several" qui tam actions); accord Wallace, supra note 19, at 19
(reporting that relator Fine filed seven qui tam complaints between 1992 and 1993).
Perhaps such an informer, with unusual access to a large number of potential claims,
would have the ability to "screen" qui tam cases and assert only the most meritorious. The
typical private informer, however, does not have the public prosecutor's luxury of sifting
through numerous possible cases to select only those presenting the best evidence of
fraud.
The FCA has spurred the growth of a "qui tam bar" consisting of law firms that
devote substantial resources to FCA litigation. See Fisk, supra note 9, at Al (noting a
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claim, even if it seems unlikely to yield a victory on the merits. For
instance, the case could prove to have a nuisance value, causing the
defendant to settle to avoid the higher costs of defending a fraud
claim." 2
While it makes economic sense from the informers' standpoint to
file a large number of FCA cases in hopes of a few significant
payouts, this course of action produces costs for defendants and the
public. In an effort to obtain information on the costs of defending
FCA cases, Professor Kovacic surveyed forty government contract
and commercial firms. 3 The surveyed firms had been defendants in
thirty-eight completed qui tam cases that had been pursued without
Justice Department intervention. In defending these cases, the firms
spent approximately $53,403,000 in outside legal costs: "The total
amount of [FCA] recoveries obtained in these matters was $3,694,484.
The average expenditure in outside legal fees by defendants in these
cases was $1,431,660, and the average [FCA] recovery was $97,223." 44
These figures suggest that, at least in cases that the Justice
Department declines, the social costs to defendants of qui tam
enforcement are dwarfing the benefits accruing to the public.
445
Florida firm that has six attorneys and five investigators devoted exclusively to pursuing 70
active qui tam cases). Such a firm presumably rejects some cases offered by potential
informers, but because the firm does not hold a monopoly on enforcement powers, a
rejected informer may still be able to find another attorney willing to handle the case.
Moreover, as suggested in the text, the profitability of a qui tam practice may depend on
having several cases pending at once. Thus, even a firm with a significant qui tam practice
might be willing to take some marginal cases and rely on the law of averages to protect the
firm's bottom line. Certainly, no private firm will have a sufficient pool of potential cases
so that it can be as selective as the Department of Justice in deciding how to allocate
enforcement resources.
442. Even when the risks of an adverse judgment seem low, an FCA defendant must
take into account the high penalties provided by the statute: treble the government's
actual damages, plus a fine of $5000 to $10,000 for each invoice or other document that is
deemed to constitute a "false or fraudulent claim" or a "false record or statement"
supporting payment of such a claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
443. See William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation
in Government Procurement Markets, 6 Sup. Cr. ECON. REV. 201, 224-25 (1998).
444. 1I at 226. The survey respondents estimated that even a relatively simple qui tam
case, where the proceedings are short lived, typically produces out-of-pocket legal costs in
the range of $250,000 to $500,000, not including other costs such as employee time. See id.
at 225. Potentially, of course, the self-interest of the survey respondents could have
influenced their estimates. See id. at 224-25.
445. The sizable legal fees expended in these cases need not be viewed as evidence that
the cases had potential merit or that the defendants were trying to spend the informers
into submission. In a large company, extensive legal fees can be incurred just in
conducting a preliminary legal and factual investigation to determine the merits of a case.
See CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACr ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE
S. DIST. OF TEX., REPORT AND PLAN (1991), reprinted in 11 REV. LITIG. 203, 256 (1992)
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The adverse effect of meritless qui tam claims on the public is
aggravated by the ability of many defendants to recapture their
defense costs under cost-reimbursement contracts. The Federal
Acquisition Regulations permit a government contractor under a
cost-reimbursement contract to recover up to 80% of the costs of
successfully defending an FCA action.46 Thus, it seems probable that
the thirty-eight cases covered by Professor Kovacic's survey produced
a significant net loss to the treasury.447 But even in cases where such
legal expenditures are not reimbursed directly by the public, they
adversely affect government contracting by driving up procurement
costs and discouraging firms from participating in the procurement
market. An informer has no incentive to consider such costs, even
though they may be significant to the public." 8
Fruitless qui tam cases also adversely affect the public by
(reporting that attorneys in a survey identified preliminary investigation of cases as the
second highest source of litigation costs, with discovery activities as the highest).
Moreover, when the case concerns a program employing hundreds of workers, an
informer can impose heavy legal costs on the defendant with a simple request for
production of documents, which must be gathered and reviewed by outside counsel. See
LARRY S. KAPLAN, COMPLEX FEDERAL LITIGATION: AN ATORNEY's GUIDE TO
MANAGEMENT AND TRIAL § 18.02, at 397-98 (1993) (discussing large costs of document
production); WILLIAM SCHWARZER ET AL., CIVIL DISCOVERY AND MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE: A GUIDE TO EFFICIENT PRACTICE § 6-3 (2d ed. 1994) ("Overuse and
misuse of document requests are common sources of complaints about the discovery
process. Dragnet requests that would produce many more documents than are needed or
relevant are easy to draft. ").
446. See 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-47(b), (e) (1999) (stating that up to 80% of reasonable costs
of defending FCA action brought "by a third party in the name of the United States" may
be allowable costs under government contracts unless the actions resulted in a judgment
or a settlement); Kovacic, supra note 443, at 226; Kovacic, supra note 107, at 1840-41; see
also JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 3-85 to -87 (1998)
(noting that "the allowability of costs in defending qui tam actions" remains an open
question). For additional information on qui tam actions, see generally QuI TAM:
BEYOND GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook,
Series No. H-456, 1993).
447. See Kovacic, supra note 443, at 226 ("The results of the survey suggest that the
government frequently reimburses the defendant in an amount that substantially exceeds
the [FCA] penalties obtained by a relator who proceeds with a case independently after
the Justice Department has declined to participate.").
448. A fee-shifting provision might make the informer more sensitive to the costs of
defending against an unsuccessful qui tam action. In a widely cited article, Professors
Becker and Stigler have advocated a private market in law enforcement somewhat
analogous to that created by a qui tam statute. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler,
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-
17 (1974). However, to deter "[c]apricious or arbitrary enforcement," their proposal
includes "full compensation of persons acquitted of charges" paid for by the party bringing
the charges. Id. at 15. The FCA contains a fee-shifting provision, but it has virtually no
bite, because it applies only if a case is "clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious or brought
primarily for purposes of harassment." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (1994).
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consuming government investigative resources. 49 Tndeed, the FCA
mandates that the Justice Department investigate allegations of fraud
contained in qui tam complaints.45 In 1992 testimony before
Congress, a Justice Department witness stated that Civil Division
attorneys had spent approximately 20,000 hours investigating 150 qui
tam cases that subsequently were dismissed or abandoned;45' this total
did not include time spent by other government investigators, such as
employees of the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations. One source of the problem is that a
qui tam informer can file a wide-ranging complaint and let the
government do the investigation. If the government finds evidence of
fraud, the informer can claim a share of the recovery.452 If not, the
investigation has cost the informer little. The costs of a government
investigation matter a great deal to the public, however, because tax
dollars pay the salaries of law enforcement personnel.
b. Technical Violations
Judge Posner has noted that legal rules are often overinclusive
"because of the inherent limitations of foresight and ambiguities of
language.''453  The legislature cannot anticipate or express with
precision all of the circumstances that might warrant an exception to
a rule of general application, so it paints with a broader brush than
the public interest requires. Strict enforcement of an overinclusive
rule, Posner argues, can impose heavy social costs.4"+ This problem is
often addressed through "discretionary nonenforcement" by public
prosecutors.455 Such benevolent exercises of prosecutorial discretion
reduce the costs of overinclusion "without a corresponding increase
in underinclusion (loopholes)."4 6
449. See United States ex reL Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151
F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 1998) (approving the Justice Department's dismissal of qui tam
claims because "the government can legitimately consider the burden imposed on the
taxpayers by its litigation, and that, even if the relators were to litigate the FCA claims, the
government would continue to incur enormous internal staff costs"); Kovacic, supra note
107, at 1840.
450. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)-(b); United States ex reL Pratt v. Alliant Techsystems,
Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
451. See Gerson Testimony, supra note 416, at 25-26.
452. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (providing that the informer can "receive at least 15
percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the
claim").
453. POSNER, supra note 414, at 600.
454. See id-
455. See id.
456. IL Some commonplace examples of law enforcement discretion include situations
when "[t]he police overlook minor infractions of the traffic code" and when "building
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Such discretionary nonenforcement is impossible under a qui tam
statute, however, because prosecutorial discretion requires a
government "monopoly" of enforcement powers.457 In a system of
qui tam enforcement, an overinclusive statute is likely to be applied to
the outermost limits of its language. This overenforcement is a
consequence of the informer's conflict of interest. The Supreme
Court recognized both the problem and its source in Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer.458 Because qui tam informers
"are motivated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather
than the public good," they "are less likely than is the Government to
forego an action arguably based on a mere technical noncompliance
with reporting requirements that involved no harm to the public
fisC.1 4 59
The seventeenth century English case in which East Indies
merchants were sued under a statute regulating "garbling" of spices
illustrates the problem of prosecution for "technical" violations of a
regulatory command.460 The Privy Council ordered a stay of the case
after the merchants argued that they had satisfied the intent of the
statute and would be excessively burdened by compliance with its
literal terms."' This sort of argument may persuade a government
prosecutor who wishes to advance the statutory policies while
minimizing the costs imposed on the public. Conversely, the
argument is unlikely to influence a qui tam informer zealously
pursuing a bounty.462
The False Claims Act is a classic example of an overinclusive
statute. There is no question that Congress painted with a broad
brush. A defendant need not have a specific intent to defraud the
government to fall within the statute's reach; reckless submission of a
false claim suffices to trigger treble damages and civil penalties under
the Act.4 63 Moreover, many cases have held that a defendant can be
liable for FCA civil penalties even when the government has suffered
inspectors ignore violations of building code provisions that, if enforced, would prevent
the construction of new buildings in urban areas." Id.
457. See id.
458. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
459. Id at 949.
460. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
461. See PRIVY COUNCIL 1615-16, supra note 244, at 512, 512 (entry dated Apr. 30,
1616); supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
462. Similarly, Lord Coke accused qui tam informers of enforcing obsolete statutes that
remained on the statute books, but which no longer served their original purposes. See
COKE, supra note 200, at *191.
463. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1994).
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no damages, a rule that brings attempted-but unsuccessful-frauds
within the scope of the statute.' A defendant can also be liable even
if government officials knew about the circumstances that render the
claim false, a principle that allows application of the statute when
government employees play a role in the fraud.465 While such broad
rules of liability are explicable in terms of the statutory policies, the
synergistic effect of rules like these is to make the FCA applicable to
a broad range of conduct, some of which only tangentially relates to
the statute's purpose of preventing and punishing schemes to defraud
the United States Treasury.
The breadth of the FCA encourages qui tam informers to press
claims alleging technical statutory violations with little relation to the
statutory purposes. An example is offered by United States ex rel.
Hughes v. Cook,466 a case decided prior to the 1986 FCA
amendments. The informer sued nine doctors, claiming they had
violated the FCA in submitting claims for Medicaid reimbursement.4 67
The plaintiff's sole argument was that the doctors had not filed their
medical licenses with a state court in a timely fashion, allegedly
making the licenses void under Mississippi law.46 Of course, one can
imagine a scheme to defraud Medicaid by submitting claims for
services by unlicensed "doctors." But here the informer made no
claim "against the qualifications, credentials, ability or integrity" of
the defendants. 9 The district court granted summary judgment on
the ground, inter alia, that the defendants had not "knowingly"
defrauded the government,47 a defense that would be harder to
establish under the amended FCA, with its expanded definition of the
term "knowing."47
The 1996 case United States ex rel. Sanders v. East Alabama
464. See, e.g., United States ex reL Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d
1416,1421 (9th Cir. 1991) ("No damages need be shown in order to recover the penalty.").
465. See id. ("That the relevant government officials know of the falsity is not in itself a
defense.").
466. 498 F. Supp. 784 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
467. See id. at 785.
468. See id. at 785-86.
469. Id. at 785 (relating the informer's deposition testimony concerning one of the
defendant doctors).
470. See id. at 786-88. The court also based its decision on the fact that the medical
licenses were not void due to changes in the applicable state laws and that the informer
lacked authority to challenge the licenses. See id. at 788-89. Because these arguments
depended on the particulars of state law, they might be unavailable to other defendants
facing comparable FCA claims.
471. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1994); see supra note 463 and accompanying text.
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Healthcare Authority472 illustrates a similarly "technical" claim under
the amended FCA. There, the informer argued that the defendant
hospital failed to satisfy Medicare and Medicaid regulations because
it had improperly obtained a "Certificate of Necessity" from state
administrators, and that reimbursement claims submitted by the
hospital were therefore fraudulent.473 Deeming it irrelevant that the
government was not injured by the defendant's conduct, the court
concluded that a knowingly or recklessly false representation that the
defendant satisfied state licensing requirements could bring a claim
within the reach of the amended FCA.474 Such an FCA claim seems
far afield from the statute's purpose of protecting the United States
Treasury, especially in the absence of any injury to the government.475
From the informer's perspective, however, it makes little difference
whether a particular case is a wise application of the False Claims
Act.476 Any reckless misstatement in a document submitted to the
government might generate a bounty, whether or not the defendant
meant to defraud the public. 477
One consequence of the informer's financial incentive to
prosecute technical FCA violations is that those doing business with
the government must pay attention to minute and relatively
insignificant details of the federal government's procurement process.
Any failure to comply with the vast array of federal regulations
472. 953 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
473. See iL at 1407. The court stated that the plaintiff's claims were "based upon an
improperly obtained Certificate of Need ('CON') which allowed East Alabama
Healthcare Authority to operate and receive reimbursement for 106 additional beds at
East Alabama Medical Center." Id.
474. See id. at 1410-11. The court did not specify the precise licensing requirements at
issue; however, unless the requirements related to the quality of medical services
provided, it seems excessive to use the federal False Claims Act as an additional means to
enforce state licensing rules.
475. See supra notes 59-61, 383 and accompanying text.
476. Even if the Government suffered little or no damage from a defendant's conduct,
the informer still may have a strong financial incentive to sue for civil penalties under the
FCA. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,437-38,452 (1989) (noting that prior
to the 1986 amendments a defendant who submitted 65 false claims was liable for $130,000
in civil penalties, even though he overbilled the government by only $585 and the
government's actual damages were less than $16,000). For instance, an informer asserting
a defective licensing theory as in Cook or Sanders might be able to argue that thousands of
separate Medicare or Medicaid claims were technically "false" because each was based on
a false representation that the hospital or doctor was properly licensed. The FCA
provides a minimum penalty of $5000 and a maximum penalty of $10,000 for each
statutory violation. See 31 U.S.C., § 3729(a). Thus, even without any damages to the
government, the potential liability of the hospital or doctor on such a claim could be
enormous.
477. See supra notes 12, 102 and accompanying text.
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governing procurement might be the basis of a qui tam complaint.
Government contractors cannot count on the good sense of public
officials to distinguish rules that matter in a particular context from
rules that do not.478 As Professor Kovacic argues, contractors are
required to operate "strictly by the book."47 9 To avoid liability, strict
compliance is "essential even though the outlay of resources to attain
complete adherence to a specific regulatory command may
significantly surpass the value that the government derives from
having its suppliers follow that command scrupulously.""4  Moreover,
"[b]ecause the [FCA] treats grievous and trivial deviations from
regulatory commands alike, firms must structure their compliance
systems to obey all commands fully."'
Courts have responded to the problem of overly technical qui
tam claims through "judicially imposed" limitations on the scope of
the statute.4m For instance, in United States ex reL Lamers v. City of
Green Bay,4s an informer alleged that the city had made false
representations to the United States regarding a program to transport
schoolchildren on the city's federally funded public transit system.
The informer argued that the city had lied in repeatedly claiming that
the school routes were mere "extensions" of pre-existing routes,
which the city believed at the time to be required by federal
478. It could be argued that strict enforcement of government regulations by qui tam
enforcers will create pressure to eliminate inefficient procurement rules. This would not,
however, solve the problem of regulations that are only inefficient in particular settings.
In other words, there may be many regulations that are useful some of the time, but that
should be selectively relaxed in other circumstances. A public prosecutor can perform this
function, which Judge Posner calls "discretionary nonenforcement," POSNER, supra note
414, at 600, at little cost through judicious exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but a qui
tam prosecutor has a financial incentive to insist on strict compliance with every applicable
regulation.
479. Kovacic, supra note 443, at 233.
480. Id. at 219.
481. Id. at 223. Additionally, Professor Kovacic notes,
There may be numerous instances in which compliance with a nominal legal
command, either in the form of a statute or a regulation, may undermine rather
than enhance the public interest. Qui tam monitoring creates substantial hazards
for contractors who fail to abide scrupulously by nominal regulatory commands,
and it denies the government the ability to use prosecutorial discretion to
mitigate costs of ill-conceived regulatory controls.
Id. at 223. Professor Kovacic suggests that the costs imposed by qui tam enforcement of
the FCA tend to undermine recent government initiatives to introduce commercial
practices into the procurement process and encourage commercial firms to enter the
government contract market. See id at 201-04.
482. See, e.g., Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776,784-85 (4th
Cir. 1999) ("Liability under each of the provisions of the False Claims Act is subject to the
further, judicially-imposed, requirement that the false statement or claim be material.").
483. 168 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 1999).
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regulations. 4 The Seventh Circuit rejected this claim on the ground
that the city official in question was not lying, but "[a]t most ...
fudging."'  Moreover, "[e]ven if this was an outright lie," the
misstatement was not actionable because the city had misinterpreted
the regulations and the statement was in fact immaterial to the
funding decision.46 The court also rejected a separate claim by the
informer based on the city's 1994 certification of compliance with
program requirements. Even though federal regulators found
violations of applicable regulations not long after these assurances
were made, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that "minor technical
violations" see normal "for a new bus program, and they do not give
rise to an FCA claim."
Judicial limitations on FCA liability have the merit of weeding
out at least some overly technical FCA allegations. The cost of this
approach is a restriction in the scope of the statutory prohibition, a
cost Congress arguably attempted to avoid when it drafted the statute
broadly.4  Judicially imposed restrictions on liability increase the
government's burden in establishing an FCA violation, binding not
only qui tam informers, but the Justice Department as well.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit in Lamers appeared to struggle to
articulate a principled basis for its decision. Though "materiality" is a
familiar concept in the law, it is less clear how the court will develop
484. See id. at 1019.
485. Id.
486. Id. The Seventh Circuit's materiality requirement was borrowed from the Fourth
Circuit. See id. (citing United States ex reL Berge v. Board of Trustees, 104 F.3d 1453,
1459 (4th Cir. 1997)); see also Harrison, 176 F.3d at 784-85 (noting the requirement of
materiality in the Fourth Circuit). A materiality requirement was also recognized in Tyger
Construction Co. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 35, 55 (1993). But cf. United States ex reL
Costa v. Baker & Taylor, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (assuming but not
deciding whether the statute requires materiality).
487. Lamers, 168 F.3d at 1019; see also Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d
730, 733 (7th Cir. 1999) (interpreting Lamers to hold that "technical violations of a federal
regulation on which a claim is based do not make the claim 'false' "). The alleged
regulatory violations do seem relatively trivial. According to the Lamers court:
It is true that the City was having problems providing clear maps and uniformly
applying its "any corner is a stop" policy, as the FTA found in its 1995
administrative decision. In addition, there was evidence that the new [school]
routes caused public confusion and drivers waited longer than usual for
passengers at school routes.
Lamers, 168 F.3d at 1019.
488. Perhaps the Seventh Circuit did what the Supreme Court said should not be
done-partially "nullify" the FCA "because of dislike of the independent informer
sections," and in the process "exercise a veto power" that does not belong to the courts.
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 542 (1943); see supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
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its distinction between "minor technical" or "normal" regulatory
violations and those that give rise to an FCA claim. And there seems
very little promise in a rule making FCA liability turn on a judicially
perceived distinction between "fudging" and "lying." But a court
presiding over a system of qui tam FCA enforcement must either
restrict the scope of statutory liability in the manner of the Seventh
Circuit in Lamers or permit informers to parlay minor regulatory
defaults into treble-damage FCA claims.
c. Economically Harmful Prosecutions
Informers' insensitivity to the social costs of their prosecutions
also explains the pursuit of economically harmful qui tam actions by
English informers. William Hackett and his fellow informers, for
instance, were criticized for aggressively pursuing cases against
merchants in Wiltshire County causing the interruption of trade with
surrounding counties.419  Informers in 1620 interfered with the
shipment of grain throughout England, causing grain surpluses in
certain regions and shortages in others.490 In contrast, public
prosecutors are likely to refrain from filing prosecutions which could
result in such adverse economic impacts. But the informers' bounty
motivates them to ignore public economic interests that would be
affected by particular prosecutions.
3. Nurturing Unlawful Conduct
The interests of the public and those of informers also diverge
radically with respect to the "supply" of prohibited conduct.49' The
public adopts a regulatory command because it wants the proscribed
behavior to decrease. On the other hand, the informer makes a living
from the illegal conduct, and, therefore, the informer's interests are
advanced by an increase in the number and severity of statutory
violations.4 2
This aspect of the informer's conflict of interest explains
allegations of entrapment leveled against informers under English qui
tam statutes.4 93 In most instances, the public will be best served if
statutory enforcement efforts are directed at violations that would
489. See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
490. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
491. See POSNER, supra note 414, at 597-98 (discussing private enforcers' interest in
increasing the "supply" of offenders).
492. See id.
493. See, e.g., iL at 597 (noting that a private enforcer can increase the supply of
offenders through entrapment); supra notes 326, 335 and accompanying text.
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take place regardless of official encouragement.4 94 The informer may
be able to collect bounties more efficiently by manufacturing
statutory violations that otherwise would not occur. Thus, informers
under the English statute on retail liquor sales sometimes persuaded
persons to serve them alcohol for the purpose of bringing qui tam
suits. 495
This conflict between the interests of the public and the interests
of bounty hunters also helps to explain a problem that arose under an
English statute prohibiting farmers from drawing plows by their
horses' tails.496 Certain patentees had received a royal patent to
compound with Irish farmers who violated the statute. According to
the Privy Council, the patentees deliberately established a low fine,
"seeking rather to nourish then abolish that uncivle custome.' '49 7 The
public interest was in reducing the number of farmers mistreating
their horses. But the patentees were paid per infraction. Thus, to
increase their profits under the royal patent, they sought to encourage
violations of the statute, undercutting the deterrent purpose of the
legislation.
Two features of the FCA reduce the likelihood that informers
will engage in entrapment for the sake of bringing qui tam actions
under the statute. First, the statute imposes liability on one who
"causes" certain FCA violations.498 Consequently, an informer who
seeks to bring about a violation of the statute might wind up on the
wrong side of the qui tam enforcement process. Second, the FCA
permits the court to reduce the informer's bounty upon finding that
the informer "planned and initiated" the violation of the statute, and
it requires the informer's dismissal from the action without a bounty
upon conviction of a criminal offense "arising from his or her role in
the violation. ' 499 Thus, a court may deny some or all of the statutory
reward to an informer who instigated an FCA violation.
Although an FCA informer might be dissuaded from
494. An exception might be an instance when a person frequently violates a statute
without getting caught. In this circumstance, the public might benefit from official
encouragement of a violation, which then could serve as the basis for a prosecution.
495. See, e.g., supra note 326 and accompanying text.
496. See supra note 256.
497. PRIVY COUNCIL 1623-25, supra note 256, at 152,152 (entry dated Dec. 8,1623).
498. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (1994) (establishing liability for one who "causes"
presentation of a false claim); id. § 3729(a)(2) (establishing liability for one who "causes" a
false record or statement to be made or used to get a false claim paid); id. § 3729(a)(4)
(establishing liability for one who "causes" delivery to the government of less property
than is reflected in a receipt); id. § 3729(a)(7) (establishing liability for one who "causes" a
false statement or record to be made or used to avoid an obligation to the government).
499. Id. § 3730(d)(3).
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precipitating a violation of the statute, the informer's conflict of
interest can manifest itself by influencing the informer's conduct upon
discovering a fraudulent scheme. In the Sixth Circuit case United
States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Electric Co.," the
government intervened in a qui tam action and obtained a large
settlement from the defendant. The appeal arose from an award of
attorneys' fees to the informer, and the court remanded the case for
review of several issues, including one based on the claim that the
informer deliberately delayed filing his qui tam action for nearly
three-and-one-half years after the informer's initial consultation with
his attorneys.50 ' The defendant argued that the delay in filing suit was
a deliberate tactic by the informer to increase the government's
damages so that his bounty would increase proportionately. The total
dollar amount of false claims submitted as of 1987, when the informer
first contacted his attorneys, was $13.1 million.502 By the time the
informer actually filed suit, however, the damage to the government
had more than tripled, to $41.6 million, meaning that the informer's
potential bounty had tripled as well.03 The Sixth Circuit found the
defendant's claim sufficiently credible that it remanded for a district
court investigation of whether the informer "unnecessarily delay[ed]
sending his legal counsel the documents necessary for them to begin
assessing the merits of his claims" and whether the attorneys chose to
file the case "at the latest possible moment."504
The Sixth Circuit's suspicion of an intentional delay in filing suit
only arose because of the financial stake offered to the informer
under the statute. A public prosecutor who obtained solid evidence
of a continuing fraud upon the treasury would be expected to file suit
quickly to staunch the hemorrhaging of public funds. The informer,
however, is paid based on the amount of fraud he proves. Thus,
assuming no competing informers are on the horizon, it is in the
informer's financial interest for the government to be damaged to the
greatest extent possible before the scheme is brought to light.
500. 41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994).
501. See iL at 1043-44. The attorneys representing the informer conceded that they
first met with their client in mid-1987. See idi at 1043. At that time, they allegedly
received no documentation and did not even know the informer's real name. See id- The
informer supposedly provided documentation to support his claims in July 1989. The law
firm then conducted its own investigation and filed suit in November 1990. See id. The
informer's explanation of the delay was that he feared a "powerful and ruthless" Israeli
general involved in the fraud. Id at 1037.
502. See id. at 1038.
503. See id at 1038-39.
504. Id at 1044.
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4. Qui Tam Actions by Government Employees
A number of courts have permitted qui tam actions by employees
of the government, even when the information underlying the fraud
claim was acquired on the job.5  In such cases, the government
informer has essentially the same financial incentives as a private
informer. Thus, like a private citizen, the government informer has
an incentive to pursue technical FCA claims, where the social costs of
enforcement outweigh the benefits to the public. Likewise, the
government employee has an incentive to look the other way when he
discovers fraudulent conduct, so as to increase his potential recovery
in a subsequent FCA action. The government informer faces an
additional layer of potentially conflicting interests, however, beyond
those present for a private relator. Pursuit of the largest possible
recovery in a qui tam action may conflict not only with the informer's
role as a representative of the public in the litigation, but also with
duties owed to the public as a result of the employment
relationship.5°
The conflict of interest becomes most acute when a qui tam
action is pursued by an employee whose job description includes the
detection and prevention of fraud upon the government. In this
circumstance, it is quite likely that the financial incentives created by
the FCA will lead to malfeasance on the job. For instance, the
informer may conceal fraudulent conduct of contractors until he has
505. See United States ex reL Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1494 (11th Cir.
1991) (holding that the False Claims Act does not prohibit a government employee from
filing a qui tam action based upon information acquired while working for the
government); United States ex rel Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d
1416, 1417 (9th Cir. 1991) (allowing a suit by an Assistant District Counsel for the Army
Corps of Engineers based upon information gathered during his period of employment);
United States ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 760 F. Supp. 72,72 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (permitting a suit
by the commissioner of local housing authority that administered federal funds based on
information obtained in that position); United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp.
1158, 1159 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (allowing a suit by a Special Agent of the Office of Inspector
General of the Department of Health and Human Services upon information obtained in
government employment); Erickson v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp.
908, 919 (E.D. Va. 1989) (allowing suit by Agency for International Development
employee based on information acquired during his employment). See generally BOESE,
supra note 446, at 4-20 to -27 (discussing qui tam provisions and their application to
government employees).
506. See Hanifin, supra note 19, at 608-15 (noting various conflicts between the
interests of informers and the job responsibilities of a government employee, including an
informer's interest in permitting fraud to continue to increase the size of the potential
recovery); Wallace, supra note 19, at 21 (noting a conflict of interest, especially if a
government employee stays on job after filing a qui tam action); Theis, supra note 19, at
244-45 (noting the conflict of interest for a government employee informer and the
possible effect on job performance).
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had time to initiate a qui tam case. Even if the informer is scrupulous
in performing all job responsibilities, the public arguably is forced to
pay twice for the same services.5°7 One significant function of the qui
tam bounty is to compensate the informer for disclosing evidence of
fraudulent conduct.5 8 In the case of a government fraud investigator,
however, the public has already paid for that disclosure through the
employee's salary. Perhaps for these reasons, two federal appellate
courts, on different theories, have barred qui tam claims pursued by
government employees responsible for protecting the public from
fraud.5 °9
V. A SUGGESTED STATUTORY REFORM
The analysis to this point has suggested that qui tam statutes,
including the FCA, create an inherent conflict of interest. The
informer is expected to represent the public in litigation, but is given
a personal financial interest in the outcome of each case that conflicts
with various public values affected by the enforcement process.510
The bounty provision motivates the informer to maximize his
financial recovery, even if the litigation is harmful to the community.
As a result, statutes like the FCA remove the societal and individual
protections afforded by dispassionate exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.' The informer's conflict of interest under the FCA has
manifested itself most plainly in "declined" cases, where the informer
conducts the litigation on the government's behalf without the
participation of the Department of Justice.512 The question is how the
conflict of interest should be addressed.
One way to address the informer's conflict of interest is to follow
507. See Hanifin, supra note 19, at 614-15 (noting the double payment problem); Theis,
supra note 19, at 244-45 (discussing the effect of qui tam suits on the conduct of
investigations by government employees).
508. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
509. Both courts found that the government employee was not an "original source" of
the information forming the basis for the suit under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (1994). In
United States ex reL LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), the First Circuit
held that a quality assurance specialist for the Defense Contract Administrative Service
did not have "independent knowledge" of information acquired during his employment.
Id. at 20. In United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 1995)
(en banc), the Ninth Circuit reached the same result on the theory that an auditor within
the Department of Energy Office of Inspector General was compelled to report fraud to
his superiors as part of his job and, therefore, had not disclosed the information
"voluntarily." Id. at 741.
510. See supra notes 393-410 and accompanying text.
511. See supra notes 429-90 and accompanying text.
512. See, e.g., supra notes 416-20 and accompanying text (discussing the allocation of
settlement proceeds in declined cases).
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the approach of the English Parliament. 13 Congress simply could
eliminate the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, along with
the other qui tam provisions scattered throughout the United States
Code.514 Following the English lead in eradicating this English legal
transplant would be consistent with the principle-vigorously
maintained in other contexts-that governmental powers should not
be exercised for the sake of private gain. 15 On the other hand, the
qui tam provisions of the FCA probably have served a valuable
purpose in prompting disclosures of fraudulent conduct. Since 1986,
the government has recovered $2.698 billion in qui tam cases that the
Justice Department entered or "otherwise pursued," of which $409.8
million was allocated to the informers.516 Some of the approximately
$2.29 billion net recovery by the Treasury in these cases doubtless
would have been recovered without a qui tam enforcement
mechanism, but it is also likely that the statutory bounty induced
disclosures of fraudulent conduct that otherwise would have
remained hidden. Therefore, it is worth considering whether a
modification of the statute could preserve the principal advantages of
qui tam litigation while addressing the consequences of the informer's
conflict of interest.
Many of the more serious abuses of qui tam litigation could be
eliminated by introducing a disinterested exercise of prosecutorial
discretion into the enforcement process.5 17  This could be
accomplished by modest tinkering with the statute to eliminate the
informer's right to pursue declined cases.518 Currently, the FCA
513. See supra notes 348-78 and accompanying text (discussing Parliament's abolition
of qui tam legislation).
514. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing other federal qui tam
statutes).
515. See supra note 394, 399-405 and accompanying text.
516. See Wiener E-mail, supra note 10.
517. One circuit court has held that the government can intervene in an FCA case and
dismiss the action over the objection of the relator. See United States ex rel. Sequoia
Orange Co. v. Strathmore Packing House Co., 151 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 1998). If so, then
the FCA permits the Justice Department to exercise a sort of affirmative prosecutorial
discretion by intervening to shield particular defendants. The Justice Department
apparently has exercised this power on only one occasion, in Sequoia Orange Co.; the
Justice Department's behavior is, of course, not at all surprising given the political risks of
appearing to "protect" those who are accused of "defrauding the government." Even if a
power of occasional intervention for the purpose of dismissal is consistent with the FCA, it
leaves unchecked the informer's conflict of interest in the vast majority of declined cases.
Such a power is no substitute for a systemic incorporation of prosecutorial discretion into
the FCA enforcement scheme.
518. Eliminating prosecution of declined cases quite possibly would produce a net
financial benefit to the United States Treasury and, in any event, would entail no major
sacrifice by the public. The recoveries since 1986 in qui tam cases pursued by the Justice
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requires the informer to file the qui tam action under seal and serve
the complaint, along with a written disclosure of the informer's
evidence, on the Department of Justice.519 The Justice Department
then conducts an investigation and decides whether to intervene to
assume control of the litigation.520 If the Justice Department elects
not to intervene, the current statute permits the informer to continue
litigating the declined case without the Justice Department's
participation. Under the proposed reform, the statute would
mandate dismissal without prejudice of cases over which the Justice
Department elected not to assume control.5' FCA claims, then,
would be litigated only with the approval and participation of career
public servants lacking a financial interest in the litigation process. 523
Such a modification of the statute would address many of the
Department have been $2.698 billion, but the total for FCA recoveries in declined cases
has been only $189 million, which should be further discounted to reflect the 25% or more
that must be paid out in bounties. See Wiener E-mail, supra note 10; see also supra note
420 (discussing recoveries in declined cases). The much larger recoveries in cases pursued
by the Justice Department suggest that the department has done a good job of selecting
qui tam cases with a high probability of success. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 197
(concluding that "the Justice Department is an effective judge of quality" and citing an
average recovery of $8 million in cases pursued by the DOJ versus a $30,000 average
recovery in declined cases).
While recoveries in declined cases have been relatively small, a high percentage of
those cases has been dismissed without any recovery. See Wiener E-mail, supra note 10
(stating that 1173 out of 1661 declined cases (70.6%) were "[d]ismissed, no recovery," that
40 cases were "[i]nactive," and that the status of 67 cases was "[u]nclear"); supra notes
437-38 and accompanying text. Because a cost-reimbursement contract requires the
public to reimburse a portion of the legal costs incurred in successfully defending an FCA
action, public payments to contractors for defense of declined cases probably have
exceeded the public's recovery in cases involving such contracts. See supra notes 446-47
and accompanying text (discussing recovery of qui tam defense costs under federal
regulations).
519. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1994).
520. See id. § 3730(b)(4).
521. See id. § 3730(c)(3).
522. Essentially the same statutory modification was advocated in a recent interview by
John T. Boese, who has written a practitioner's guide on qui tam actions and has defended
a large number of clients sued under the FCA. See BOESE, supra note 446; Peter
Aronson, Critics Gripe at Suits, Claiming U.S. Is Cheated Out of Billions, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
9, 1999, at Al (stating that Boese has indicated that the "law should be changed so that if
the government decides not to intervene, the case is dismissed").
523. If the government later attempted to sue the defendant on grounds previously
alleged in a dismissed qui tam action, the informer's right to a bounty could be preserved
statutorily. A personal claim by the informer, such as a claim for wrongful termination,
could be permitted to continue notwithstanding the dismissal of FCA claims. Personal
claims are not pursued on behalf of the public and, thus, do not create a conflict of
interest. If the informer was still employed by the defendant and the Justice Department
chose not to intervene, the court could be authorized to maintain the file of the case under
seal to protect the informer against adverse repercussions in the workplace.
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problems observed in qui tam enforcement in England and in this
country. With respect to the initiation of litigation, no FCA claim
would be pursued unless a government official concluded that the
prosecution would advance the public interest. The Justice
Department could decline prosecutions where the social costs of
enforcement seemed to outweigh any benefits to the public. For
instance, overly technical claims based on minor violations of
regulatory requirements probably would not be pursued. Speculative
claims without substantial evidentiary support would be less likely to
go forward, particularly in cases involving cost-reimbursement
contracts under which the government might have to pay a portion of
the defense costs. Participation of the Justice Department would also
protect the interests of the public in the settlement process because
informers and defendants could not allocate settlement proceeds to
personal claims of the informer unless government prosecutors
agreed to the allocation. 4
The proposed modification of the False Claims Act would
preserve the primary benefits of qui tam enforcement in this context
and would satisfy to a large extent the congressional concerns that
underlay the expansion of qui tam enforcement in 1986. The
principal advantage of qui tam litigation has been the creation of
incentives to disclose fraudulent conduct.5 5  Under the proposed
modification to the statute, these financial incentives would remain.
The informer could file a case under seal and, if the Justice
Department elected to intervene, the informer would be entitled to
share in the proceeds.
The proposed statutory modification could also address
Congress's other reasons for passing the FCA amendments. One
stated congressional justification for the 1986 FCA amendments was
the concern that the Justice Department was unwilling to pursue
fraud claims aggressively.5 26 To some extent, such conflicts between
the executive and legislative branches are a natural byproduct of a
system of separated powers. Having a disinterested prosecutor
evaluate the merits of a case before extensive defense costs are
524. The modification would not eliminate all potential for blackmail. An informer
still might seek a payment from a potential defendant in exchange for the informer's
silence. However, the incentives for extortionate conduct would be reduced to the level
that exists in the case of a purely public enforcement process.
525. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's desire to
encourage whistleblowers).
526. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing congressional distrust
of the Justice Department's willingness to pursue FCA claims).
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incurred is advantageous from the standpoint of individual liberty
even if legislators are frustrated by perceived executive inaction. To
the extent Congress had a legitimate concern about
underenforcement of the False Claims Act, the proposed statutory
modification would permit more effective congressional oversight of
the enforcement process. Each time the Justice Department refused
to prosecute a qui tam case, a documentary record would be created
of the informer's allegations and the supporting evidence. Congress
could hold periodic oversight hearings forcing the executive branch to
justify refusals to prosecute particular qui tam cases when the
evidence of fraud seemed compelling. The threat of adverse publicity
and congressional control over agency budgets should be sufficient
tools to promote vigorous enforcement of the FCA.
The other congressional concern motivating the 1986 FCA
amendments-a lack of government enforcement resources-should
be less of a problem under the FCA than in other statutory
contexts 27 Congress has the ability to appropriate funds for
additional prosecutors and investigators. If a significant pool of
meritorious but unprosecuted FCA cases exists, additional damage
and penalty awards should more than cover the salaries and expenses
of new enforcement personnel. The inability to cover these costs
would cast serious doubt on any claim that the statute was being
underenforced.
In any event, the proposed statutory modification could permit
private supplementation of government resources. While the
Department of Justice would have control over FCA litigation,
informers and their attorneys still would be permitted to participate.
The Department of Justice could rely on the informers' attorneys as
adjunct prosecutors, having them take depositions, answer discovery,
or perform appropriate investigative tasks.5"
527. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (discussing congressional concern
over limitations on FCA enforcement resources).
528. Assuming that Congress chooses not to make significant changes to the qui tam
provisions of the FCA, it might still adopt minor statutory changes-some of them
recommended by those who commented on this Article-to address particular
manifestations of the informer's conflict of interest. For instance, the informer's incentive
to reduce the public's recovery by allocating settlement dollars to personal claims could be
countered by codifying the holding of Searcy v. Philips Electronics North American Corp.,
117 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1997). There, the court held that voluntary dismissal of an FCA
claim over the Justice Department's objection was impermissible, arguably giving the
Department something akin to a veto over settlements in declined cases. See id. at 160.
The informer's incentive to delay filing a qui tam suit could be addressed by fixing the
bounty at the time the fraud was discovered or, perhaps, by adopting a shorter statute of
limitations for qui tam cases. Government employees could be disqualified from pursuing
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CONCLUSION
The essential underlying problem with qui tam statutes is
apparent in the longer Latin phrase that gives rise to the name. The
informer sues "on behalf of the King as well as for himself." '5 29 But
the interests of the "King"-or the public in our system of
government-are not coextensive with those of a financially
motivated private informer. This conflict is the lesson of the English
history of qui tam enforcement, as well as the more recent experience
under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act. If we are not to
follow the example of the English Parliament in abolishing qui tam
legislation, we would be wise to modify the False Claims Act to
incorporate a systematic exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the
Department of Justice. In this manner, we can preserve the primary
advantages of qui tam litigation while protecting the public and
individual defendants from the most harmful consequences of the
informer's conflict of interest.
qui tam actions through a minor modification of the statute.
529. See supra notes 3, 41-42 and accompanying text.
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